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Models are developed to study the readiness and
subsequent combat performance of an air-interceptor squadron
facing sudden attack. These models necessarily link combat
with logistics. The models are mainly analytical and not a
Monte Carlo simulation, and can be used to indicate the
optimal weapon system to be procured and to study the effect
of peacetime decisions on combat outcomes. The logistics
models use the matrix-geometric approach to study the
general multivariate repairman problem, with the possibility
of simultaneous component failures. A repairman assignment
problem is formulated and solved using a multivariate
continuous-time Markov decision process. Surprise scenarios
are analyzed and represented explicitly. Air-to-air combat
is modelled as a transient multivariate continuous-time
discrete-state Markov process. Diffusion theory is used to
approximate the solutions. The reason for using diffusions
is ease of interpretation and computational economy. A
comparison with simulation results shows that diffusion
yields good approximations. Improvement to the diffusion
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Defense decision makers face a difficult planning and
management task: assuring that their peacetime decisions
result in maximum effectiveness of their combat units in a
wartime environment. It is apparent that the defense deci-
sions made today have great impact on a nation's security in
the future
.
Since the end of World War II, the primary emphasis of
logistics modelling has been to minimize cost under peace-
time conditions. This is a consequence of a long period of
relatively universal peacetime conditions; the enormous cost
of modern sophisticated weapon systems; the long lead times,
from the procurement to actual deployment, of these systems;
and the general reduction in defense budgets over the years
(with the exception of the most recent historical period)
.
As a result, the logistics component of military resource
requirements is becoming increasingly costly, with control
loosely related to operational performance. Furthermore, it
is highly vulnerable to military budget cutting (Drezner and
Hillestad, 1982)
.
Defense decisions must be objectively oriented. Unin-
structed and unaided intuition alone is insufficient.
Models must be a part of the decision-making process.
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Drezner and Hillestad (1982) point out that, as a result of
economic emphasis, and lack of distinct relationships to the
operational performance, models are constructed around
peacetime efficiency, by considering systems and policies
that are based on least-cost peacetime alternatives. Rich,
Stanley and Anderson (1984) point out that logistics
planning must now more directly and explicitly consider
wartime threats and activities. In their words:
The weapon system development community should develop
analytical approaches and tools to evaluate trade-offs in
operating concepts founded on alternative basing and sup-
port arrangements. Moreover, a weapon system's support
characteristics should receive increased emphasis and
clearer articulation in the formal expression of system
requirements in the design and development stage. That
emphasis must be matched by a more concerted use of logis-
tics capability assessment models during concept formula-
tion and advanced development and by earlier testing and
evaluation aimed at uncovering the correcting weapon sys-
tem support characteristics that could limit the system's
combat effectiveness.
We endorse the above views, and believe that the models
constructed and analyzed in this thesis provide a step in
the indicated direction.
The main objective of this thesis is to develop analyti-
cal models that will assist in making decisions regarding
the design or procurement and operation of a defensive
weapon system.
This thesis analyzes an air defense weapon system, in
particular an air-interceptor squadron, and constructs
combat-logistics models for its performance. In general
11
these models or their extensions can be applied to other
types of weapon systems and warfare scenarios.
B . BACKGROUND
We start by describing the characteristics of the real
problem facing the defender, sketching the main features we
choose to model, and stating the decision problems we
address in this thesis.
The real problem as faced by the defender consists of
the following components:
(a) Threat : There exists the possibility that the enemy
will carry out a hostile air attack against a small
country (or region) with a single defending air base.
(b) Air Defense System : In order to defend the country
from a hostile air attack, the defender needs to de-
sign (or procure) and operate an air defense system.
The air defense system is to consist of an air-
interceptor squadron, short-medium range surface-to-
air missiles (SAM) , an early warning system, communi-
cation command and control (C 3 ) system, and an
intelligence system.
(c) Early Warning System : The early warning system con-
sists of a long-range ground-based radar with identi-
fication friendly or foe (IFF) capability. The
system perhaps uses information obtained from an air-
borne warning and control system (AWACS) operated by
friendly forces.
(d) Intelligence System : Intelligence information can be
provided by monitoring enemy movements and deploy-
ments, monitoring enemy military training activities
and their military communications. Analysis of the
information obtained provides expectations about
enemy intentions.
(e) Logistics Systems : The logistics system consists of
repair shops and a supply depot. Each repair shop is
specialized in repairing a certain type of module,
e.g. , engine, radar, airframe, etc. Each shop is
assigned a certain number of "repairmen." We use the
term "repairmen" to stand for repair units; the
12
limitations on the units' capacity for work may
actually be instrumentation, tools, or the availa-
bility of spare parts. The supply depot is provided
on base.
The air interceptor squadron is assigned peacetime mis-
sions, such as training and reconnaissance. The equipment
on the interceptor is susceptible to failure during such
(essential) operations. Thus some of the air-craft assigned
to the squadron may not be available at a given moment.
The logistics system is responsible for maintaining
maximum aircraft readiness; the aircrew, the C 3 , and the
early warning systems assist in causing maximum destruction
to enemy bombers. Clearly, there is a need for models that
are capable of answering questions concerning the
effectiveness of new weapon systems in combat, and of
analyzing the tradeoffs between the various components of
the weapon system. The combat-logistics models presented
here contribute to fulfilling this need.
This research constructs and analyzes some combat-
logistics models for the air-interceptor squadrons. The
combat-logistics models integrate logistics models with
combat models.
The objectives of combat-logistics modelling are:
(i) to determine the optimal weapon system: given a
specific threat, what is the optimal weapon system
to be procured in order to optimize a certain
measure of effectiveness (MOE) in combat? This
question is to be answered with consideration paid
to budget, manpower and storage space limitations.
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(ii) to provide an approach for evaluating the effects of
changes in the logistics system (in non-combat





The approach chosen for developing the combat-logistics
model is:
1. To analyze the aircraft squadron logistics system and
construct analytical models to represent it.
2. To model and analyze the effect of considering differ-
ent surprise scenarios.
3. To develop analytical air-to-air combat models that
can represent the type of combat the squadron is ex-
pected to undergo in case of enemy attack.
4. To integrate the models constructed in (1) and (2)
with the combat models constructed in (3) above, and
use mathematical programming techniques to optimize
the effectiveness of the squadron subject to antici-
pated "real life" conditions and cost constraints.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
Our interest is mainly in the analytical side of the
general problem outlined, and we review some of the work
that has been done on related problems.
Multi-echelon inventory problems have recently received
considerable attention by logistics analysts. This is
because the multi-echelon problem captures many logistics
factors such as: the effect of component shortages on
weapon system availability, the stockage levels at the
supply depot, repair capability, the existence of appropri-
ate and reliable test equipment, manpower, and transporta-
tion. Zangwill (1966) developed a deterministic model to
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determine the optimal production schedule for a multi-
product, multi-facility production and inventory problem.
Sherbrooke (1968) took a major step in analyzing multi-
echelon supply systems by developing the Multi-Echelon
Technique for Recoverable Items Control (METRIC) , which is
an analytical model of a base-depot supply system. The
METRIC model assumes that the item demand is a stationary
compound Poisson process with a mean value estimated by a
Bayesian procedure. A failed item is repaired on base with
probability g, or sent for depot repair with probability 1-
3. If an item is sent for depot repair, the base gener-
ates a resupply request on the depot. The model assumes no
lateral resupply between bases. The model minimizes the
expected backorders for any system investment, and computes
the optimal redistribution of stock.
Muckstadt (1973) extended the results of METRIC to
incorporate a multi-indenture (subcomponents of components)
relationship. Mod-METRIC computes both base and depot spare
stock levels for all items and all indenture levels.
A further extension of METRIC, which considers non-
stationary demand processes, is the Dyna-METRIC model, see
Hillestad (1982) . For a description of Dyna-METRIC from a
logistician 1 s perspective, the reader is referred to Pyles
(1984) . The Dyna-METRIC model assesses the contribution of
the components 1 support processes to wartime aircraft
availability and sortie rate.
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Drezner and Hillestad (1982) point out that a major
weakness of work in the logistics area for military applica-
tions is the lack of consideration of the weapon system
availability and capability. The use of backorder measures
for determining stockage levels does not consider the
importance of the various components of the weapon systems.
Backorder measures are common in the METRIC family of
models.
We now mention several features of the maintenance
activity that can be incorporated into our logistics models.
One widely used method of increasing operational availa-
bility is to cannibalize weapon systems, substituting good
components from one downed aircraft to prevent another air-
craft from becoming unavailable. However, this area has
received little attention in the literature, although the
situation of full instantaneous cannibalization was
considered (see Fisher and Brennan (1986)). A pioneer work
for modelling cannibalization is by Hirsch, Meisner and Boll
(1968) . The most recent work in this area is by Fisher and
Brennan (1986) , where several cannibalization policies are
compared using simulation. Our study includes consideration
of cannibalization strategies.
Logistics models are evolving toward the wartime support
aspects of logistics but more relevant measures of military
performance must be considered. Rich (1986) points out that
we cannot be satisfied with such measures as aircraft
16
availability and sortie generation capability. Instead, we
need to focus on measures of system output such as targets
killed. The observation has helped motivate the research
reported in this thesis.
A problem that currently faces defense decision makers
is the extensive specialization, and the resulting size, of
the maintenance force. An F-16 wing, for example, includes
1089 support personnel organized into 23 different special-
ties; see Rich, Stanley and Anderson (1984). This situation
leads to vulnerability of the forces being supported and
stresses manpower resources. An alternative that decision
makers usually consider is cross training of the maintenance
personnel so that they become generalists, i.e., capable of
repairing more than one type of system (e.g.
,
propulsion
system, hydraulic system, fuel system, etc.). This alterna-
tive becomes more attractive as the technology evolves, and
systems are designed to be more modular. Increasingly,
repairs at the base level consist of fault detection and
replacement of the faulty modules. The faulty modules are
then sent to the depot for actual repair.
Rich, Stanley and Anderson (1984) also point out that
combat forces must be able to operate in forward areas with
minimal support resources. This means streamlining the
flightline workforce by training and using maintenance
generalists.
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If the above alternative is employed, then one of the
major questions that will face the decision makers is: how
to manage the maintenance force so that the air-interceptor
squadron readiness is sustained at the maximum possible
level? Chapter III of this thesis addresses this question
by searching for an optimal repairmen assignment policy that
maximizes the expected number of aircraft ready to engage in
combat. We do this by formulating the problem as a
multivariate-continuous-time Markovian decision process.
Recently, Szarkowicz and Knowles (1985) considered the
problem of determining optimal operating policies for an
M/M/S queueing system. The system state is represented by a
bivariate vector, the first component is the number of
customers in the system, and the second component is the
number of active servers. They used a continuous time
Markov decision process formulation to obtain an optimal
control policy for the number of active servers; the cost
structure includes customer holding and server operating
costs as well as a linear switching cost.
The problem that Sparkowicz and Knowles analyzed differs
from our problem, since we consider more than one type of
item to be repaired, and we need to have an item of each
type to be operational in order to have an operational
aircraft.
18
For more work related to this area, the reader is
referred to Howard (1969), Zuckerman (1986), Jo (1984),
Crabill (1972) and Miller (1968a), (1968b) and (1969).
To consider the effect of the logistics system and the
allocation of fixed monetary resources to competing but
interrelated demands (such as, spares, test equipment,
personnel, etc.) on the combat outcome of the weapon system,
we need to consider the combat process explicitly in the
model.
In order to keep the model analytically attractive, we
chose to represent the logistics system at a lower level of
detail than the METRIC family of models, and to introduce
the combat model explicitly. The logistics model is there-
fore relatively simple. It presents only the most dominant
features of a combat-logistics process (i.e., the process
that the weapon system undergoes in peace and wartime
environments) . This research effort may be regarded as a
prototype of a large family of more complete combat-
logistics models. Taylor (1980) points out that a simple
model may yield an understanding of important relations that
are difficult to perceive in a more complex model, and such
insights provide valuable guidance for higher-resolution
computerized investigations.
Since the combat model plays a role of the same
importance as the logistics model, an entire chapter of this
thesis is devoted to the combat model. In particular, our
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approach is to provide efficient computational methods to
obtain "exact" solutions to multivariate Markov models,
supplementing these with approximate, easily comprehended
approximations based on diffusions.
Recently, Taylor (1983) presented a comprehensive
treatise on Lanchester-type models for combat, i.e.,
differential-equation models of attrition in force-on-force
combat operations in which both deterministic and stochastic
models for combat are considered. Taylor (1983) states,
"combat is anything but a deterministic process." Thus, in
order to incorporate the random nature of combat into the
model, the combat process must be represented by a stochas-
tic process. Combat analysts tend to represent the combat
process probabilistically by Markov processes; see for
example, Taylor (1983) , Kimble (1970) , Clark (1969) , and
Bhat (1984)
.
The most recent work done in this area is by Karmeshu
and Taiswal (1986) , where they incorporate the effects of
environmental fluctuations by regarding the parameters of
the problem as stochastic processes.
Feigin, Pinkas, and Shinar (1984) proposed a simple
Markov model for the analysis of many-on-many air combat.
The model is a four variate-Markov process where the state
variables are: the number of free blue planes, the number
of free red planes, the number of pursuing blue planes, and
the number of pursuing red planes. Their solution approach
20
was to construct and solve the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov
equations
.
We choose to model the air-to-air combat process by
generalizing the deterministic model so that some
probability statements can be evaluated. This can be done
by representing the combat process by a multivariate diffu-
sion process. We find that the diffusion-combat models
constructed in this thesis provide good approximations to
the corresponding Markovian-combat model. For the
definition, description and discussion of diffusion
processes the reader is referred to Karlin and Taylor
(1981) . For related work the reader should refer to the
papers of Iglehart (1965), McNeil (1973), Schach and McNeil
(1973), Gaver and Lehoczky (1975), (1977a), (1977b),
(1977c), (1979), and Gaver and Jacobs (1985).
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis models a problem that is complex and has
many factors to be considered. Therefore, we choose to
decompose the problem into components: a logistics problem,
and a combat problem; we then analyze each one separately,
build an analytical model for each, then integrate (or link)
the various models to evaluate the system effectiveness,
which is, in combat terms, some measure of "leakage" or
survivorship of the attackers. Each chapter analyzes and
develops a model for a specific subproblem. Chapter II
models the general repair system. Chapter III studies and
21
models the repairman assignment problem, while Chapter IV
studies and models the air-to-air combat problem. Chapter V
provides the approach for linking the logistics model to the
combat model. Figure (1.1) illustrates the general
structure of the thesis.
In the first part of Chapter II, we build a model of a
simple logistics system. We assume that each aircraft re-
quires a single module in order to be considered opera-
tional. The problem is modelled as a birth-and-death
process, and also as a closed migration process. A closed
form solution for the limiting distribution is presented.
This is a simplified version of the real problem; it serves
as a starting point or feasibility study.
The surprise phenomenon is then analyzed and classified
as total or partial surprise. Depending on what type of
surprise is considered, the squadron readiness probability
distribution is then computed. A simple example is provided
to illustrate the model.
In the second part of Chapter II, we generalize the
above model to represent a two-module logistics system;
i.e., it is assumed that each aircraft requires two opera-
tional modules (one of each type) in order for it to be
considered operational. We find that a simultaneous failure
mechanism must be introduced in order to have a realistic
representation. A simultaneous failure mechanism means that
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COMBAT-LOGISTICS MODELS (Chapter V)
* Single-module-combat-logistics:
Integrates 1ML with a combat model.
* Two-module-combat-logistics:
Integrates 2ML with a combat model.
Figure 1.1. Structure of the Thesis
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both modules failing is positive. The problem is formulated
as a bivariate birth-and-death process. To simplify the
computations the problem is then formulated so that it can
be presented in a matrix-geometric form. This is done by
adopting the arguments in Gani and Purdue (1984) and in
Gaver, Jacobs and Latouche (1984) . For an explanation of
the matrix-geometric formulation the reader is referred to
Neuts (1981) . The squadron readiness probability distribu-
tion for the two-module logistics system is then presented
for both types of surprise. This is followed by a simple
example to illustrate the technique.
In Chapter III, we hypothesize an operational logistics
scenario. The problem is a repairmen allocation problem,
where the repairmen are assumed to be general technicians
capable of repairing both types of modules. The mainte-
nance supervisor is interested in finding the optimal repair
policy that maximizes the squadron readiness. The problem
is formulated as a bivariate-continuous-time-Markov-decision
process. A one-to-one transformation of a multivariate-
Markov process to a univariate-Markov process is presented.
The transformation allows us to use the existing theory and
techniques for the univariate-Markov decision process to
solve a multivariate one. The problem is then solved by
dynamic programming and linear programming approaches. An
example to illustrate both approaches is given, followed by
24
a comparison and evaluation of the results of both
approaches.
In Chapter IV we discuss the characteristics of the air-
to-air combat and provide the following air-to-air combat
scenarios to be modelled:
(i) BCD Scenario : Both defenders and enemy bombers are
assumed to be vulnerable, and defenders spend some
time searching for a free enemy bomber. Once a free
enemy bomber is detected, it is then engaged by a
free defender. The one-to-one engagement is assumed
to continue until either a bomber or a defender is
killed. If the bomber is killed the defender once
again searches for a free bomber; the process
continues.
(ii) I Scenario : This scenario assumes that the
defenders are invulnerable. Only one free defender
can engage a free bomber, and the engagement is
assumed to be instantaneous; i.e., once a defender
becomes free, no time is spent searching for a free
bomber if one is available (perfect C 3 system)
.
This is the simplest situation; it is characterized
by a one-dimensional Markov chain.
Both of the above scenarios implicitly assume that the
enemy bombers arrive in combat simultaneously.
In the second part of Chapter IV, we construct and
analyze deterministic models for the above two scenarios.
Next we generalize the deterministic models by developing
diffusion models to represent the air-to-air combat. Simple
continuous-time discrete-state Markov models are then
constructed to represent the combat processes for the above
scenarios; the latter models are referred to as Markovian-
Combat models (of course the diffusions are an approximation
to these, and are themselves Markovian; the reason for using
diffusions is ease of interpretation and computational
25
simplicity) . The forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations for
these models are derived, as are their Laplace transforms.
Techniques for solving the Laplace transforms are presented.
In order to evaluate and compare the different
approaches, the Markovian combat process for the BCD
scenario is simulated. A large deviations equation for the
MOE, under the I scenario, is derived; for the large
deviations approach see Feller (1971) , and for applications
see Mazumdar and Gaver (1984)
.
Finally we present in Chapter IV some illustrations to
compare and analyze the combat models.
In Chapter V we study the entire combat-logistics
situation that confronts the decision maker. We then
present the model's basic concept and assumptions. The
problem is then formulated as a non-linear-integer mathe-
matical programming model.
We first examine the single-module combat logistics
(1MCL) model which is a result of linking the single-module
logistics model to a combat model, subject to budget and
operational constraints. The two-module combat logistics
(2MCL) model is next constructed as a generalization for
1MCL.
By way of illustration we present some examples for 1MCL
and 2MCL models using both the BCD and the I scenarios.
Some sensitivity analysis on the combat and logistics
parameters are also conducted.
26
We close our discussion in Chapter VI with a review of
the results obtained and their implications, and some
concluding remarks and recommendations for further research.
Two appendices are included to describe additional but
somewhat peripheral research related to the main emphasis of
the thesis.
Appendix A contains a discussion of the large deviations
technigue. A large deviations eguation for fixed, and
randomized, sums of independent and identically distributed
random variables is presented, followed by applications to
compound Poisson process and renewal processes. The
technigues have application to classical inventory control
problems. A proposed approach to minimize the large devia-
tions error is introduced, followed by an illustration of
the approach applied to the compound Poisson process.
In Appendix B, we generalize Lanchester's linear law by
developing a diffusion model. A simple continuous-time
discrete-state Markov model is then constructed to represent
the corresponding combat process.
27
II. OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter formulates and analyzes some operational
logistics problems. Logistics is an area that gives rise to
classical operational research problems which suggests that a
considerable body of work has been done in this area. Never-
theless, the linkage between combat models and logistics is
a research area that is ripe for further research. Particular
attention in this thesis has been directed towards the repair-
man problem. Feller (1971) defines the repairman problem, and
Kelley (1979) provides a closed product-form solution for the
single type module repairman problem. This chapter formulates
and solves a multivariate repairman problem with simultaneous
failure and consequent simultaneous demand for several resources
Gaver and Lehoscky (1976) formulated and analyzed a 2-module
repairman problem, wherein there was a number, a, of aircraft,
each requiring both types of modules, one of each, to operate.
When an aircraft fails it has conditional probabilities p, , p ?
and p, „ of being down due to a failure of Type 1, Type 2, or
both types of modules, respectively, where p, + p + p, ~ = 1.
This model assumed that an aircraft will be in repair until
the failed modules were repaired (i.e., the assumption indi-
cates that there were no spare modules assigned to the organi-
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The total number of Type 1 and Type 2 modules available






The maintenance commander is assigned 3 repairmen,
and every repairman is capable of repairing both
modules.
An aircraft is reported down with a rate X = 1 aircraft
per day.
The probabilities of an aircraft down due to module
failures of Type 1, Type 2 or both Types are P, = .4,
P
?
= .5, P, ~ = .1 respectively.
Modules of Type 1 and Type 2 are repaired with rates
y, = .5 and y„ = 1 modules per day.
A FORTRAN program has been written to compute the infini-
tesimal generator matrices, and create the output format
suitable for optimality analysis. The linear programming
was implemented using the LINDO interactive package. A
FORTRAN program to implement the dynamic programming approach
was written using the policy improvement technique. Appendix C
presents the computer listings for the programs.
The graph of the above system is shown in Figure (3.5)
where the repair rates are functions of the decision. The
infinitesimal generators Q for y - 0,1,2,3 are illustrated
in Figures (3.6), (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9) respectively. The
infinitesimal generators Q for any policy can now be calcu-
lated using the infinitesimal generators Q , y = 0,1,2,3.
This is done by picking the necessary rows from the four Q
matrices. For example, suppose the infinitesimal generator
for the policy







g(n) = f(n) + I q(n,m)V (3.19)
m=l
The set of equations (3.19) consists of (M-,+1) (M„+l) equations
with (M,+l) (M
2
+l) +1 unknowns ( (M, +1) (M2 +l) V ' s and 1 g).
Therefore set V..„ ,,.,,, ,,, = and solve for the rest.(M,+l) (M
2
+l)
Thus, for a given policy we can find the gain and the
relative values of that policy by solving the (M-,+1) (M~+l)





= 0.^ J (M, +1) (M2 +l)
The Policy- Improvement routine is then used to find a






Max f(n) + I q (n,m)V
y m=l ^
The optimal y will be the decision to be taken when in
state n; hence, a new policy has been developed. The proce-
dure is then repeated until g is maximized, i.e., when the
policies on 2 successive iterations are identical.
J. MODEL ILLUSTRATION
The following basic data were used as an example:
An aircraft requires 2 types of modules (e.g., engines
and communications) to be operational. Modules of Type
1 are engines and modules of Type 2 are communications
equipment
.
The squadron is assigned exactly 2 aircraft.
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The set of equations (3.16) is a matrix representation
of equations (3.15). The equations are a set of linear,
constant-coefficient differential equations that relate the
total reward in time t from a start in state n to the quanti-
































= f(n) + t I g(n,m)gm + I g(n,m)Vm
m=l m=l
(3.17)












(t+dt) = (l+q(n,n;dt) [f (n)dt+V
n
(t)]
+ I q(n,m)dtV (t) + o(dt)
/ III
npm





= f(n) + q(n,n)f(n)dt + q(n,n)V
n
(t)
+ I q(n / m)Vm (t)
n^m






|t vn (t) = f(n) + I q(n,m)Vm (t) (3.15)
m=l








Changing to vector notation, this becomes
g£ V(t) = F + Q V(t) (3.16)
where








= [f (1) ,...,£ (M-l+1) (M2+l)]
Q = infinitesimal generator.
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READ: f (n) (No. aircraft ready when
in n)
q (i,j) (infinitesimal rates)
I
For each state n determine a decision
d. that maximizes f (n)
Set all relative values V =
POLICY IMPROVEMENT: For each state n find the











Using the relative values V of the previous policy







VALUE DETERMINATION: Solve for all remaining
(M1 +l) (M 2+D -1 relative values Vn and the gain






g = f (n) + I q (n,m) V.
m=l m
If the policies on 2 successive
iterations are identical, stop.
Figure 3.4. Iteration Cycle Schematic (Howard, 1969
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The optimal policy can be found using the policy-iteration
method which consists of the value-determination operation and
the policy-improvement operation. Both operations can be
used recursively as shown in Figure (3.4), until the optimal
policy is found.
Let:
V (t) = Total expected reward the system will
earn in a time t if it starts in state
n
.
V (t+dt) can be related to V (t) by considering the
n n J 3
following transitions and rewards.
t t+dt reward probability
n n f(n)dt+V (t) 1 - j q(n,m)dtn
~in^m
(m^n) V (t) q(n,m)dt Vm^n
Therefore
,
V(t+dt) = (1 - I q(n,m)dt) [f (n)dt +V (t)]n / nn^m
But,





q(n,m) = rate of transition from state n to
state m.
r(n,m) = reward associated with the transition
from n to m.
Since there is no reward gained by transitioning from
state n to state m, r(n,m) = for n f m, and h(n) = r(n,n]
Hence, for the repair scheduling problem:
g =























Since at each state a decision has to be chosen from a
number of decisions, therefore it can be thought of as having
several Markov processes, and the objective is to know which
one yields the highest expected number of aircraft operational,
in the long run.
It is possible to describe the policy by a decision vector
F whose elements represent the number of the decision selected
in each state; i.e., the i element of the vector r indicates
the number of repairmen to be assigned to Shop 1 whenever
the process is in state i.
An optimal policy is defined to be the policy that maxi-
mizes the gain, or average return per transition.
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Number of constraints = 3112 constraints.
Therefore the 'practical' problems tend to be large
under this formulation.
I . DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH
The finite-state-continuous-time-Markov process being
analyzed has been shown to have a limiting distribution.
Therefore, the policy-iteration method for the solution of
the sequential decision process, developed by R. Howard
(Howard, 19 69), can be used.
Howard states that every completely ergodic Markov process
with rewards will have a gain, g, given by:
N




N = number of states
tt = limiting probability of being in state n
h(n) = expected immediate return in state n defined
by
:
h(n) = r(n,n) + J q(n,m)r(n,m) (3.13)
m^n
n = 1 , 2 , . . . ,N
where
134
y. This observation (Ross, 1983), allows us to solve the
linear program, and the solution will always have y as either
or 1.
The above formulated linear programming problem has
(M-l + 1) (M2 + l)+l = M1M2 + M, + M„ + 2 functional constraints.
Since the infinitesimal generator Q is of rank M, M~+M, +M-+1
,
there is a constraint that is linearly dependent on the other
constraints. Hence the problem has a single redundant con-
straint, and the number of constraints in the L-P can be
reduced at no loss by dropping one of the constraints (ii)
in the L-P.
The L-P can be solved by the simplex method, and its solu-
tion has some interesting properties (Ross, 1983). The solution
will contain (M,+l) (M
2
+ l) = NLNU+lVU+NU+l basic variables
tt (y) >_ 0. Since the repair policy was assumed to be sta-
tionary, the policy is deterministic, meaning that one and
only one decision will be chosen each time the process enters
any given state. It follows that only one tt (y*) > 0, while
the tt (y) = for y = 0,1,..., R, y ^ y*. Since the Markov
process is irreducible and since every state is positive
recurrent, it follows that tt (y*) > for n = 1 , 2 , . . . , (M-,+1) (JVU+J
Therefore, tt (y) > for exactly one y = 0,1,..., R, for each
n = 1,2, ... , (M-j^ + 1) (M2 + l) .
The L-P has (R+l) (M,+l) (M
2
+ l) decision variables. Suppose
that the problem at hand has M, = 50, M = 60, R = 20. Then:
Number of decision variables = (21) (51) (61) = 65,331 variables.
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^*(y), y = 0,1/- ../R, n = 1,2, . . . , (M1 +l) (M 2 +l) , that
maximizes the objective function and satisfies the constraints





max I I f(n)ir (y)















(ii) I I tt ( Y )q (n,m) =
n=l y=0 Y
m = 1,2, ... , (M-j^ + l) (M 2 + l)
(iii) i
n
(y) > Y = 0,1,2, . . . ,R
n = 1,2, ... , (M1 + l) (M 2 + l)
Since the objective function is a linear function of the
decision variable tt (y); and the constraints form a set of
linear equations, the above problem is a linear programming




is a nonlinear function of i and j , it is not a function of
TT ( v) •
n '
The value of tt (y) will dictate the value of y, where
if tt (y) > then the decision to be taken when in state n is
n '
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where: q(n,m) is the (n,m) element of the matrix Q, the
infinitesimal generator of the Markov Process; i.e., q(n,m)
is thought of as the rate from state n to state m. Therefore















2. I I Tr n (Y)q (n,m) = m = 1
,





(y) > y = 0,1,2,. ..,R n = 1 , , 2 , . . . , (M1 + l ) (M 2 + l
The long run expected number of aircraft that are opera-
tional is given by:
(Mj+1) (M +1)








I I f(n)TT n (Y|
n=l y=0











7T ( Y ) = TT. . (y) (3.10
n 1 , j
where
:
tt (y) = P{ state = n and decision = y)
n
These limiting probabilities were obtained from equations
(3.6) and (3.8)
.
From the law of total probability, we get:




= I TT n
( Y ) (3.11)
Y
Since tt is a limiting distribution, then tt is the
n J n











2. Y tt q(n,m) - m = 1 , 2 , . . . , (M-, +1) (M„ + l
n=l (the forward equations)
and
3. tt n = 1,2, . . . , (M,+l) (M + l) .















state for {Y (t) ,t >_ 0}
state for {X, (t)
,























Figure 3.3. The Transitions Flow for State (i,j














Figure 3.2. Transition Flow for the
Failure-Reoair Process
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y , be the total repair rate when the process is
in state n for Shop 1.
l_ip be the total repair rate when the process is


























i and j are given by equations (3.6) and (3.8).
Figure (3.2) shows the corresponding transition graph
for the process {Y(t),t >_ 0}. The transition for any state
(i,j) is shown in Figure (3.3) for any repair policy.
H. LINEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH
Let tt. (y ) be the unconditional limiting probability that
the system is in state (i,j) and decision y is made, that
is
:
it. . (y ) = Plstate = (i,j) and decision = y} ,1 r 3
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operating on the state space { 1 , 2 , . . . , (M, +1 ) (M„+l ) } . Hence,
if Y(t) = n then X, (t) = i, X~ (t) = j where i,j are given
by equations (3.6) and (3.8) respectively.




























i,j are given by Equations (3.6) and (3.8)
Let tt = lim P (t)
n m,n




(0) = iQ ,x 2 (0)
= j Q }
Using equations (3.3) to (3.5), the following was obtained
TT = TT .
n 1,3
Since tt . was shown to exist and is positive, therefore
it was concluded that tt will exist and is strictly oositive
n J '
(i.e., < tt < 1).
n
Let:


























































Various examples carried out for the various cases and
the above equations were found to give the correct corres-
pondence between the set N and the corresponding state space
S.
Therefore, it could be concluded that the set of equations
(3.9) allow us to transform a K-dimensional-continuous-time
Markov process operating on a finite discrete state space
to a univariate-continuous-time Markov process operating on
K
the finite state space N = {1,2,..., n (M.+l)}. This allows
j=l J
the analyst to carry out all necessary analysis on the uni-
variate-continuous-time-Markov process, using all existing
theorems and algorithms for the univariate process, and
then retransforming the results back to the K-dimensional
process using again the set of equations (3.9).
As shown above, in the case of bivariate Markov process,
knowing n, the corresponding state (i,j) can be determined
and vice versa, i.e., if (i,j) is known, then n can be
determined. With such observations the bivariate continuous-
time-Markov-process can be transformed into a univariate-
continuous-time-Markov-process . Define the stochastic
process {Y(t),t























































TIy - i 1 (M2+l)(M3+ l) - i2 (M3+l) - 1
i
4








































































- i. (M-+1) - 1
n












I i n (M.+D-i (3.9)
2 < m < K-l
K-l K
iK = n
- I i n (M +1) - 1
j=l J £=j+l *
Considering different values for K, we get the following
equations
:
For K = 2:










= n - i (M
2
+l) - 1

















+d (m 3 +i:
- 1
n






+l) (M,+l) + j (M-+1) + k + 1
Thus, the trivariate Markov process X(t), operating on
the state space S, can be transformed into the univariate
Markov process {Y(t),t
_> 0} operating on the state space N
by using the following equations:
n = i (M
2
+l) (M.+l) + j(M
3











M.+l " i(M2 +1) " X
k = n - i(M +l) (M-+1) - j(M. + l) - 1
Various trial runs have been conducted on the above
equations for both bivariate and trivariate Markov processes,
and found to be correct. This shows that a generalization
for a K variate-Markov process is possible, as shown below:
Consider a K -variate-continuous-time-Markov process
X(t) = {X, (t) ,X (t) , . . . ,X_,(t) ;t > 0} operating on the state
i- z is. —




, i, ) ; i . = 0,...,M.,j = 1 , . . . , K} . The1 z K 3 v 3
cardinality of the state space is H (M.+l).
j=l ]
K
Let N = {1,2,..., n (M.+l)}. Let n e N. Then
j = l 3
K-l K
n = I i. n (M +1) + i + 1
j=l 3 £=j+l x- "K
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Now, knowing both i and n, we need to determine j
If i = 0, then:
If n £ (M +1) then j =
If (M
3
+l) < n <_ 2(M
3





+l) < n ± (n 2 +l) (M 3 +l) then j = n.
















l (M +1) < n <_ [(M2+l)+n 2+l] (M3+l) then j
=
Hence: If i = 1, then j
Therefore
n








THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN N AND (I, J)




































j = 0, . . . ,M
2
;k = 0, . . . ,M }. Let N = {1,2, ... , (M-j+1) (M 2 + l) (M 3 + l) }
Let n t N, then we need to determine (i,j,k).
If n <_ (M2 + l) (M 3 + l) then i
=









+l) + j + 1 (3.7
j = n-i(M 9 +l) - 1 (3.8)
To illustrate the above, consider the case where M
1
= 2
and M„ = 3 . A graph of the state space is shown in Figure
(3.1), where each state is numbered by n and the corresponding
(i/j) values. Table (3.1) shows the correspondence between
n and (i,j) computed using equations (3.6) and (3.8). Examina-
tion of the table shows clearly the usefulness of equations
(3.6) and (3.8) .
1 2 3 41












9 10 11 12
(2.,0) (2,1 ) !,<!) (2,3)
Figure 3.1. A Correspondence Between n and (i,j)
To generalize the above mapping, we derive equations
similar to equations (3.6) and (3.8) for the case of a
trivariate-continuous-time Markov process.
Consider a Markov process X(t) = {X-^ ( t) ,X 2 (t ) , X 3 (t ) ; t > 0}




+ 1) < n <_ 3(M
2
+1) then i = 2
Hence, if n,(M
2
+ l) < n <_ (ru+1) (M2+l) then i = n.
The general form is
i(M
2
+l) < n < (i+1) (M
2
+l)









Note that i must be integer. Therefore: if

















where j~X~j is defined to the smallest integer >_ X, and |_Xj



























(t) ; t > 0}.
S = {(i,j): i = 0,1, . . .,M1 ;j = 0,1,... ,M2 ) .
The cardinality of the set.S is (M, +1) (M~+l) . When the process
is in state (i,j), there are f(i,j) = min{a ,M -i ,M~- j
}
operational aircraft. Therefore the commander's objective
stated mathematically is
:
max I f ( i , j ) tt . .
all y(i/j) (i,j)eS ±,J





To compute the optimal repair policy, two optimization
approaches will be used, linear programming and dynamic
programming
To simplify the notation, it may be observed that a
one-to-one mapping between the set N = {1 , 2 , . . . , (M-, +1 ) (M„+l ) }
and the set S can be defined. Figure (3.1) shows a corres-
pondence between N and S. Let n e N, and (i,j) e S. We
need to determine the values of i and j if n is known. We
note that,
if n < M o +1 then i =
and if NU + 1 < n <_ 2 (M +1) then i = 1
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All policies to be considered are stationary policies. That
is, whenever the process is in state (i,j), the decision to
be made is the same for all values of t.
The objective of the maintenance commander is to maximize
the squadron readiness, which will be measured, as stated
before, by the expected number of operational aircraft .
Alternative measures are possible, and may even be more appro-
priate. To obtain a mathematical expression for the commander's
objective, define the following:
P





(0) = m} (3.3)
Let p ^(t) = P f a <t) , then (3.4l j nm ,
l
j





i.e., it. . is the limiting probability of observing the
system to be in state (i,j).
All states of the Markov process defined by (3.2) com-
municate, so the Markov process is irreducible. Hence the
limiting distribution exists and is independent of the initial
condition. Since every state is a positive recurrent
state, the limiting probabilities ti . are all positive









If Shop 1, where repair of Type 1 module is conducted,
has R, repairmen assigned, where <_ R, £ R, then the transi-
tion probabilities are, to terms of order dt:
Probability





A min{a,M-, -i ,M
2
~j }dt
P 12 A min{a,M-,-i,M 2 -j }dt (3.2)




The above assumptions and formulation specify the sto-
chastic process {X, (t),X~(t),t ^ 0} as a bivariate Markov
birth-and-death process. The limiting probability exists
and can be found by solving a system of linear equations.
G. DECISION MODEL FORMULATION: A REPAIR POLICY
A repair policy is a rule for making decisions after
observing the system. The policies that are considered in
this study are the type of policies that depend only upon the
observed state of the system at time t, {X, (t),X~(t)}, and
the possible decisions available, where decisions can only
be taken when the state of the system changes. Therefore
each policy can be completely characterized by a vector that
prescribes the decision to be taken when the system is in
state (i,j), i = 0,1,..., M, ; j = 0,1,..., M~ . The components
of such a vector represent the number of repairmen to be
assigned to Shop Type 1 when the system is in state (i,j).
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F. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an aircraft squadron that consists of a number,
a, of failure-prone aircraft each susceptible to failure from
one or both of two causes. Let A denote the overall Markovian
failure rate of an individual aircraft, and let P, denote the
conditional probability that a failure requires just Type 1
(e.g., engine) repair, P» the conditional probability that the
failure is of Type 2 (e.g., communications) and P, _ the condi-
tional probability that both Type-1 and Type-2 failures occur.
Thus, P-, + P~ + P, ~ = 1 , and the sequence of successive failure
types is one of independently and identically distributed
random variables. Suppose that there are M, and M~ modules of
Type 1 and Type 2 respectively, assigned to the squadron where
min{M, ,M~} >_ a. There are R repairmen assigned to the squadron
where each repairman is capable of repairing both types of
modules
.
Next, let X. (t) , i = 1,2, denote the number of modules
of Type i, i = 1,2, that are in or require repair at time t.
Thus the number of operational aircraft is min{a ,M, -X-, (t),
M~-X2 (t) } where it is assumed that an aircraft requires both
modules (one of each) to be considered operational, and this
is the number of aircraft that are failure-prone; the others
are awaiting one or both of the Type-1 and/or Type-2 modules.
Finally, it is assumed that repair is Markovian (or exponen-
tial): jj . denotes the rate at which an individual repair
of Type i, i = 1,2, is completed at Shop i.
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The repair process factors include repair time (diag-
nostic, removal of module from aircraft, ordering parts,
repair of a failed module, testing of a module after repair,
quality assurance inspection) , and the queueing discipline
used in the shop. For example, first-come-f irst-serve , or a
priority system may be employed.
The major factors affecting the assignment decisions
are the number of modules down requiring repair of each type,
and the number of repairmen assigned to the maintenance organi-
zation. Therefore, the maintenance commander has to choose
one decision among a finite set of possible decisions while
considering the combat effectiveness of the squadron. The
combat effectiveness of the squadron during peace time (be-
tween combat occasions) can be assumed to represent the readiness
of the squadron at any point in time, which can be represented
by the expected number of aircraft ready (or up) to engage in
combat at the time the squadron must respond to an attack.
This chapter presents a mathematical model that will
identify an optimal repair policy among finite feasible poli-
cies that are available for the commander to follow. As will
be seen, the policy is idealized so as to allow calculations
to be made. It does not recognize all reasonable constraints
to which the repair system is subject. Nevertheless it, or
its extensions, should provide some useful guidance for a
decision maker.
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The two major factors affecting the repair policy
are the failure rate and the repair rate of each type. The
failure rate of each type of module depends on the number of
aircraft, the failure rate of a module, the conditional proba-
bility of the module failing given an aircraft reported failed,
and the total number of spare modules available.
The repair rate of each type is a function of the
repair rate of a single repairman or team, the number of
repairmen assigned, and the number of modules of the same
type down at a given time.
These two major factors will be considered in analyzing
the repair policy in this chapter.
3 . Repairmen Assignment Decisions
The repairmen assignment decisions are the responsi-
bility of the maintenance commander (supervisor) . The decision
concerning the number of repairmen to be assigned to each
repair shop when the state of the system changes should follow
a (nearly) optimal repairman assignment policy; such a policy
is referred to in this study as the repair policy. The factors
affecting the repair policy can be classified as:
dependent upon the logistics system of the squadron, or
dependent upon the repair process.
The logistics system factors include the availability
of maintenance tools, documentation, preventive maintenance
program, spare parts when needed, quality assurance program,
and many others. In what follows the influence of such factors
will be left implicit.
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E. PROBLEM CHARACTERISTICS







The demand process depends on factors that include
number of aircraft in operation, number of pilots assigned,
probability of failure of modules, possibility of a simul-
taneous failure, i.e., resulting in a simultaneous demand.
2 Repair Process
The factors affecting the repair process can be
categorized as:
Factors related to the maintenance organization.
-
' Factors related to the operational organization.
Other factors.
Maintenance organizational factors include the number
in various skill categories of repairmen, the location of
different shops, rate of repair, availability of tools and
test instruments, and the cannibalization policy.
Operational factors include number of aircraft assigned
to the squadron, type of missions the aircraft are conducting,
pilot skills and training, failure rate of the modules in-
stalled, and the sortie frequency.
Other factors include weather conditions, foreign
object damage (FOD) , manufacture or urgent maintenance bulletins,
changes in type of threat, and number of spares available.
Ill
representing state i. The dimensionality of y(i) depends
on the type of actions considered.
For example, if { (X1 (t) ,X2 (t) , X., (t) ,X4 (t) ) , t > 0} repre-
sents the number of modules of types 1, 2, 3 and 4 down,
respectively, and the action to be determined is the total
number of repairmen to be assigned to the maintenance facility,
i.e., the repairmen are assumed to be capable of repairing
all types of modules t then y(i) is a scalar. More realis-
tically, suppose that the supervisor is assigned R repairmen,
and the action to be taken is to distribute the R repairmen
among the four shops. Then y i±) is of dimension 3. The first
component of y (i) will be R, , the number of repairmen to be
assigned to Shop 1. The second component is R„ , the number
of repairmen assigned to Shop 2, and the third is R-. , the
number of repairmen assigned to Shop 3. R. , the number of
repairmen assigned to Shop 4, is the balance, R. = R- (Rt+R^+R., )
and need not be a component in the vector y (i)
.
Therefore, if a stationary policy is employed then the
sequence of states {X(t),t > 0} where X(t) is a vector, forms
a multi-variate continuous-time Markov process with a transi-
tion probability P.
.
(t) = P. . (t,y(i)). As in the univariate
case there will be a unique infinitesimal generator for every
policy to be considered.
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{X(t),t :> 0} forms a continuous-time Markov process with a
transition probability,
P- • (t) = P.
.
(t, Y (i)) . (3.1)
-1
- / J -1 1 J
The evolution of the system from state to state described
by P- -(t,y(i)) depends on the infinitesimal generator whose
elements are q(j|i,y(i)), j = 1,2, . . . ,M, where <_ q ( j | i , y (i) ) <
j ^ i, is the rate of transition from state i to state j when
M
decision y(i) is employed, and q(i|i,Y(i)) = -
J. q ( j | i ,y (i) ) •
i=l
Therefore a collection of the row vectors q(j|i,y(i))
for i = 1,...,M will form an infinitesimal generator that
uniquely determines a continuous-time Markov process. That is,
the probability is q ( j | i , y ( i) ) dt + o(dt) that the system will
be in state j at time t+dt , 0<dt<6, 6>0, given that it is
in state i at time t and action y (i) e r . is always used in
the interval [t,t + <5) when the system is in state i.
The preceding statement can be generalized for the multi-
variate-continuous-time Markov process. A state can be repre-
sented by a vector whose components are the states for the
marginal-continuous-time Markov process. Let m be the
cardinality of the set of all possible state vectors; then
the system can be found in one of m possible states labeled
l,2,...,m at any point of time. When the system is in state
i an action y(i) is chosen from a finite set P.. The dimen-
l
-y
sionality of y(i) need not be the same as the vector
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The vector whose components are X. (t) for all K types of
modules installed on the aircraft, is taken to be the state
of the system. Because the probabilistic nature of the
system state changes, the process X(t) = {X-, (t ) , . . . ,XV (t ) ;
t
_> 0} represents a multivariate stochastic process. It
will be assumed that the state of the system at time (t+s)
given the history to time t is a function only of the state
at t, so the process can be handled as a multivariate-
continuous-time Markov process. If the supervisor is able
to make a decision on the required number of repairmen to be
assigned to every shop, every time the state of the system
changes, then the problem can be formulated as a multivariate-
continuous-time Markov decision process. Although it may be
unrealistic to assume that the personnel are so rapidly inter-
changeable, this is the situation that is examined.
Consider a system, S, which at any point of time must
be in exactly one of s possible states, labeled l,2,...,s.
Suppose S operates from time zero to time T, where T -> co .
When S is in state i, an action y is chosen from a finite set
T. of possible actions, and the return rate is f (i,y) that
depends only on the current state and action taken.
The policy is assumed to be a stationary policy. A policy
is said to be stationary if it is non randomized and the
decision it chooses at time t depends only on the state of
the process at time t (Ross, 1983). It follows that if a
stationary policy is employed then the sequence of states
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C. SCOPE
An air-interceptor squadron is selected to represent the
operational situation under study. The squadron is considered
to operate independently of other squadrons. An aircraft re-
quires a certain number of its systems to operate in order to
be considered operational. The shop supervisor is assigned
R repairmen capable of repairing all types of systems installed
on the aircraft (i.e., general technicians).
This study concentrates on finding the optimal way of dis-
tributing the repairmen among different shops. Here the term
"optimal" refers to the maximization of the readiness of the
squadron. Ultimately the readiness of the squadron is assessed
by its ability to engage into air combat when called upon with
the maximum number of interceptors in an attempt to minimize




To achieve the above objectives, the repair process of
the squadron during peace-time or non-combat periods has to
be analyzed. The effect of the repairmen assignment decisions
constitutes the restrictions for determining the optimal repair
policy. When an aircraft lands, the entire repair shop com-
plex experiences simultaneous demands for several different
types of repair. It is assumed that an aircraft consists of
several types of systems; for example, engine (propulsion),
communications, airframe systems, etc. The system is referred
to as a module. Let the number of modules of type i down for
repair at time t be {X. (t) ,t > 0}.
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III. FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF A PROBLEM IN REPAIRMEN
ALLOCATION FOR AN OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter models a repair shop maintenance process for
a given aircraft squadron. The model formulation is based on
a stochastic continuous-time Markovian decision process.
Mathematical programming optimization techniques are imple-
mented to determine the optimal repair policy. After this brief
introduction, the objectives of this chapter will be presented,
followed by the scope of work. The problem characteristics
will be introduced, followed by the assumptions used in the
model. The model is then developed, and sample solution of
the model, using dynamic and linear programming techniques,
are analyzed and verified. The optimization techniques are
compared, and potential opportunities for improvements are
suggested.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this chapter is to formulate and analyze
a repair policy for an aircraft squadron. Analysis of the
repair policy means determining the various repair policies
available to the shop supervisor, defining the effect of each
policy on the squadron readiness, and selecting that repair
policy which maximizes the expected number of aircraft ready
to engage or "scramble" when an attack occurs.
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From equation (2.35) the expected probabilities for
the number of modules down at the time of attack become:
State: (i,j): (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
E[P. .(W)] : .5825 .1269 .0170 .1433 .0491 .0074 .0570 .0147 .0017
!f 3
Hence, from equation (2.36) , the readiness is given by:
P{D(0) = 0} = .0978
P{D(0) = 1} = .9022
The example was used only to show a simple applica-
tion for the method of computing the operational readiness
of the aircraft-squadron using the matrix geometric approach.
The results obtained were compared with the results obtained
by writing down the generator and solving for the limiting dis-
tribution, and for the Laplace transforms. The results obtained
were the same as those obtained using the matrix geometric ap-
proach. The matrix geometric method has the attractiveness that
at any time we are working with small-size matrices, which
allows for solving a large-scale problem. As shown before,
if we are considering a system with M, = M„ = 100 modules,
then the infinitesimal generator will be of size 10,201 * 10,201,
which is too large to calculate the limiting distribution and
Laplace transform by solving ttQ = 0, ire = 1 directly. Using
the matrix geometric approach, we can only work with matrices
of size 101 x 101, which are much smaller.
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Nifj) (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
(n,mK
(0,0) .8370 .0640 .0032 .0637 .0219 .0016 .0058 .0024 .0003
(0,1) .5270 .3522 .0165 .0505 .0297 .0060 .0051 .0025 .0004
(0,2) .4296 .2818 .2132 .0404 .0238 .0048 .0040 .0020 .0003
(1,0) .5312 .0496 .0026 .3488 .0284 .0016 .0289 .0084 .0004
(1,1) .4179 .1567 .0099 .1567 .2126 .0092 .0198 .0141 .0030
(1,2) .3616 .1701 .0666 .1011 .1283 .1495 .0125 .0086 .0018
(2,0) .3541 .0331 .0018 .2325 .0189 .0011 .3526 .0056 .0003
(2,1) .3088 .0759 .0047 .1557 .0926 .0041 .1490 .2079 .0013
(2,2) .2798 .0920 .0217 .1179 .0896 .0451 .0887 .1212 .1441
The following are the values for tt P . . (n) :3 n ,m n ,m ; i
, j
\i,j) (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
(n,m)\
(0,0) .2793 .0214 .0011 .0213 .0073 .0005 .0019 .0008 .0001
(0,1) .0867 .0568 .0027 .0082 .0048 .0010 .0008 .0004 .0001
(0,2) .0194 .0127 .0096 .0018 .0011 .0002 .0002 .0001
(1,0) .0915 .0085 .0004 .0601 .0049 .0003 .0050 .0014 .0001
(1,1) .0412 .0155 .0010 .0155 .0210 .0009 .0020 .0014 .0003
[1,2) .0094 .0044 .0017 .0026 .0033 .0039 .0003 .0002
[2,0) .0398 .0037 .0002 .0262 .0021 .0001 .0397 .0006
:2,d .0134 .0033 .0002 .0068 .0040 .0002 .0065 .0090 .0001






















































Using Proposition (2.4), we get the following values for
P • . ( n ) :
n ,m ; l , j
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Hence, the matrices F , n = 0,1, G, , n = 1,2, and
G~ , n = 0,1,2 can be determined using the above rates
B
Q






(i) ~(i) ,:d) N ~(d,t (i)






~ (2) ~ (2) ~ (2) T






















P{D(0) = 0} = .234
and
P{D(0) = 1} = .766
Assume there is a warning that is exponentially
distributed with mean = 1 day. The failure rate during this
period drops from A = 1 aircraft per day to A' = 0.5 aircraft
per day, and y, =1, y_ = 1 modules per day increase to y' = 2,
y' = 2 modules per day. To find the readiness at the time of
the attack, we need to determine the parameters of the new
stochastic process {X, (t),X~(t); t
_> } . The rate parameters





























b = tt e + TT.e = 1.5497
Therefore, dividing by b we obtain:
-¥
tt_ = [.3985 .1927 .0541]












) = [.1343 .0520 .0079]
To renormalize,
2
b = V tt e = 1.1941
n nn=0
Therefore, we obtain
tt\ = [.3337 .1614 .0453]
tt
1
= [.1723 .0987 .0261]
tt
2
= [.1125 .0435 .0066]
Therefore the readiness is
2 1
P(D(0) = 0} = I tt + I tt
i= o


















































From Proposition (2.2), we get:






















= G (1) D. = G (2)
Hence, the infinitesimal generator, Q, becomes
(0 ,0) (0,1) (0,2) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
(0,0) -1 0.4 0.4 0.2
(0,1) 1 -2 0.4 0.4 0.2
(0,2) 2 -2
(1,0) 1 -2 0.4 0.4 0.2
(1,1) 1 1 -3 0.4 0.4 0.2
(1,2) 1 2 -3
(2,0) 1 -1
(2,1) 1 1 -2
(2,2) 1 2 -3









Let Q be the infinitesimal generator for the process










































(t) = (P10 (t) ,Pu (t) /P 12 (t) >
P (t) = {P Q0 (t) /P 01 (t) ,P Q2 (t)}






























Transition Rates: A Simple Example
to Illustrate the Matrix Geometric
Approach
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4 . A Simple Example to Illustrate the Proposed Technique
Consider one aircraft in operation. Suppose the air-
craft is operational if it has both engine and avionics
systems (one of each) installed and in operating condition.
Suppose further that there are a total of 2 engines and 2
avionics systems in the organization. Both engines are
assumed to be repaired by an engine technician that is not
capable of repairing the avionics system, and can only
work on one system at a time. Suppose that the organization
has a single engine technician and 2 avionics technicians.
Let A = 1 aircraft per day be the total failure rate of the
aircraft, the pilot reports failure due to engine with proba-
bility p, = 0.4, and due to avionics failure with probability
p~ = 0.4, and due to a failure of both systems with probability
p, ~ = 0.2. Let p, = 1 engine per day be the repair rate of
the engine, and y = 1 avionics systems per day.
A graph of the state space and the transition rates
for each state of the process {X-, (t) ,X„ (t) ; t > 0} is shown
in Figure (2.4) .
Consider {X-. (t ) , X ( t) ; t >_ 0} as a Markov process on
the state space {S„,S-,,S
n
} as defined below:
S
2
= {(2,0) (2,1) (2,2)}
S
1
= {(1,0) (1,1) (1,2)}
S
Q








(W) w}] = n I tt p . . (n)L
n ^ n n , m nm , 1
n
n=0 m=0 ' J
(2.3
Hence, the readiness probability distribution is
then given by:
M -k




K j=0 Ml k ' D










In terms of the Laplace transforms the above
P(D(0) = k} =
M, -k M, NL1
i=0 n=0 m=0 z.
n)






< k < a-1
(2.37)
IVL-a NL-a M, NL
n y y y y ^ p . . (n)








The readiness probability distribution can be
calculated by solving for P{X(W) = i,X(W) = j|w}.












































Since it is non-random, taking the expectations of
n,m * -i c-








nO (s) ' Pnl (s) PnM
2
(s)1
Using Proposition (2.4), we find that the vectors
for the Laplace transforms for the new, restricted, bivariate
birth-and-death process, {X, (t) ,X„ (t ) ; t >_ 0}, P (s), n = 0,1,
. .
.

















To find the readiness probability distribution at
the time of attack, it is required to find the number of
modules of both types down at the time of attack.
Let P .
.
(W) be the conditional probability of
nm,ij r J
the process being in state (i,j) at W (i.e., when the attack
occurs) given the process was in state (n,m) initially, and
that W is exponentially distributed with mean n . Therefore,
P
nm,ij (W) = p ^ xi(w ) = i/X 2 (W) = j|x1 (0) = n,X 2 (0) = m,W}
Now, note that







(w) ] = nP • (n)
nm, 13 nm, 13
So, as in the case of the single-module model, the required
readiness is given in terms of the Laplace transforms.
In much of what follows, for simplicity of nota-
tion, we will suppress the initial condition and write,




(s) = P • • (s) ,lj nm, 13
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p^R-L i = R, , . . . ,M1
3 L r ^ I • • • I K-'y -L
( »2?











The initial distribution for {X, (t) ,X„ (t) ; t >_ }
is the limiting distribution for { X, (t) ,X„ ( t ) ; t _> 0} with
parameters A, y,, and y_, given by Proposition (2.2):
P{X, (0) = i,X 9 (0) = j} = 7T. (i,j) e (2.32)
Therefore, { X, ( t) ,X 2 ( t) ; t > 0} is a bivariate
birth-and-death process, with initial conditions it. for
(i
,
j ) e S . Let
P
nm ij (t)
= P^i^) = i/ x 2 (t ) = j I
X
JL
( ) = n,X 2 (0) = m}
and P .
.























P{D(0) = k} = < I I tt. . k = a (2.30
1 i=Q j=0 1,J
otherwise
This assumes that attacks occur infrequently, so
a steady-state distribution prevails, and that there is essen-
tially no warning.
b. Partial Surprise
As in the Single-Module model formulation,
suppose that the intelligence data suggests that the enemy
will strike after W units of time (e.g., days). Let W be a
random variable exponentially distributed with mean n
Assume that during the time W the failure rate decreases from
A to A ' where A > A', and repair rates increase from y, and
y~ to y-j and yl, respectively, where y, < y,1 and y < yl.
Let {X, (t),X»(t); t 0} be the number of modules
of Type 1 and Type 2 down at time t. The process {X, (t)
,
Xp (t) ; t > 0} is a bivariate-continuous-time-Markov process
with rate parameters:
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P- , (s) = P. n (s)C. [-E. ,
]
i-m-1 i-m-2 i-m-2 i-m-1
-1 m+1 -1
+ e j- [ - E i ] *
D i- £+l[ E i-£ ]
We have proved the following proposition.
Proposition (2.4)
The vectors P (s), n = 0,1,..., M, / given that the
process started in state (i,j), are given by:
V S) S^- E 'i 1] J Di-£+ l [ -EI-£ ]
P.
,
(s) = P. , , (s)C.
,
, [-ET , Jl-k i-k-1 i-k-1 l-k
+ e^-E" 1 ] JI D.., + 1 [-E-^]
<_ k <_ i-1; i <_ n <_ M,
p„(»)
- Vi 1^,-! 1^ 1
The readiness distribution can now be computed.
a. Total Surprise.
Under the Two-Module Logistics formulation, with
a total surprise scenario, a readiness distribution model can
be derived as follows:
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From (2.29) we obtain:
-*-*-*-*






*!_!<> = V 2 ( s ' Ci-2 [ -Ei-l ] + ej [-EI1]Di [ -EI-l ]
Therefore the statement is true for k = 1. Suppose it is true
for k = m, < m < i. We need to show that it is true for




P- m (s) = P. m ,(s)C. m , [-E. m ] + e. [-E.
X
] n D. .,, [-E. Jl-m i-m-1 i-m-1 l-m j i , i-£+l l-ic
For k = m+1, using equation (2.18),
sP. , ( s ) = P. ~ ( s ) C . ~ + P . , ( s )' B . n+P- ( s ) D .i-m-1 i-m-2 l-m- 2 i-m-1 i-m-1 l-m i-m
= P. ~ (s)C . + P . -, (s)B. ,i-m-2 i-m-2 i-m-1 i-m-1
t
_i




+ e . [-E. 1 ] n D. „ . [-E. .] D.
J l „_-, i-£ + l i-£ i-m
Therefore
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For the vectors from n = M
n
down to n = i+1 of P (s)
1 n




1] for n = i + 1 "-"M
2
Now, applying the argument in Gaver , Jacobs, and
Latouche (1984) to equations (2.23), we obtain:













[-ETl] +e . [-ET1 ] (2.29
3
Mathematical induction can be used to show
Vk (s) = Pi-k-i (s)c i-k-i ! - EI-k !
+ e.I-E" 1 ] ^ D.. £+1 [-E-^]
for < k < i
To show that the statement is true for k = 1, note
that from equations (2.23), we obtain:
sP. , (s) = P. (s)C. » + P. , (s)B. , + P. (s)D.l-l 1-2 i-2 l-l l-l l l
Multiplying the first line in the above equations by
-1, and adding the normalizing equation, we obtain the equa-
tions for the vectors tt , n = 0,1,..., M-., given by Proposition
(2.2) .
Proposition (2.3) can only be applied if the process
started with probability 1 in state (0,0). However, the
analyst may need to calculate the Laplace transforms for
the process with different initial conditions. In particu-
lar, suppose one has positive probabilities P{X, (0) = i,
X
2
(0) = j } for all states.
We need to generalize the above results to allow for
other starting conditions, in particular to allow considera-
tion of the partial surprise scenario.
Given the process started in state (i,j),







- « * ... ^ 2
and
P (0) = for all other k,
where
:
e. = (0 ... 010 ... 0) j = 0,1, ...,M,
The i element of e . is equal to 1 whenever the




, C , and D are as given by Proposition (2.1) .
n n n 3 2 ^
Proposition (2.3) can also be used to find the limit-
ing distribution as follows:




Now, multiplying the equations for P (s) given by
























7t [-h ] = o
->" -+
r "I
n n-1 n-1 n
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In the case n = 0, we obtain from the induction
hypothesis
,
P-^s) = ^(sJCqC-e" 1 ]
Substituting into the first line of (2.27), we get











Q (s) [-(B +C [-E^
1 ]D
1
-sIJ = e Q
P (s)[-E
Q
] = e Q
We summarize these results as Proposition 2.3.
Proposition (2.3)
->
The vectors P (s), n = , 1 , . . . ,M, , are determined by
the equations:
P (s)[-E ] = e Q








E = B + C [-E * ]D . , - si










n!l ]Dn+ l " sl ° ' < n i ^l' 1
E.. = B.. - si
M, M,
We have shown (equation 2.28) that the statement is
true for n = M, . We will again prove the claim by induction
Suppose that the statement is true for n = i. We will show
that it must also be true for n = i-1
.
For n = i-1, we get, from equation (2.22) that
sP^Cs) - P.„
2
(s)Ci-2 + Pi.^sJB.^ + P.(s) Di























-sI)] = Pi. 2 Cs)C.. 2
Hence
P.














n-l (s)Cn-l + V s)Bn + Pn+ l (s)Dn+l (2.27)
sP
Mi
(s) PMf l (s)CMr l + PMl ^)BMi
where e
n
represents the initial condition
P (0) (1 ... 0) = e,
Thus, we obtain
\ is)[sl-\ ] PMf l (s)CMf l
PM1 (S)
= PMf l (s)CMf l [
-EMj ] (2.28)
where





-, (s)C -, [-E -1






and B , C , and D are as given by Proposition (2.1)
.
n n n r J c
2 . Algorithm for Computing the Limiting Distribution
The following algorithm was used to solve the recur-
sive equations given by Proposition (2.2). The algorithm is
based on the one given in Gaver , Jacobs and Latouche (1984).
1. Starting with H = B , compute recursively the
matrices H , for < n < M,-l.
n — — 1
-> ->




= 0, TT-e = 1.
-»
3. Compute recursively the vectors tt , n = 1 , 2 , . . . ,M, ;
and renormalize the vectors tt ' s so obtained at each






Following the argument in Gani and Purdue (1984) we
->












-s tMultiplying both sides of (2.23) by e ' and integrating
over all values of t, we get the following:
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In the case of n = 0, we have
Vo + *1 D 1 = 5




Thus, we have proved the proposition.
Proposition (2.2)
The limiting distribution for the bivariate-Birth-and-
Death process, for the Two Module Logistics model with simul-
taneous failure is given by the following recursive equations
Vo = °
7T = it ,C , (-H 1 ) 1 < n < M,
n n-1 n-1 n — — 1
Mi
r "*





H = B + C (-H ^,)D J_ 1 < n < M, -1n n n n+1 n + 1 — — 1
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The claim is that
->
-*- — 1
7T = TT ,C , ("H )
n n-1 n-1 n
where
:
H = B + C (-H n )D ,n n n v n+1 n+1
H», — B,.
M, M,
We will prove this by mathematical induction. We know from
equation (2.26) that the statement is true for n = M,
.
Suppose it is true for n = i. We need to show that the state-
ment is true for n = i-1 . From the second line of (2.20)
,
we get:
TT. nC ~ + TT . , B. ,+TT.D. =1-2 i-2 l-l l-l l l
Therefore
it. C. - + it.
n
B. -. + it. ,C. ^(-H.^D. =1-2 i-2 l-l l-l l-l l-l l l
it. , [B. , + C. .(-H.^D.] = -it. „C.





7T . -, = -TT. - C [-H. ,i-l i-2 1-2 i-I
which proves the statement is true for n = i-l
.
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In the case of n = 0, we have
Vo + ? 1 D 1 = °







Thus, we have proved the proposition.
Proposition (2.2)
The limiting distribution for the bivariate-Birth-and-
Death process, for the Two Module Logistics model with simul-





tt = tt ,C n (-H
1
) 1 < n < M,
n n-1 n-1 n — — 1
Mi




H = B + C (-H ,, )D . < n < M, -1
n n n n+1 n + 1 — — 1
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The claim is that
TT = TT ,C , "H )
n n-1 n-1 n
where








We will prove this by mathematical induction. We know from
equation (2.26) that the statement is true for n = M,
.
Suppose it is true for n = i. We need to show that the state-
ment is true for n = i-1 . From the second line of (2.20)
,
we get:
TT. ~C „ + TT . , B. ,+TT.D. =1-2 i-2 l-l i-I l l
Therefore
:
tt. C. n + tt. .B. -, + tt. ,C. ,(-H.
1 )D. = u"1-2 i-2 i-I i-I i-I i-I i l
tt. , [B. , + C. 1 (-H.
1 )D.] = -tt. „C. „i-I i-I i-I l l i-2 i-2
> -> -1
TT . , = -TT . C • [-H . ,i-I 1-2 i-2 i-I
which proves the statement is true for n = i-1
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t* m = -tt„ ,Cu i (B.. ) = ?M ,C., , (-H,,
1
) (2.26M, M, -1 M, -1 M, M, -1 M, -1 M,
From the second line in (2.25) , when n = M, -1 , we get
-»- -y
-> -±
TTn/i oC.. o + IT.. -, B.. -, + TT.„ D,. =M, -2 M -2 M, -1 M,-l M, M,
Substituting (2.26), we obtain:
M,-2 M, -2 M, -1 M, -1 M,-l M -1 M, M,
Therefore
:











H„ i = BM t + CM -, (-H.. )DMM,-l M-,-1 M -1 M, M
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D = G, ^ 1 < n < M,
n 1 — — 1




and G* (n = 0,1,...,M,),
we can use the above proposition to construct the infinitesi-
mal generator, and hence the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations.
Now, we are ready to find the limiting distribution for the
process by adapting the argument from Gaver , Jacobs and
Latouche (1984)
.
1 . The Limiting Distribution
The Markov-process {X, (t) , X
2
( t) ; t > 0} has been
shown to have a limiting distribution. Let
tt = lim P (t)
n . n
as t -*- °°, we get:
l im d_p
n
( t) . S
t->-oo
Therefore, from (2.23), it follows that
Vo + Vl = °
tt ,C -, + tt B + tt ,,D n = 1 < n < M,-l (2.25)n-1 n-1 n n n+1 n+1 — — 1
M,-l M,-l M, ML
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with initial condition
P (0) =[10 ... 0] , p
n
(°) = ° 1 < n 1 M !
Thus, by comparing the system of equations (2.24) to (2.23),
we have the following result.
Proposition (2.1)
The Bivariate-Birth-and-Death process { X, ( t) ,X- ( t ) ; t > }


































n) AT + P 2 F
(n)
A] 1 < n < Mf l
B
M.












A: £ n <_ M..-1
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g2 (0,1^-1) - (f (O^-l)^ (0,^-1) ) p2f (0,^-1)
g2 (0 /M2 ) -g^CNy





therefore we get the following set of equations:
eV« 5o ( t)[ - (F (0) +G (0) )+G (0) AT+p2F (0) A] + ?i(t)G (l)
hK™ Pn-l (t) [p l F>




+G'nWn) AT+p,F (n) A]



































(n / 0)) p2
f(n,0)
g2
(n,l) -(f (11,1)^(11, l)+g2 (n,l)) P2f(n,l)
\
g2 (n^-l) -(f (11,^-1) 4g1 (n,M2-l)+g2 (n,M2-l)) p2f(n,M2-l)
g2 (n fM2) -(g1 (n,^)-^ (n,^)
)


















pxf (n-l^-l) p12 f (n-l^-l)
for n = 1 , . . . ,M, -1
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From equations (2.21) , we can obtain the equations for
d ->
-T7T P (t) , (n = , . . . ,M, ) , and expressing these in matrix form
gives
:







(Mlf l) -(g1 (M1 ,l)+g2 (M1/ l)












































Hence, the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations become
dt p o (t) P (t)B Q + P 1 (t)D 1
St Pn (t » P , (t)C -, + P (t)B + P ,,(t)D ,. (2.23)n-1 n-1 n n n+1 n+1
1 <_ n <_ M -1
at?Ml (t)


















Let Q be the infinitesimal generator for the Markov
process {X
1 (t) ,X 2 (t) ; t >_ 0}. Then Q will be a block tri-
















where B , C , and D are square matrices of order M„+l
n n n M 2
The
diagonal elements of the diagonal matrices B are strictly
negative and are determined so that the row sums of Q are zero.
The process can be fully defined by the infinitesimal generator
and the initial condition. Therefore, we need to determine
all of the elements of B
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x
(t) = {P. ft (t),P n . (t) f ... / P 1 M (t)}1,0 VW '*1,1 1,M,
5 (t) {P 0,0 (t) ' P 0,l (t) P0,M
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system of equations tends to be large as M, and M 9 increase
•
For example, if there are 50 modules of both types, the system
has 2,601 equations. Thus, for a large maintenance system,
the above approach would be infeasible to follow. Therefore,
another approach is desirable. The Matrix Geometric Method
of M. Neuts (1981) is the alternative pursued here.
H. MATRIX GEOMETRIC APPROACH
Following the approaches in Neuts (1981), and Gani and
Purdue (19 84), we now formulate the continuous time Markov
process model for the two-module logistics problem. This
formulation facilitates computations for modules of realistic
number.
Consider {X, (t),X 9 (t); t >_ 0} as a Markov process on the





= UM1# 0) , (Mlf l) ,..., (M1/ M 2 ) }
SM -1
= { (Mj-1,0) , (M.j-1,1)i, . ..", (M1-1,M2 )}
S
1
= { (1,0) , (1,1) ,. .., (1,M2 ) }
S
Q
= { (0,0) , (0,1) ,. . . , (0,M 2 ) }
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+ Pl f (i-l,0)7T i _ 1
+ g 1
(i + l,0)Tr i+1
^
+ g2 (i / l)Tr il ) =
-(f(0,j) + g 2 (0,j))Ti 0j + p2 f (0,j-l)ir ._ 1
+ g 1
(l,j)Tr
lj + g 2 (0 ' j + 1)TT o,j + i = °
(f(i,j) + g1 (i / j) + g 2 (i,j))^ i . + p x f (i-1, j)TT i _ 1
+ p^fd-l^-l)^.,^.^ + p 2 f(i / j-l)u^ j _ 1
+ g 1
(i + l'J)Tr i + 1/j + g 2 (i,j+1)TT i / j+l
=
° (2.22)
(gl( i,M2 ) + g 2 (i,M 2 ))TT.^
2
+ P 12 f(i-1,M2 -1)TT._ 1 ^2
_ 1
+ p2 f (i/M2- 1)lr i f M,-l






(gi (Mlf jj + g2 (Mi'3> ,rM1 ,j
+ pif(Mi- 1 ' j)7rMr1^
+ P12 f(M1 -l,j-l)^Mi_^._ 1 + g 2 (M 1 ,j + l)TTMi/j+1
=
( gi (M1+M2 ) + g2 (M1 ,M2 ))irMif






I I IT-- = 1
i=0 j=0 1D
Therefore, it is required to solve (M-,+1) (M„ + l) linear systems






-(91*1-3) + g2 (Mi'3"PMl/j (t)
+ p^lBj-l.jlP,,
-l,j (t)
+ P12 f(M1-l,j-l)PMi . 1;j . 1 (t)
+ g,(M
1
,j+l)PM .... (t) 1 j M--1g2 (Ml ,j Mi/j+1
<%,«,<







/ 1 if i = j =
otherwise
The bivariate continuous-time-Markbv process
{X, ( t) , X„ (t) ; t _> 0} has already been shown to have a limiting
distribution. Define tt . . to be the limiting probability of
the process being in state (i,j), i.e.,
tt . . = lim P . . (t)
Taking the limit, as t -> °°, in the forward Chapman-
Kolmogorov equations, gives the following system of equations
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Subtracting P. . (t) from both sides and dividing by dt, and
letting dt tend to zero, gives the following:
dP (t)









-(f(i,0) + g 1 (i,0))P i Q (t) + Plf (i-l,0)Pi_ 1 Q (t:
+ g 1
(i+l,0)P i+1 Q (t) + g 2 (i,l)P i 1 (t)
1 <_ i <_ M -1
=
-(f(0,j) + g2 (0fJ))P j(t) + p 2 f(o f j-i)P
^ j _ 1
(t;
+ g 1 d,j)P 1/j (t) + g 2 (0,j+l)P ^ j + 1 (t)
1 < j < M2 -l
-(f(i,j) + g^i,]) + g2 (i,j))Pi . (t)
+ Pl f (i-l,j)P i _ 1
^ j
(t) + p 12 f (i-l,j-l)P i _ 1/j _ 1 (t)
+ p 2 f (i,j-l)P i ^._ 1 (t) + g1 <i+r,j)Pi+1 ^(t)
+ g2 (i,j +l)P^ j+1 (t)
1 < i < M
1






gi (i,M 2 ) + g 2 (i-M2 ))PifM2 <t)
t ?uf(i-l,llj-l)p1.lfllj .1 (t)
+ gi (i+ l,M2 )P i+1(M2 (t) 1 < i < Ml-1
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3 . Formulation III
Under this formulation, it is assumed that the condi-
tional probability of a simultaneous failure of both Types
(p, „) is positive. { X, (t) , X_ (t) , t >_ 0} is a bivariate
birth-and-death process with parameters given by (2.17).
Define P .
.
(t) to be the conditional probability of
nm , i j
r -1
the process being in state (i,j) given that it started in
(n,m) . Then,
P . . (t) = P{X
n





To simplify the notation we suppress the initial condition
and write,
P. . (t) = P . . (t) .
l j nm , 1
3
To obtain the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, we
write the probability that the process is in state (i,j) at
time t+dt as a function of the state probabilities at time t.
The probability of being in state (i,j) at time t+dt is expresse
by
:
P. .(t+dt) = (l-(f(i,j) +g
1





. (t) + p 12 f (i-1, j-l)dt
x P (t ) + p f(i,j-l)dtP (t)
_L-L,J"~-L Z X,JX
+ g1































































Figure 2.3. Transition Flow for the Two-Modules
Logistics Process Under Formulation II
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{X, (t) , X~ (t) , t >_ 0} is a bivariate birth-and-death process,
operating on the state space S = {( , ),..., (M-, ,M„ )} . Figure
(2.3) shows a graphical representation of the rates of transi-
tion between states.
It is clear from the figure (2.3) that state (M, ,ML)
is a transient state. Hence:
lim P A „ ., t
t->°° 1 2
It is also clear that once the state vector departs
from value (M,,M„), the process will never reach (M, ,M~)
again. So unless the process starts in state (M, ,MJ
,
this
state will never be visited. Since the initial condition is
assumed to have all modules up, the supervisor can never ex-
pect to have all modules of both types down at any point in
time. This results from the fact that under this formulation
it is assumed that when an aircraft is down awaiting modules,
it is waiting for one module only, never both types. This
assumption is very optimistic and it doesn't represent a
flight-line logistics operation. Therefore, it was concluded
that this formulation is inappropriate for the aircraft-
squadron logistics problem.
The preceeding two formulations suggest that a simul-
taneous failure mechanism (i.e., p, ? > 0) is necessary in
order to provide operational realism. This is carried out
in the next section.
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where
M. -1N 1 k
B





n fk (j) n gk (j) n fk (j)






Under this formulation, it is assumed that p, ~ = 0,
i.e., there is no simultaneous failure of both items. Air-
craft can be reported down either because of a failure of
Type 1, or a Type 2 module, with probabilities p, and p„,
respectively; where p, + p„ = 1. Therefore the rate parameters
are given by:
pk f (i, j) , k
= 1,2
where
f(i,j) = A min {a,M,-i ,M~- j
}
while g-,(i,j) and g 9 (i,j) are the same as given by equations
(2.17) .
Define {X-, (t),X 9 (t); t >_ 0} to be the number of modules of








n Iw-ZT1 + I
\ M, -1 .£. M. -1k i=l l k





The assumption made under formulation I results
in a very simple and unrealistic system, because an aircraft
requires only one type of module to be considered as a mission
capable aircraft. This formulation is impractical for
aircraft squadron scenarios where the objective of the
maintenance commander is to maintain the highest possi-
ble readiness in the squadron. The above formulation could
be used for modelling a depot repair system where there are
multiple types of modules that could be assumed to demand
repair independently. A generalization of the above method
that can accommodate the depot repair scenario is trivial and
a closed product form solution for the limiting distribution
of the joint probability can be found. Suppose there are N
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n g, (n) n f (n) n f, (n)
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" fk (0)lT + gk (1U l = °
(fk (j)+gk (j))TTj + fk (j_lu j-i + gk (j+1)TT j+i = °
1 j M. -1
-
wk
gk (Mk }x + fk (V 1,ir!L-i = °k k
1^ i
j = 3
where the last expression is the normalizing equation.
The marginal processes { X, (t) , t >_ 0}, k = 1,2,
can be viewed as independent closed migration processes.
Hence, the joint distribution is equal to the product of the
marginals, which are given by (2.19).
Let it . . be the limiting distribution for the
ID
joint process { X, (t) ,X~ (t) ; t > 0}. Then:
1 2









n f, (n) IT f (n)
n=0 n=0










The forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, using the
same probabilistic argument as in the Single-Module Logistics





-it— - -(fk (J>+gk (j))p*(t) + f^-DP^a)




dt = _fk (0)P (t) + 9k ^)P^(t) (2.18)
dPMk
(t)
-^F— = "^k (Mk )PMk
(t) + fk (Mk" 1)PMk-l
(t)
with initial condition
(1 if j = i
.k ,_ )
P ; A ( ) k = 1 ,
2
otherwiseI
a. Limiting Distribution for Formulation I
k thLet tt_. denote the long run probability of the k
process, k = 1,2, being in state j. Then:
^
k
= lim Pk . (t) k = 1,2
3 t+oo I'D
dPk (t)
If the limits exist, then lim —iv = 0, therefore,
at£-yoo
the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations become:
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1 . Formulation I
Under this formulation, it is assumed that the two
modules fail independently. The assumption states that an
aircraft requires only one of the two types to be considered
a mission capable aircraft. That is, as long as there is one
module, regardless of its type, installed on the aircraft
then the aircraft can perform its mission. Suppose that the
rate parameters are given by:
f
k (j) = Pk Amin{a,Mk-j} k = 1,2






u k"k = R, , . . . ,M, k = 1,2
'k
where p,+ p = 1.
Under the above assumption, the marginal processes




(t) to be the conditional probability of
lj
the k process, k = 1,2, being in state j given that it
started in state i. Then
P
k
.(t) = P{X, (t) = j|X, (0) = i} k = 1,2















> (i,j + l) p 2 X min {a ,M, -i ,M~- j }dt
* (i+l,j+l) p,
2
X min {a f M,-i,M 2 -j }dt (2.16)
-* (i-l,j) y, min {R, , i}dt
* (i,j-l) y 2 min {R2 , j }dt
{X, (t ) ,X„ (t) ; t >^ } is a finite state space continuous-
time-Markov process. All states of the process, defined by
(2.16), communicate, so the Markov process is irreducible.
Hence, by Theorem (2.1), the limiting distribution exists,
and can be found by solving a system of linear equations. The
parameters of the process are given by:






y , i i = 1 , 2 , . . . ,R -1
( u,R, iy l Rl










= 1/2, .. . ,R
2
"1
' y R„ j = R , . . . ,M,
To achieve the objectives of this chapter, three differ-
ent formulations for the Two-Modules Logistics problems will
be presented.
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Capacity = a air-
craft
Failure Rate = X






Repair Rate = y_
Capacity = R,










(t) Number of modules
down of Type 2
X.(t) = Number of modules
down of Type 1
Figure 2.2. Schematic of the Two-Modules Logistics System
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instantaneous cannibalization, so that one aircraft will not
be awaiting a Type-1 module only, while another aircraft
awaiting a Type-2 module only. A Type-1 module can be canni-
balized from the latter aircraft and installed on the former
aircraft resulting in one aircraft operational.
Finally, it is assumed that repair in both shops is
Markovian (or exponential) where y, and y„ denote the repair
rates at which individual repairs of Type-1 and Type-2
modules, respectively, are completed. Figure (2.2) shows a
schematic of this system.
Once X, (t) and X~ (t) are known, then the number of modules
of both types in any category can be determined from the
Markovian assumptions.







(ii) The number of spares of Type i is max{ ,M . -X
.
(t)-a),
i = 1,2 x ±





(t) }, i = 1,2
(iv) The number of modules of Type i waiting for repair
is max{0,X. (t)-R. } , i = 1,2ii
Thus the number of modules in any category can be determined
once X. (t) , i = 1,2, are known.




t > 0}, of order dt are given below:
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result of incorporating the warning time, and considering the
new parameters for the process.
Under both classes of the surprise scenarios, we
were able to compute the readiness of the squadron measured
in terms of the initial distribution for the number of aircraft
ready to engage in combat.
G. TWO-MODULES PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an aircraft squadron that consists of a number,
a, of failure-prone aircraft. Each aircraft requires each of
two modules (e.g., an engine system, and an avionics system)
to be considered mission capable. Let p, , p~ and p, ~ be the
conditional probabilities that, when an aircraft is reported
down, it requires respectively, Type 1, Type 2, or both types
of repair, where p-. + p» + p, „ = 1. Let X denote the overall
Markovian failure rate of an aircraft. Suppose that there are
M, and M„ modules of Type 1 and Type 2 respectively assigned
to the organization, where min{M, ,M„}
_> a. Furthermore there
are R, and R„ repairmen (crews) capable of repairing modules
of Type 1 and Type 2, respectively,, and only one repairman
(crew) can work on a failed module at any time.
Let X, (t) and X~ (t) denote the number of modules of Type
1 and Type 2 that are awaiting or undergoing repair at time t.




-X~(t)}. This is the number of aircraft that are failure
prone; the others are awaiting either a module of Type 1 and/or
a module of Type 2. This formulation tacitly assumes
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Thus P{X(W) = j,X(0) = i|w} is given by
j
i
1 2 3 4 5 6
.0414 .0566 .0683 .0686 .0576 .0514 .0237
1 .0142 .0614 .0740 .0743 .0624 .0556 .0257
2 .0043 .0185 .0407 .0410 .0344 .0307 .0142
3 .0011 .0047 .0103 .0154 .0130 .0115 .0053
4 .0002 .0010 .0021 .0032 .0038 .0034 .0016
5 .0002 .0006 .0007 .0008 .0010 .0006
6 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
Therefore
,
P(X(W) = j |W} = I P{X(W) = j ,X(0) = i|w}
i=0
which is given by the following table:
State :j =0 1 2 3 4 5 6
P{X(W) = j | W} = .0612 .1424 .1961 .2033 .1721 .1537 .0712
The readiness probability distribution becomes:
Number of aircraft :j =0 1 2 3 4
P{D(0) = j} .0612 .1424 .1961 .2033 .3970
Note that the median number of aircraft ready to engage has
improved to approximately 3; and the expected number of air-
craft ready to engage has improved to 2.7325. This is a
50
16748 .9240 1.1146 1.1209 .9404 .8383 .3869
2310 1.0011 1.2075 1.2143 1.0188 .9082 .4192
1393 .6037 1.3313 1.3389 1.1233 1.0013 .4622
1051 .4554 1.0042 1.5127 1.2692 1.1314 .5222
0882 .3821 .8425 1.2692 1.4843 1.3232 .6107
0786 .3406 .7510 1.1314 1.3232 1.6252 .7501






1 2 3 4 5 6
.1125 .1540 .1858 .1868 .1567 .1397 .0645
1 .0385 .1669 .2013 .2024 .1698 .1513 .0698
2 .0232 .1006 .2219 .2232 .1872 .1669 .0770
3 .0175 .0759 .1675 .2521 .2115 .1885 .0870
4 .0147 .0637 .1404 .2115 .2474 .2205 .1018
5 .0131 .0568 .1252 .1886 .2205 .2708 .1250
6 .0121 .0524 .1155 .1741 .2036 .2500 .1923
Hence,
P{X(W) = j,X(0) = i|w} = P{X(W) - j i X (0) = i,V7}P{X(0) = i}
P . . (W) 7T .
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State: i=0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7T(i) = .3676 .3676 .1838 .0613 .0153 .0038 .0005
Then using equations (2.8), we can compute the




ational aircraft: j = 1 2 3 4
P{D(0) = j} = .3676 .3676 .1838 .0613 .0196
This means that under the total surprise scenario,
the probability of the squadron having no aircraft ready to
engage the incoming threat is .3676, the probability of having
one aircraft operational is .3676, and the probability of having
two aircraft operational is .1838, etc. Note that the median
number of aircraft ready to engage is less than 1; and the
expected number of aircraft ready to engage is .9387 aircraft
which is also less than 1. This suggests that the squadron
must prepare for combat in order to survive,
b. Partial Surprise










p{d(0) j} < n I I tt.p. R (n) j = a (2.15!k=a i=0 '
otherwise
2 . An Illustration for the Single-Module Logistics Model
The following basic data and assumptions were used as
an example for the Single-Module Logistics model illustration:
An aircraft requires one type of module to be considered
as a mission capable aircraft.
The squadron is assigned a = 4 aircraft.
The total number of modules assigned to the squadron
is M = 6
.
The maintenance commander is assigned 2 repairmen
(crews)
.
An aircraft is reported down at a rate of A = 1 aircraft
per day, during peacetime, and becomes A 1 = 0.5 aircraft
per day, during the warning time, if a partial surprise
scenario is considered.
Modules are repaired at a rate of y = 0.5 modules per
day during peacetime, and u ' = 1 module per day during
the warning time if a partial surprise scenario is
considered
.
- The expected time for the warning period (i.e., time
until the attack) is n~l = 6 days.
For illustration, both classes of surprise attacks
will be considered.
a. Total Surprise
The limiting distribution for the number of
modules up was found to be:
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From the law of total probability,
M
P{X(W) = j | W} = I P{X(W) = j,X(0) = i|W}
i=0
M




P{X(W) = j|w} = I tt.P{X(W) = j I X (0) = i,W} (2.13)
i=0 X
Taking the expectation of both sides of (2.13)
with respect to W, we obtain the following:
M
E[P{X(W) = j|W}] = I tt.E[P{X(W) = j | X (0 ) = i,W}]
i=0 ±
Using equation (2.11), we get:
M 2
E[P{X(W) = j|W}] = n I tt.P. .(n) (2.14)
i=0 1 1,J
Hence, the readiness probability distribution is
given by:
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so that the required readiness is given in_ terms of a Laplace
transform.
Taking the Laplace transforms of (2.10) and inte-
grating by parts yields:
(
^o
+s)P i,o (s) + X iP i,l (s -P. (0)I/O
(A!+y! + s)P ifj (s) + ^j-lP i,j-l (s)
+ A 'P. . ,, (s) = -P. . (0)
:+i i,:+i i,d
i < j < M-l
(2.12)
(




1 if j = i
to otherwise
The readiness probability distribution can be
calculated by solving for P{X(W) = j|W}, j = 0,1,..., a, from
the above system of linear equations using (2.11) together
with the initial distribution for the restricted process
{X(t), t > 0} given by (2.9).
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dP. (t)
-^T~ = -WU^ + ^M-lP i,M-l (t
atpi,j (t) = -u: +^)pifj (t) + u'.^^ft
+
*j + ipi, j+i (t) < 2 - 10 '
itP i,o(t) " ^oP i,o(t > + H P i (t)
Let P. . (s) be the Laplace transform for P. . (t)
-st
e'. . (s) = / "" P. . (
To find the readiness probability distribution at
the time of attack, it is required to find the probability
distribution for the number of modules available at the time
of attack. Let
P. . (W) = P{X(W) = j | X (0 ) = i,W}1 / 3
Now note that
E[P. . (W)] = / P. .(oj) n e nwdo) = n / e
,|aJ
P.




. (W) ] = n P- • (n) t (2.11)1 / 3 ! / 3
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Let X(t) be the number of modules available at
time t with the new rate parameters. Therefore, the
{X(t), t >_ 0} is a continuous-time-Markov process with the
following rate parameters:
A ! = A ' xmin{a , i} =
1 '
A ' i for i = 0,1,... ,a-l
A ' a for i = a , . . . ,M
and
y'R for i = 0,1, ..
.
,M-R
\i\ = y' xmin{R,M-i}
y'(M-i) for i = M-R+1,...,M( u (M-
The initial condition for {X(t), t ^ } is the
limiting distribution for {X(t), t >_ } , i.e., set of equations
(2.7) .
P{X(0)=i} = tt. i = 0,l,2,...,M (2.9)
Therefore, {X(t), t >_ 0} is a birth-and- death
process with initial conditions tt • for i = 0,1,..., M. Let
P.
. (t) = P{X(t) = j | X (0) = i}1
' J
The forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations for
{X(t) , t > 0} are:
43
Let D(0) = Number of interceptors ready to engage in
combat at the time of attack.
Then




P{D(0) = j} I tt. for j = a (2.8)
i=a
otherwise
This assumes that attacks occur infrequently, so a steady-
state distribution prevails, and that there is essentially no
warning.
b. Partial Surprise
Suppose that the intelligence data analysis indi-
cates that the enemy might strike after W units of time (e.g.,
days) . Assume that W is a random variable distributed exponen-
tially with mean n . During such a time period the squadron
will undergo a mobilization and preparedness stage, and the
squadron activities will change. They will eliminate training
and conduct air reconnaissance and early warning missions
only, and they will change (enhance) the maintenance repair
capability. Such changes are assumed to cause the failure
rate to decrease and the repair rate to increase.
Assume that the failure rate decreases from A to
A ' where A > A ' , and that the repair rate increases from \i to
\i ' where y < y ' .
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the repair policy implemented, the number and types of test
and diagnostic equipment, and the supply of spare parts.
Finally, the quality of facility management is an intangible
influence
.
The operational factors include the number of aircraft
assigned to the squadron, the number and skill of the pilots,
the effectiveness of the training programs, and the sensitivity
of the early warning system.
The intelligence factors include:
(a) The procedures used in collecting information about
the enemy movements including the prediction of
enemy actions based on current political status.
(b) Quality of the analysis of the information collected
and the confidence of the decision makers in the
conclusions reached. Information could indicate the
intention of the enemy, however the defender sometimes
fails to anticipate surprise attacks.
The effect of surprise is reduced as the readiness in-
creases. Surprise attack can be classified in different




In an attempt to model the surprise phenomena mathematically,
the following warning scenario was considered.
1 . Models for Readiness: Stages of Surprise
a. Total Surprise
Under the Single-Module-Logistics formulation, if
a total surprise phenomenon is considered, then a readiness
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The factors affecting the combat readiness of an inter-
ceptor squadron can be categorized as:
Factors that are related to the logistics system.
Factors that are related to the operational system.
Factors that are related to the intelligence or warning
system.
The logistical factors include the number of spare modules
authorized to keep on base, the number of maintenance per-
sonnel assigned to the maintenance organization, the skill
and level of training of maintenance personnel, together with
40




, „ I „, .„ „ , M , i-1
A i! ( A } + UR(aR) , k -(M-i)I (iT ) }
(2.6)
"°
iil l% ' al
" V "~'
i=M-R (1
Therefore, the limiting distribution can be calculated by
determining tt first using equation (2.6), and then applying




Another approach to computing the tt . ' s is to view the
system as a closed migration process. Kelly (1974) shows
that a closed product form can be derived for the equilibrium
distribution
.
The flight line and the repair shop can be considered as
stations between which the modules move. Assume that modules
cannot leave or enter the system, and that the total number
of modules in the system, M, is fixed. Then, X(t) is a cyclic
queue, where a module departing from one station joins the
other with probability 1.
Using Kelly's results for a closed migration process, we
get the following expressions for the limiting distribution:
39
Vm + yM-l^M-l = °
" y 0^0 + X 1 U 1
= ° (2 * 4)





Below are given alternative methods for calculating it . .
Approach 1 :
The finite-state-continuous-time Markov process
(X(t), t >_ 0} has been shown to have a limiting distribution
From the set of equations (2.4), tt . can be written recur-
sively as:
I lA l-l for i











l.Ru, 1 for i =1, . . . ,M-R-1





i-(M-R-1) ^0 f°r i =M_R M(M-i) !a! A' a
M
and 1 tt . = 1 . Hence
i=0 x
M-R-l M




All states of the Markov process defined by (2.1) communi-
cate so the Markov process is irreducible. Hence the limiting
distribution exists and is independent of the initial condition
Since every state is a positive recurrent state, the limiting
values are all positive and form a probability distribution.
This results from the following theorem (Bhat, 1984):
Theorem (2.1)
(1) If the Markov process is irreducible then the limiting
distribution lim P.(t) = tt . exists and is independent
t^-oo J 3
of the initial conditions of the process. The limits
{tt., j e S), where S is the state space, are such that
they either vanish identically (i.e., tt . = for all
j e S) or are all positive and form a probability
distribution (i.e., tt . > for all j e S , tt. = 1).
J J€S :
(2) The limiting distribution { tt .
, j e S) of an irreducible
positive recurrent Markov process is given by the unique
solution of the equation ttO = , and > tt . = 1 , where
j e:S ^
Q is the infinitesimal generator for the process, and
TT = (TTjwTU, . . . ) .
Let tt
. denote the long-run probability of the process
being in state j. Therefore:
tt . = lim P . (t)
From the above, as t -> °°, -r— P. (t) -* 0, therefore the




(t) from both sides and dividing by dt and
letting dt tend to zero results in the following:
dP, (t)
= "(A .+y .)P . (t) + u. ,P. , (t) + X.^P.,.. (tdt v ' v j ^"-p-' ^j-rj-1^' ]+l]+l
since —
-r-r— -* as dt * 0. With the initial condition:
1 if j = M
P. (0)
otherwise
the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations are
dPM (t)
-at" = - AMPM (t) + ^M-lPM-l (t)
dP ft)
-ar- = -^o p o (t) + A i p i (t » <2 - 2)
dp (t)
-&- =
-Uj+w j )Pj (t) + Uj.iPj.^t) + A j+1 p j+1 (t)
1 £ j <_ M-l
with the initial condition:
































state space {i = , 1 , 2 , . . . ,M} . The parameters of the process
are given by:
A . = A xm
i
in{a,i)
Ai for i = , 1 , 2 , . . . ,a-l




y . = y xmin{ R,M-i}
yR for i = 0,1,2,... ,M-R
y x (M-i) for i = M-R+l, . . . ,M
Let Q be the infinitesimal generator for the Markov process
{X(t), t >^ 0}. Then Q will be given by the matrix on the next
page. Define P.
.
(t) to be the conditional probability of the
process being in state j given that it started in state i.
Then P..(t) = P{X(t) =j|X(0) = i} . To simplify the notation
we suppress the initial conditions and write,
p j(t) = P. j(t
The forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations are derived by
writing the probability that the process is in state j at
time d+dt as a function of the state probabilities at time
t. The probability of being in state j at time t+dt is
expressed by:
P. (t+dt) = (l-(A.+ y.)dt)P- (t) + y._..dtP._, (t) + A . ,dtP . , (t) + o(dt)
J J] 3 3 j J J
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Flight Line
Capacity = a air-
craft
Failure rate = A
spares
X(t) = Number of available modules
Repair Shop
Waiting for
Repair Capacity = R
Repair Rate = y
~^r-
^/
Number of modules "down"
Figure 2 .
1
Schematic of the Single-Module
Logistics System
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is assumed that repair is Markovian (or exponential), where y
denotes the rate at which an individual repair is completed.
Figure (2.1) shows a schematic of the above system. Karlin
and Taylor (1984) have analyzed the above problem and have
shown that once X(t) is known, the number of modules in any
category can be determined. A module can be in any of four
states
:
(i) Operating (installed on aircraft)
.
(ii) "Up" but not operating, i.e., a spare,
(iii) Under repair,
(iv) Waiting for repair.
Each of the modules down at time t must either be undergoing
or awaiting repair. Thus:
(i) The number of modules operating is min{a,X(t)}.
(ii) The number of spares is max{ ,X (t ) -a}
.
(iii) The number of modules in repair is min{R,M-X (t) }
.
(iv) The number waiting for repair is max{ ,M-X (t ) -R}
The number of modules in any category can therefore be
determined easily once X(t) is known.
The transition probabilities of the process {X(t), t > 0},
of order dt are given below:
t t+dt Probability
i > i+1 y min{R,M-i}
+ i-1 X min{a, i} (2.1)
The above assumptions and formulation specify the stochas-
tic process {X(t), t > 0} as a birth-and-death process with
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may experience either simultaneous or independent demands for
two types of repair, depending on the case under consideration.
Let the number of modules of type i, i = 1,2 for repair at time
t be (X. (t), t > 0, i = 1,2}. Then the bivariate vector having
components X-. (t) and X~ (t) can be considered to be the state
of the system at time t. If full cannibalization is allowed,
then X-, (t) and X^ (t) determine the number of aircraft operational
As is true for the univariate case, this process may be modelled
as a bivariate-continuous-time Markov process. More generally,
if we have a multi-module, e.g., K-module, setup, the process
could be modelled by a K -variate-continuous-time Markovian
process
.
E. SINGLE-MODULE PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an aircraft squadron that consists of a number, a,
of failure-prone aircraft. Each will be considered not mission
capable if, and only if, a specific module is not working. Let
A denote the overall Markovian failure rate of an aircraft,
where failure of an aircraft means a failure of the module it
currently carries. Suppose that there are M modules assigned
to the organization where M > a, and there are R repairmen
capable of repairing the modules, and only one repairman is
required to repair a failed module.
Let X(t) denote the number of modules that are installed
or available at time t. Thus the number of mission capable
aircraft is min{a,X(t)}, which is the number of aircraft that
are failure-prone, the others awaiting a module. Finally, it
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C. SCOPE
An air interceptor squadron is selected to represent the
logistical situation under study. The squadron is considered
to be assigned a number, a, of aircraft. The study concen-
trates on finding the readiness of the aircraft at the time
of attack by enemy bombers. This readiness depends upon the
total number of each module type and the number and rates of
repair characteristic of the repairmen in each shop. In turn,
the readiness that results influences combat effectiveness.
D. APPROACH
To achieve the above objective, the logistics system of the
squadron during a "peacetime" (noncombat) situation must be
analyzed. The repair shop experiences demands for repair,
depending on the type of problem under study. If the problem
formulation considered assumes that the whole aircraft is a module,
then the shop experiences a single type of demand for repair.
Let the number of modules up at time t be (X(t) , t 0};
under Markov conditions the variable X(t) can be considered to
be the state of the system. Because of the random nature of
the system state change, the process (X(t); t
_> 0} represents
a stochastic process. By introducing certain reasonable assump-
tions that will be stated later, the process can be modelled as
a continuous-time Markov process.
However, if the problem under study assumes that an aircraft
requires each of two types of modules to qualify as a mission
capable aircraft, then the two-shop maintenance organization
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gave a good approximation to long-run aircraft availability
when compared with simulation model results. Their work tends
to validate the use of a convenient approximate model (diffu-
sion) for decision making.
The single-type module repairman problem is presented first
in this chapter followed by the two-type module repairman prob-
lem. After discussing the objectives of this chapter, the
models for the various types of problems will then be constructed
followed by sample solutions. The probability distribution
function for the interceptor squadron readiness will be calcu-
lated. Those results will then be used in Chapter V for the
blending of the logistics and combat models.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this chapter is to formulate and analyze
the generalized repairman problem for the maintenance organi-
zation of an interceptor squadron. Analysis of the repairman
problem means determining the various factors affecting the
repair process in the organization. A major factor is the
number of different types of modules requiring different types
of repair facilities and different repair times. This chapter
analyzes the following repairman problems
:
- a single type of module.
two types of modules with independent failure rates.
two types of modules with dependent failure rates, with
the probability of a simultaneous failure of both modules
being negligible.
two types of modules with a non- zero simultaneous
failure rate.
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needs to be determined. The repair policy represented by
the vector y recommends that: whenever the system is in
state n take the decision y (n) , (e.g., if in state 1 then
take decision 1, if in state 5 take decision 3, etc.) . Now,
to determine the corresponding infinitesimal generator Q,
we use the following algorithm:
For: n = 1, (M1+1)(M2 +1)
Q(n,m) = Q (n) (n,m) m = 1 , . . . , (Mx+1) (M2 +l)
The preceding discussion for determining Q will be clearer
when the infinitesimal generator Q* for the optimal policy
is determined.
Note that the policy decision is made potentially at
each state change.
In an attempt to search for the most favorable (i.e.,
optimal) policy that needs to be followed in order to maxi-
mize the readiness of the squadron we maximize the expected
number of aircraft ready to engage in combat. Table 3.2
shows the total number of aircraft ready to engage (f(n))
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K. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
1 . Steady State Analysis
For any policy the long-run expected number of air-
craft that are up and ready to engage per unit time, E[D(°°)],
can be calculated by multiplying the number of aircraft up
when in state n (f(n)) by the long-run (limiting) probability














{tt , (y) , . • • /iT, 2 (y) } represents the steady-statedistribution of the state of
the system under the policy
being evaluated.
The state space consists of only 12 states.
Since all states communicate, the process is a
regular Markov process. Therefore the limiting probabili-
ties exist. The resulting optimal policy is dependent on
the number of aircraft, modules of Type 1, modules of Type
2, and repairmen assigned to the base.
2 . Optimization Results
a. Linear Programming Results
The results of applying the linear programming
optimization approach using the LINDO package are shown
below in Table 3.3. The resulting optimal policy is shown
immediately following Table 3.3.
This optimal policy recommends assigning no
repairmen to Shop 1 when there are no items of Type 1 down,
assigning one repairman to Shop 1 when there is an item of
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Decision 000032113222
are two items of Type 1 down. The remaining number of
repairmen are to be assigned to Shop 2 if there are items of
Type 2 down or they are idle. Following this policy gives
an objective function value (i.e., expected number of air-
craft that are operational) of .9579. This policy determines
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Therefore, by assigning the repairmen according
to the optimal policy, the resulting stochastic process
can be assumed to be a bivariate-continuous-time-Markov
proces {X-^ (t) ,X (t) ; t >_ 0}, over the state space
S = { (0,0) , (0,1) , (0,2) , . . . , (2,3) } , with the infinitesimal
generator Q* and initial conditions:
P (o) =
n,m
( 1 if n
I
= 0, m =
otherwise
Such a process has the limiting probabilities
shown in Table 3.3 and an expected number of aircraft ready
to engage of .9579.
b. Dynamic .Programming Results
The results of applying the dynamic programming
procedure are given in Table 3.4. The optimal policy is
shown immediately following Table 3.4. The total objective
function value = .9579.
The infinitesimal generator (Q*) for the
continuous-time Markov process resulting from the application

































The optimal policy is:
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Suppose the squadron is assigned 6 aircraft,
M, = 6 modules of Type 1, and M„ = 7 modules of Type 2.
The repair shop supervisor is assigned 6 repairmen, while
the remaining parameters are the same as in the previous
example. Table (3.5) gives a summary of the results.
It shows for every state 'n', the corresponding (i,j) state
for the bivariate process, the recommended number of repair-
men to be assigned to Shop 1, and the number of aircraft
that are up and ready to engage whenever the process is found
to be in state (i,j) . Following this policy the squadron
will maintain on the average 2.88 aircraft up at any time.
L. COMPARISON OF THE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING AND THE LINEAR
PROGRAMMING SOLUTIONS
A comparison of the dynamic programming and the linear
programming approaches shows that the two approaches yield
different policies. Table 3.6 shows the results side by side.
Both approaches gave the same limiting distribution and
hence the same objective value. The difference in the opti-
mal policies v/hen {X, (<») =0} suggests that there is more
than one optimal policy, i.e., the optimal policy is not unique
This is intuitively obvious since there is no cost asso-
ciated with moving repairmen between shops, the assignment
of idle repairmen to Shop 1 versus Shop 2 doesn't affect
the objective function value.
Both approaches resulted in the same infinitesimal




A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY DYNAMIC
PROGRAMMING RUN FOP." THE 6 AIRCRAFT CASE
M (I.J) DECISION 4i«cx4rr i»
1 (S.«l 4. 4.
2 (0.1) S. 4.
1 (0.2) 4. S.
4 (0.2) I. 4.
1 (0.4) 2. I.
1 (O.S) 1. 2.
7 (0.4) 0. 1.
• (0.7) 0. 0.
» (1.0) 4. S.
IS (1.1) S. s.
11 (1.2) 4. s.
12 (1.2) 1. 4.
IS (1.4) 2. 2.
1* (l.S) 1. 2.
IS (1.4) 0. 1.
"
1* (1.7) 0. 0.
17 (2.4) 4. 4.
12 (2.1) s. 4.
If (2.2) 4. 4.
20 (2.2) I. 4.
21 (2.4) 2. 2.
22 (2.S) 1. 2.
2X (2.4) 0. 1.
24 (2.7) 0. 1.
25 (2.0) 4. 2.
24 (1.1) s. I.
27 (2.2) 4. 1.
2a (2.2) I. 2.
2* (2.4) 1. I.
>• (l.S) 1. 2.
21 (1.4) 0. 1.
12 (1.7) 0. 0.
» (4.0) 4. 2.
}4 (4.1) s. 2.
IS (4.2) 4. 2.
{4 (4.2) 4. 2.
27 (4.4) 4. 2.
xa (4.S) 4. 2.
i* (4.4) 0. 1.
«• (4.7) 0. 0.
41 (S.O) 4. 1.
42 (S.l) S. 1.
42 (S.2) s. 1.
44 (S.l) s. 1.
41 (S.4) s. 1.
44 (5.5) s. 1.
47 (S.4) s. 1.
4a (S.7) 9. 0.
4* (4.0) 4. 9.
10 (4.1) 4. 9.
SI (4.2) 4. 9.
12 (4.1) 4. 9.
it (4.4) 4. 9.*-
S4 (4.S) 4. C.
S» (4.4) 4. 9.
S4 (4.7) 4. 9.
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TABLE 3.6


















distribution, therefore, it may be concluded that both
approaches identified the same bivariate-continuous-time
Markov process.
Observe that whenever the process is in a state
(i,j) such that i+j < R, the optimal decision will always
be to assign i repairmen to Shop 1 and j repairmen to Shop 2
and any idle repairmen to either shop. However, if i+j > R,
then a decision has to be made to determine the number of
repairmen to be assigned to Shop 1.
157
Consider the state (2,2) . The optimal policy
calls for assigning 2 repairmen to Shop 1, and a single
repairman to Shop 2. This shows that the supervisor is giving
a priority to items of Type 1 since both aircraft are down,
and only one item of Type 1 is needed to get one aircraft
up.
Consider the state (2,3). The optimal policy
still calls for the assignment of 2 repairmen to Shop 1, and
a single repairman to Shop 2. This shows that the supervisor
must still give priority to items of Type 1, even though an
aircraft requires both items to be in up condition. This
is due to the difference in the repair rates, y-, = .5 and
y„ = 1 module per day. Therefore, it takes two days on the
average to repair a module of Type 1 and one day to repair
a module of Type 2. To carry out the analysis mathematically,
define:
U, . = Time to repair the i item of Type 1,
i = 1,2.








Therefore, U , i = 1,2 are two independent identically






> t} = P{min(U11 ,U12 ) > t}
p{u
i:l
> t,u12 > t}
p{u
i;l
> t}p{u12 > t}
e •. e = e
Thus: U, = min{ U, -. ,U,
?
} is an exponential random variable
with rate 2y, . In the example, y. = .5. Therefore the rate
to get the first item of Type 1, when the process is in
state (2,3) with 2 repairmen assigned to Shop 1, is 1.
Therefore, on the average, when in state (2,3) (i.e., all
modules are down and 2 modules are needed, one of each type,
to get an aircraft up) , it takes on the average one day to
get the first aircraft operational. If the supervisor has
assigned only one repairman to Shop 1 and 2 to Shop 2, then
it will take on the average 2 days to get a module of Type 1
up. By following the above analysis for Type 2 modules, it
will take on the average 1/2 day to get the first module.
However, an aircraft requires both types to be considered
up. Therefore on the average it will take 2 days to get the
first aircraft up. The preceding analysis supports the deci-
sion provided by the optimal policy.
As shown earlier, the decisions to be taken
whenever the process is in a state (i,j) such that i+j <_ R
(R = 3) is trivial. To determine if the resulting repair
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policy is indeed optimal, a Fortran program was written
to evaluate all possible policies. This is done by
considering all possible decisions that could be taken
whenever the process is found in state: (1,3), (2,2),
or (2,3). Table (3.7) shows all possible policies, the corres-
ponding limiting probabilities of the resulting process and
the objective function value. It is clear that the repair
policy suggested by both the linear programming and the
dynamic programming approaches are optimal policies, resulting
in the same Markov process.
The linear programming approach has the advantage
of the widespread availability of commercial packages for
use (e.g., LINDO and MPS III). An additional advantage of
the linear programming approach is the ability to easily
conduct sensitivity analyses. However, for large numbers of
modules, aircraft and repairmen, the linear programming approach
may be impractical. It seems that the dynamic programming
approach is more suitable for the larger size problems because:
It requires less data input and preparation.
There might be a possibility of degenerate solutions in
linear programming which will yield an impractical
optimal solution (e.g., in the case when there are
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321032122211 0.1177 0.09*1 0.0594 9.9113 9.2747 0.1505 0.03*7 9.0172 9.1*74 9.9575 9.9137 9. 901* 0.*4?Z
12 19 12 12 12 12 9.1177 9.99*2 0.0599 9.9113 0.27*1 9.1505 0.9409 9.9111 9.1**7 9.0570 0.013; 9.0020 0.*474
2Z103Z123213 9.1174 9.99*4 9.0513 9.911* 9.Z730 3.1502 0.0*03 0.9195 9.1*53 0.0541 0.0123 0.00*0 0.9445
12 1912121229 9.1174 9.999) 9.0529 9.0117 9.271* 9.1514 9.9437 9.9IS9 9.141* 9.0532 3.3115 0.0015 0.9519
321932123221 9.1174 0.0992 0.05ZZ 0.011ft 0.2713 0.1514 0.0*29 0.0197 0.1*1* 0.052* 9.9191 0.001* 9.951*
221932123222 9.1174 9.9993 9.0524 0.0120 0-2709 0.1515 0.04)9 0.01*4 0.140* 9.052* 0.0174 0.0022 9.95Z0
3Z19S2123223 6.1171 9.9**4 0.952* 9.9123 0.2**7 0.1511 0.0*40 3.3211 0.l5*ft 0.051* 0.014* 0.00*4 0.9507
1 2 I 9 1 2 1 2 I 2 1 9 9.1152 0.9*** 0.05*3 0.0123 9.2*11 9.151* 9.051) 0.0207 0.147* 0.0*34 0.0407 0.0017 0.**ft5
321032123231 0.1152 0.1900 0.09*5 0.012* 0.2*10 9.151* 0.0519 9.0213 9.147ft 9.9434 9.93*4 9.9020 9.94*5
321912121232 0.1153 0.1991 9.95*7 9.0121 0.2*0* 0.131* 0.0509 0.0221 0.1*77 9.9433 9.9390 3.0025 0.94ft7
: : i 3 i : . ; i : i i 9.1152 0.1092 9.954* o.ot:i 0.2*93 9.1519 0.0505 0.023* 9.1*73 0.0432 9.0353 9.005ft 0.9475
321032133299 9.1151 0.0947 0.03*3 0.0142 3.2**2 0.141* 0.0321 0.0*2* 0.1*23 0.05*7 0.915) 0.OO11 O.*l*0
321032131201 9.1151 9.9*94 0.05*4 9.0145 9.2*35 9.1*1* 9.9221 9.9443 9.1417 0.95*2 . 1 *• 9.0013 9.919ft
321932133292 9.114* 0.0994 9.9551 9.91*9 9.2*24 9.1412 9.9321 9.04*3 0.1407 0.0557 0.01*1 9.001* 8. *L«I
321932133293 9.114* 0.0999 0.0559 0.017* 0.2*04 0.1405 0.0321 0.04*7 0.15ft* 0.054* 0.0154 0.0032 0.91*1
3210S2I33ZI9 0.1154 0.0994 0.0557 0.014* 0.2*39 0.1*27 9.03*2 9.049* 9.1994 9.0942 9.012* 0.0911 9.9292
321932133211 9.1153 9.99*5 0.95*9 9.9171 0.2*23 0.1424 9.02*2 3.3**4 0.1599 0.0539 0.0123 0.0014 0.9247
12 1 12 1 I 12 I 2 0.1132 9.0*97 9.93*3 9.017* 9.2*1* 0.1429 0.9141 0.049ft 0.137ft 0.0331 3.3111 0.0017 0.921*
321932133212 9.114ft 9.1000 9.0572 3.3112 9.25*4 9.14(2 0.03*ft 0.0323 0.13*1 0.0523 0.0111 9.0034 9.9215
121932133229 0.1159 9.1905 9.0575 9.0177 0.25ft* 0.1430 9.0375 9.94*0 9.1334 9.04*9 0.91*3 9.9012 0.9279
121012333221 9.114* 9.190* 9.957ft O.fttftft 0.2511 9.1*27 9.0373 9.0394 9.192ft 9.94*9 9.91*1 9.9919 9.9Z71
12 1 I 12 1 I 12 22 9.11*7 9.100* 0.0593 0.0195 0.2574 3-1*23 9.9372 9.9529 9.1520 0.04*1 9.0155 9.991* 9.9241
121032133223 0.1)44 9.1910 0.95*9 9.91*2 9.2355 0.1413 0.034* 0.0540 9.1505 0.0**3 0.0144 0.0037 0.*234
121012133230 0.1127 0.1014 0.9402 0.91*2 9.2*01 9.1419 0.0*32 0-0552 0.1*00 0.0*00 9.035ft 0.0014 0.*214
321*32133231 0.1127 0.1915 9.9405 9.91*5 9.2477 9.1414 9.942* 9.9547 9.139* 0.0407 0.0347 9.9017 0.9210
121022133232 0.112* 9.1917 9.949* 0.0290 9.2471 9.1411 0.0424 0.05** 0.13*4 0.0404 0.0332 0.0021 0.9202
321032133231 a. 112* 0.1019 0.0*15 0.020ft 0.245* 9.1402 9.0414 9.9421 9.11*4 9.0403 0.0307 9.9942 0.9175
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IV. FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF SOME COMBAT MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to formulate Combat-Logistics models, consider-
ation of some relevant combat situations are necessary. This
chapter presents an analysis of an air defense scenario for
a relatively small country, or, alternatively, an area (or
sector) of responsibility to a defense system. The air defense
system is assumed to consist of:
1. An interceptor squadron made up of a relatively small
number of aircraft equipped to engage in air-to-air
combat
.
2. A Surface-to-Air system that consists of a number of
Surface- to-Air Missile (SAM) batteries, and Anti-
Aircraft-Artillary (AAA) batteries.
3. An early warning system that has a long range radar,
and uses information from an airborne warning and control
system (AWACS) operated by friendly forces.
3
4. A command, control and communication (C ) system.
The air defense system is responsible for defending against
any hostile air attack from a hostile agent, e.g., nation.
Suppose that the objective of the air defense system is to
absorb the initial strike; after the initial campaign it is
assumed that there will be some support from other friendly
agents. The term "absorb" means to cause maximum possible
reduction of the hostile damage to the area being defended.
Consider the following threat scenario that the air defense
system might encounter. A hostile attack occurs
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unexpectedly with multiple bombers; the attack objective is
to destroy some high-valued military and/or national targets.
The bombers appear in a wave, i.e., essentially simultaneously.
It is assumed that the air defense doctrine dictates that
for any incoming threat, the air interceptor squadron will
first engage the threat until the threat reaches a certain
imaginary line (set by doctrine) ; surviving bombers that cross
the line are attacked by the SAM units. The imaginary line
will be referred to as the hand-over line , and the term "threat"
means the enemy bombers. Therefore, the time required by the
threat to reach the hand-over line from time of detection
determines the time that is possible for the air interceptors
to engage the threat. At a later time (or shorter range) the
SAM units will engage until the threat reaches yet another
hand-over line, at which point the AAA system will take over
to engage the surviving threat elements. At each line the
leakage from the stage before must be dealt with by the system
in question. Figure (4.1) illustrates the above scenario.
Notice that each stage constitutes a different type of
combat; the leakage from that stage provides the input for the
stage following. For example, the leakage of the air-to-air
combat process is the input to the SAM-to-bombers engagement
process (e.g., the number of bombers to be engaged by SAM).
A feasible enemy doctrine dictates that the mission of
the bombers is to be aborted as soon as the number of bombers







































This study presents various models for the air-to-air
combat process; these models will facilitate the linking of
the operational logistics models presented in the previous
chapters to produce the desired combat-logistics models. The
combat-logistics models allow the decision maker to explicitly
relate combat outcomes to logistics system scale and organization
Some of the relevant measures-of-ef fectiveness (MOE's) for
the air-interceptor squadron are the following:
1. The expected number of bombers reaching the first hand-
over line; this measure is to be minimized. This step
minimizes the expected number of bombers that will be
engaged by the SAM units.
2. The probability that exactly z (z <_ B(0)), or no more
than z, bombers leak through stage 1. Particular inter-
est may well be in z = . The above measure is more
general than the first-mentioned measure, but is also
more difficult to compute. Diffusion approximations
evaluate this measure in terms of the mean and variance
of the leakage at hand-over time.
3. The duration of the air-to-air combat. Extending the
combat duration will delay the bombers from reaching
the first hand-over line. In turn, this will result
in the bombers burning more fuel, which might result
in bombers aborting their mission. This MOE in
turn will also allow the SAM units longer warning
time to prepare for combat. The manner in which
air-to-air combat duration can be increased is by
the range of first detection; which is a factor we
study in the next chapter.
The general measure of the effectiveness of the
air-interceptor squadron that will be considered (modelled
and optimized) in this study is to minimize the probability
of penetration of the enemy bombers. Here the term "penetra-
tion" refers to the ability of the enemy bombers to reach an
imaginary line (hand-over line) beyond which lies an important
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defense asset (e.g., SAM units), or beyond which the threat
will release its load (i.e., bomb-release line).
Air-interceptor squadrons usually fight with a homogeneous
set of aircraft. The squadron should be equipped so that it
is capable of defeating an anticipated threat force. The
opposing force structure at the beginning of a combat period
(t = 0) is represented mathematically by the vector (B(0),D(0)),
where
:
B(0) = The number of enemy Bombers at the beginning
of the combat period.
D(0) = The number of Defending aircraft at the
beginning of tne combat period.
Here the term "combat period" refers to the period during which
the defenders and attackers (bombers) will meet in combat. It
effectively begins when the bombers are in the range of the
defenders. The duration of the combat period can be lengthened
by extending the warning range. The study assumes that this
duration is deterministic. It could be provided by the decision
maker (e.g., points in time at which the decision maker is
interested in knowing the opposing force distribution) , or
could be the time for the bombers to fly from point of detection/
intercept to hand-over line.
B. PROBLEM CHARACTERISTICS
The study considers two features of the combat situation:
the early warning process, and the air-to-air combat process.
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1 . The Early Warning Process
The early warning process consists of the following
operations
.
a. Radar Detection of a Hostile Attack
Radar locates an aerial target in azimuth, range
and altitude. It then estimates the target course, speed and
strength (number of attacking bombers) . The radar character-
istics (particularly range) depend primarily upon the type
and performance of the radar used, as well as the altitude
selected for the antenna.
b. Target Identification
Identification enables targets to be classified
in various categories (e.g., friendly, hostile, or unidenti-
fied) . So a secondary radar which is identif ication--friendly
or foe (IFF) --has to be used.
c. Threat Evaluation
This phase evaluates a threat index, which depends
upon
:
The size of the attacking force.
Geographical location.
The required flight time to the high valued ground
targets or installations.
d. Transmission of the Warning
Warning is transmitted to all air defense units
(for example, interceptor squadron, SAM batteries, and the
AAA units) and also to the areas being defended and even the
civil population (shelters).
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Successful execution of the above operations or
missions is affected by factors such as:
Radar range; the reliability and maintainability of
the equipment, including adequacy of spare parts and
maintenance facility, and equipment calibration.
Training, skill, motivation, vigilance of the operators.
Operational doctrine of the early warning system.
The availability of, and coordination with, supplementary
detection system.
Such supplementary systems include other friendly
early warning systems in the area, as well as possible infor-
mation from neighboring allied countries.
The objective of the early warning system assumed
for this study is to maximize the time available for combat,
by detecting the enemy threat far enough in advance to launch
the air-interceptor squadron, so as to engage the incoming
threat the longest possible time before reaching their bomb-
release line. It is assumed that the longer is the available
time for engagement (combat) , the greater is the likely reduc-
tion in the incoming threat.
2. The Air-to-Air Combat Process
After detection of the incoming threat, and identified
as hostile targets, the engagement of targets by the air-
interceptor squadron requires the following steps,
a. Scrambling All Operational Aircraft
The scramble time is measured from announcement of
the alert to the Dilots until take-off. This time consists
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of the time needed to start the aircraft engines, the time
required to align the instruments, and the taxiing time.
b. Target Designation and Engagement
This step consists of assigning an enemy bomber,
selected according to its threat index, to the aircraft most
suited to achieve target interception and destruction. The
outcome of the engagement is highly dependent on factors such
as :
Defender: Acceleration capability and tolerance, condi-
tional kill probabilities given a hit, bomber silhouette
dimensions, and the statistical nature of the projectile
(missiles and/or guns) versus target range. Skill and
training of the pilots also has an influence on the
outcome of the engagement, together with the rate of
fire that can be achieved by the weapon system.
Bomber: Availability and usage of electronic counter-
measure, accuracy of its defensive air-to-air weapon
system, the amount of load carried, skill and motivation
of pilots, and familiarity of pilots with defender's
tactics
.
The reliability and effectiveness of the command and




The complex problem of describing the interaction among
the different variables, resulting from considering all of
the preceding combat factors in detail, makes the use of a
high-resolution combat simulation appear necessary for repre-
senting the combat process in detail, i.e., at a "micro"
level. In this chapter we will represent the combat process
alternatively and at a simple "macro" level by:
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1. Deterministic (differential equations) models.
2. Diffusion processes.
3. Continuous-time-discrete-state Markov process.
Such representations, as will be seen, allow useful
calculations to be made analytically. The models do not,
however, recognize all detailed constraints to which the com-
bat process is subject. Nevertheless, they, or their exten-
sions, provide useful guidance to a decision maker.
The viewpoint taken to obtain macro-level combat models
is familiar, see Taylor (1983) . At any point of time during
the combat process, a defender aircraft can be found to be
either (i) engaging an enemy bomber, (ii) free and looking
for a free bomber, or (iii) killed. Similarly, an enemy
bomber can be found to be either engaged by a defender aircraft
or free and trying to avoid being detected or found by defender
aircraft, or killed. Suppose that we assume fight to the
finish; that is, once a defender aircraft detects and engages
an enemy bomber, the one-to-one engagement process will con-
tinue until either the bomber is killed or the defender air-
craft is killed. (Note that only one free defender can engage
a free bomber.) Under this scenario the combat process can
be represented by the state vector {B ( t ) ,C ( t ) ,D (t) ; t >_ 0}
where
:
B(t) = The number of enemy Bombers free (and
alive) at time t,
C(t) = The number of enemy bombers (in turn
defender aircraft) in Combat (i.e.,
engaged) at time t,
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D(t) = The number of Defender aircraft free (and
alive) searching for a free bomber at time
t.
Let a be the rate at which an individual defender in
combat with a bomber kills that bomber (or causes a bomber
to become ineffective) ; and a be the rate at which an indi-
vidual bomber, in combat with a defender, kills that defender
(or causes the defender to become ineffective)
.
Define to be the rate at which an individual free defender
detects and starts engaging a free bomber, i.e., 6 is the






ou isD (defenders) (time)
bombers engaged
(defenders) (time)
Note that the total number of bombers alive at time t is
given by B(t) + C(t), and the total number of defenders alive
at time t is given by D(t) + C(t)
.
Next, the simplest representations for the variables
B(t), C(t), D(t) will be presented: the process of mutual
attrition is taken to be deterministic.
D. DETERMINISTIC MODELS
To simplify the representation of the combat process
analysis, we introduce a deterministic representation of the
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process by suppressing its randomness. Such a deterministic
model often, as will be seen later, results in representations
that deviate somewhat from the expectations of more sophis-
ticated stochastic process models; such deviations may be
referred to as the bias of the deterministic model. Usually
the bias becomes small as B(0) and D(0) increase.
1 . The Finite Re-Engagement Rate Combat Model; (the
BCD ModeTT
First consider the situation described in the previ-
ous section in which 6, the re-engagement rate, is finite.
3The parameter 9 presumably increases if the defense C system
3is improved, but no attempt is made here to model C in a
detailed manner.
Define the following functions:
b(t), a representation of the number of bombers
free and alive at time t, given the initial
number of bombers and defenders entering combat
initially
.
c(t), a representation of the number of bombers
and defenders engaged in combat at time t, given
the initial number of bombers and defenders enter-
ing combat initially.
d(t), a representation of the number of defenders
free and alive at time t, given the initial num-
ber of bombers and defenders entering combat
initially.
RESULT (4.1) :
A deterministic model for the above scenario is given by





= a_c(t) - 6b(t)d(t)
8b(t)d(t) - (an+an )c(t) (4.1)dt v/~vw~xw vu,B . «D
dd(t)
= a_c(t) - 0b(t)d(t)dt ^D
with initial condition:
b(0) = B(0)
c(0) = C(0) =
d(0) = D(0)
The argument from which the equations is derived is
as follows.
The first equation of (4.1) represents the rate of
change of b(t) with time. The term a c(t) represents the
expected increase in b(t) caused by a bomber killing a defender,
while the term 0b(t)d(t) represents the decrease in b(t)
caused by a free defender detecting and engaging a free bomber.
The second equation of (4.1) represents the rate of
change of c(t) with time. The term 0b(t)d(t) is the expected
increase in c(t) caused by a free defender detecting and
engaging a free bomber, while the term (a_+a^)c(t) represents
B JJ
the decrease in c (t) caused by a bomber killing a defender,
or by a defender killing a bomber.
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The third equation of (4.1) represents the rate of
change of d(t) with time; the argument used for writing this
equation is the same as that for the first equation.
Equations (4.1) can be solved numerically using Runge-
Kutta method (Gerald, 1984) but not in simple explicit
closed form. However, a limiting analysis can be as follows.
Adding the first equation of (4.1) to the second, and
the third equation to the second of (4.1), we get:
d{b(t) +c(t)}
dt "da„ c (t)
(4.2)
d{d(t) +c(t) }
dt UBa„ c (t)
Define the following:
b(t), a representation of the total number of bombers
alive at time t, and
d(t), a representation of the total number of defenders
alive at time t.
Then
b(t) = b(t) + c(t)
d(t) = d(t) + c(t)
(4.3)








-dt— = " aB C(t)
(4.4)





B dt aD dt [q '^ }
Integrating both sides of (4.5), we obtain
aB
[b(t) - b(0)] = a
D
[d(t) - d(0)] , Vt (4.6)
But from the initial conditions:
b(0) = B(0) + C(0) = B(0)
and




[b(t) - B(0)] = a
D
[d(t) - D(0)] Vt (4.7)
Since a_ , a and c(t) assume nonnegative values, then
B D
(4.4) indicates that b(t) and d(t) are both nonincreasing
functions (as they should be)
.
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a. Criterion for Defenders to Win, BCD Model
A criterion for the defenders to win can be
obtained by noting that, in order to conclude that defenders
won, it must be assumed that b(°°) = 0, and d(°°) > 0. Using







Since a , a_ , d(°°) are all positive values, then
o U
anD(0) - a B(0) >U B






Hence, the condition for the defenders to win is
expression (4.9). If the inequality is reversed, bombers
win, i.e., some bombers survive.
Equation (4.8) also shows that:
anD(0) - a B(0)
d(oo) = -^ - (4.10)
a
D
Therefore, the deterministic approximation for
the number of defenders eventually surviving combat is
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independent of the rate of engagement 6 . This is not sur-
prising, since time extends indefinitely. Of course an equa-
tion comparable to (4.10) predicts (approximately) the
expected number of bombers surviving if (4.9) is reversed.
2 . The Infinite Re-Engagement Rate, Invulnerable
Defender Model
To simplify the representation of the combat process
we can assume an Invulnerable defender's model (I scenario).
Under the I scenario, we assume that the air defense system
3has a perfect C system represented by having = °°, and that
defenders are invulnerable, i.e., a = 0, and only one-to-one
engagement is allowed.
a. Deterministic Model for I Scenario
Under the I scenario assumptions, the combat





-a D(0) if b(t) > D(0)
(4.11)
aD
b(t) if b(t) < D(0)
with initial condition:
b(0) = B(0)
Equation (4.11) represents the rate of change of
b(t) with time. At any point in time if b(t) >_ D(0) then all
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defenders are in engagement (i.e., no free defenders), and
there are b(t) -D(0) free bombers. This is represented by
the term a
n
D(0). If b(t) < D(0) then all bombers are being
engaged (i.e., no free bombers), and there are D(0) -b(t)
free defenders, which justifies the term -aDb(t).
The solution for equation (4.11) can be derived
as follows:
Define:
t* = inf{t: t >_ 0, b(t) < D(0)}




D(0) for t < t*





Note that if B(0) < D(0), then t* = 0; and the
solution for (4.12) is given by:
-at
b(t) = B(0)e for t > (4.13)
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Suppose B(0) > D(0). Then equation (4.12) says
that there exists a time point, t*, such that for any time
point t less than t* , <_ t <_ t* , the rate of change of b(t)
is -a nD(0). Recall that only one defender can engage a free
bomber, so while bombers outnumber defenders, the rate of
decrease is proportional to the defender numbers. After the
point t*, b(t) declines below D(0), where its rate of change
becomes -a_.b(t).






Integrating both sides, and using the initial
condition, we obtain:
b(t) = B(0) - aDD(0)t for t < t* (4.14)
For t > t*, we have
db ( t ) . , . .
-g^ = -aDb(t)
aDt
Adding anb(t) to both sides, multiplying by e ,
and integrating, we obtain
Ci t ex t *
e
D b(t) - e D b(t*) = for t > t* (4.15)
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From (4.14), we obtain:




substituting into (4.15) and multiplying by e , we obtain
-a (t-t*)
b(t) = (B(0) - a
D
D(0)t*)e D for t > t* (4.16)
Hence, from (4.14) and (4.16), it follows that:
B(0) - a D(0)t for t < t*
(4.17)
-a (t-t*)
(B(0) -a D(0)t*)e for t > t*
From the definition of t*, we have
b(t*) - D(0)
Substituting into (4.17) we get




t* - (B(0) - D(0) )/aDD(0)
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Equation (4.17) permits the easy direct computa-
tion of b(t), the approximation for the number of bombers
alive at various points of time during the combat period.
Note that in the preceding analysis we have
assumed that the force levels are continuous variables. This
is an assumption that we had to make in order to use the
above differential equation models to develop deterministic
representation for the evolution of the combat process. The
tacit assumption of a deterministic process is perhaps even
more questionable. Thus, we should develop stochastic analogues
for the above deterministic models. A natural procedure is
to utilize diffusion models; see Feller (1971).
In the development of our diffusion models
we assume: (i) continuity of the force level variables,
and (ii) Gaussian increments included in the process.
We first consider a deterministic model, and then develop
its stochastic analogue by representing the evolution of the
combat system by a diffusion process, i.e., as if it evolves
with independent Gaussian increments. Since the force
levels (B(t),D(t)) are assumed to be continuous, the
diffusion mathematics result in a mean and a covariance matrix
that are approximations to the corresponding matrices that
would occur if the process was modelled by a continuous-time,
discrete-state Markov process. However, diffusions often
yield good approximations with improvements occurring for
large force level (B(0) -> °°, D(0) > °°) . It follows that the
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diffusion approximation can be used to approximate the MOE
under study, which requires approximating the probability
distribution of the number of free bombers at time t.
E. DIFFUSION MODELS FOR AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT
Following the arguments in Gaver and Lehoczky (1977a)
,
we now formulate the combat processes resulting from
modelling the previous scenarios by diffusion processes.
Since we assume the continuity of the state variables,
we will, therefore, adopt the following notation:
B(t) a stochastic diffusion representation for the
number of bombers free (and alive) at time t,
C(t) a diffusion representation for the number of
bombers (hence defenders) in engagement at time t,
and
D(t) a diffusion representation for the number of
defenders free (and alive) at time t.
1 . Diffusion Model for the BCD Scenario
Define N to be the total number of aircraft of both
forces available for combat initially, i.e., N = B(0) + D(0).
We aim to characterize the air-to-air combat process approxi-
mately when N -> oo, by treating {B (t ) ,C (t) ,D (t) ; t ^ 0} as
a trivariate diffusion process. When N -> °°, we mean that
B(0) -* °° and D(0) -> °° simultaneously and in a fixed proportion
The behavior of the system state vector, (B(t),C(t),
D(t); t 0}, can be modelled directly by writing it in the











dC(t) = 6B(t)D(t)dt - (c^+a^C^dt - / (a
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where {W, (t) ,W„ ( t) ; t >_ } is a bivariate standard Wiener
process whose components are independent. That is, each com-
ponent is normally distributed with zero mean and variance
dt.
The rationale for writing (4.18) is as follows. The
dt terms represent the drift or the expected behavior of the
state variable, [B (t) ,C (t) ,6 (t) ] , between t and t+dt. As
viewed by Gaver and Lehoczky (1977a) , the evolution of the
process can be considered as being that of a locally Poisson-
ian process of rate a DC(t), 0B(t)D(t) and a nC(t) for B(t), C (t)
and D(t) respectively, with the average output rates being
9B(t)D(t), (aB+a )C(t) and 6B(t)D(t), respectively.
The term a E)C(t) in the first equation of (4.18)c
represents the expected increase in B(t) caused by a bomber
killing a defender, while the term of anC(t) in the third
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equation represents the expected increase in D(t) caused by
a defender killing a bomber. The term 9B(t)D(t) used in
equations (4.18) represents the decrease in B(t) (hence D(t)),
and the increase in C(t), caused by a free defender detecting
and engaging a free bomber. The variance of the Poisson
equals the mean, and for large parameter values (in this
case large number of initial bombers and defenders) the Poisson
is approximately Gaussian; this heuristically justifies the
coefficient of the Wiener process terms, and the Wiener terms
themselves. An increase in B(t) indicates a decrease in the
total number of defenders alive (D(t) + C(t)); and vice
versa. This is represented by the coefficients of the Wiener
processes in the first equation of (4.18) having opposite
signs than the corresponding terms in the third equation.
Consider the linear transformation:
B(t) = Nb(t) + /N X
±
(t)
C(t) = Nc(t) + /N X
2
(t) (4.19)
D(t) = Nd (t) + /N X- (t)
where: b(t), c(t), and d(t) are deterministic functions of
time, being approximations to the process means which need
to be determined. {X.(t); t > 0}, i = 1,2,3, are stochastic
elements all of which need to be determined. Justification
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of such transformations is given by Gaver and Lehoczky (1977a)
Differentiating (4.19), we obtain:
dB(t) = Ndb(t) + /N dX
1
(t)
dC(t) = Ndc(t) + /N dX (t) (4.20)
dD(t) = Ndd(t) + /N dX (t)








Let 9 = 0N be constant as N -> °°; i.e., assume that
is small enough so that 6N -> constant as N -» °°. This means
that on the average a defender takes a relatively long time
to detect and engage a bomber.
Now, substituting (4.19) and (4.20) into (4.18), and
isolating terms of order N and /N and letting N -> <*>, we
obtain the following sets of equations.
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a. Deterministic Equations
















with initial conditions given by (4.21).
The solution to these equations, which is obtained
by numerical integration, provides a deterministic approxi-
mation to the means of the process. Note that equations (4.22)




This shows that the diffusion approximation results in the
same approximations for the means as the deterministic model.
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b. Stochastic Equations





































(t) + /Sb(t)d(t) dW
2
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which appears in the form:
dX(t) = A(t) X(t)dt + V(t) dW(t) (4.24)
where A(t) (a 3 x3 matrix) being identified as the coefficient
of ^ (t) ,X2 (t) ,X (t)
)
T
, and V(t) (a 3 x2 matrix) identi-
fied as the coefficient of the Wiener process term.
Now, since X(0) = 0, and b(0), c(0) and d(0) are
given by (4.21) , then by appealing to the central limit
theorem, for all t > 0, [X^ (t) ,X„ (t) ,X (t) ] has a trivariate
normal distribution with mean and variance-covariance
matrix Z (t) which satisfies the following differential
equation; Arnold (1974):
dt lit)












Therefore, we have obtained the following:
RESULT (4.2)
{B (t) ,C (t) ,D (t) } is trivariate normal (Gaussian),
as N (hence, B(0) + D(0)) > °°; where B(0) and D(0) > °°
simultaneously and at a fixed proportion:
{B(t) ,C(t) ,D(t)
}
Normal (N(b (t),c (t),d (t) ) ,NZ (t) )
From Result (2.1), it is possible to estimate
the probability that at least a specified number of enemy
bombers are free at time t, which is a useful measure of
effectiveness (MOE)
.
The deterministic equations (4.22) and the equa-
tion (4.25) for the covariance matrix E (t) can be solved
by numerical integration.







c(t)+6b(t)d(t) -/oB (aB+ciD)c(t) -/a^c (t)
-9b(t)d(t) -0b(t)d(t)
-9b(t)d(t)
-^(Og+a^cCt) (aB+aD)c(t) v^(c^+o~)c it J
-6b(t)d(t) +6b(t)d(t) +6b(t)d(t)




a ll^ °12 ^ a 13 ^
°12 ^ a 22 ^ a 23 ^
a 13 (t) o 23 (t) a 33 (t)
Equation (4.25) becomes








(t) o 12 (t) o-, 3 (t) a22 (t) ^ 23 (t) a 33 (t))
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(aB+aD )c (t) +9b ( t ) d ( t)
aD
c(t)+9b(t)d(t)
2 . Diffusion Model for the I Scenario
Under the I scenario we can characterize the combat
process approximately when B(0) -> °°, and D(0) -> <*>, by
treating (B(t); t >_ 0} as a diffusion process.
The Ito stochastic differential equation is:
-OLD(0)dt - /clD (0) dW(t) for B(t) > D(0)
dB(t) =
"V ,a6
-aDB(t)dt - •OTt) dW(t) for B(t) < D(0)
(4.27)
Equation (4.27) is written using the rationale used
for BCD scenario. Let
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Consider the following linear transformation
B(t) = B(0)b(t) + /B(0) X(t) (4.29)
Differentiating (4.29), we obtain
dB(t) = B(0)db(t) + /B(0) dX(t) (4.30)














if B(0)b(t)+^B(0Tx(t) < D(0) = 5B(0)
Isolating terms of order B(0) and /B(0), and letting
B(0) -> 0°, we obtain the following sets of equations,
a. Deterministic Equations








b(t) if b(t) < 6
(4.32)
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Let t* = inf{t: t > and b(t) < 6}, from equa-
tion (4.32), it follows that:
-a^6 if t < t :
db(
( -a b(t) if t > t'
dt (4.33)
Suppose X(0) = 0, then from equation (4.29), we
obtain the following initial condition:
b(0) = 1 (4.34)
For t < t*,
db(t) .
~dT~ ~ _aD 6 '
therefore using (4.34), we obtain:
b(t) = 1 - aD6t for t <_ t* (4.35)
For t > t*, we have, from equation (4.33)
db(t) r...





a D t ~ ~ * a n t
*
e b(t) - b(t*je =0 for t > t* (4.36)
From equation (4.48),
b(t*) = 1 - aD6t*
Substituting into equation (4.36), we get
l-a
D





6 *)e u for t > t*
but from the definition of t* , we have
b(t*) - 6
substituting into (4.37), we get:
b(t*) = 1 - aD 6t* - 6
Hence
:




The terms of order /B(0) yield:
"'I{ -a^X(t
-/aD 6 dW(t) for t £ t
:
dX(t) = / (4.39)
-)dt-/a
D
B(t) dW(t) for t > t*
For t < t*, from equation (4.39), we get:
dX(t) = - /aD 6 dW(t)
Integrating both sides, we get
X(t) - X(0) = -/a 6[W(t) - W(0)J (4.40)




Taking the variance of both sides of equation (4.40), we
obtain
Var(X(t)) = aD 6t
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Hence, for t . <_ t*, X(t) is normally distributed with zero
mean and variance a fit.
For t > t*, from equations (4.37) and (4.39), we
get:






















x / e dW(x)
t*
Thus,
-an (t-t*) -an (t~)








2Since the function e is a deterministic func-
tion then it is a nonanticipating function. The function
g(s) is said to be a nonanticipating function if, for each
s, g(s) is independent of {W(t) -W(s); t >_ s}; where W(t)
is a Wiener process with mean zero, and variance t. That
is, g(s) is independent of the future increments of the






is a stochastic integral (Arnold, 1974) and is a nonantici-
pating function (Schuss, 1980).
Now, by appealing to theorem (4.4.2) in Arnold
(1974) , we obtain:








E[{ / e dW(T)} ] = / e dx (4.43)
t* t*
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It follows from equations (4.42) and (4.43
that
aD T
Var{ / e dW(i)
}
t*
1, aD fc aDt%
—{e - e }
aD
(4.44)
Taking the expectation of both sides of equation
(4.41) and using equation (4.42), we obtain:
-a (t-t*)
E[X(t)] = e E[X(t*)J
But X(t*) - N(0,aJt*). Therefore we get
E[X(t)] = for t > f
Taking the variance of both sides of equation









— [e -e ]
D





5t*)[e U -e ]
Therefore, for t > t*, we have
-2a (t-t*) -a (t-t*) -a (t-t*)
X(t) ~ N{0,a
D
6t*e +(l-a 6t*)e (1-e )}
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We can summarize the above calculations as
:
RESULT (4.3) :
As B(0) * °° (hence D(0) -* °°)
, B(t) is approxi-
mately normal (Gaussian)
.
B(t) = N(B(0)b(t) ,B(0)Var (X(t) ) ) .
This result can be easily used to compute leakage
probabilities in terms of D(0).
F. A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS: AN APPROXIMATION
The diffusion approximation results in the same approxi-
mations for the process means as those given by the solutions
of the corresponding deterministic models of the previous
section. It has been shown above that, in addition to develop-
ing approximations for the process means, we are able to
derive expressions for approximating the variance-covariance
matrix of each process.
Note that the dimension of the system of differential
equations resulting from the diffusion approximations is not
a function of the initial size of the forces. For example,
in the BCD scenario, we need to solve a system of 3 differen-
tial equations to solve for the deterministic means, and to
solve a system of 6 differential equations for the variance-
covariance matrix. This allows military analysts to economi-
cally model combat processes for larger size problems. It
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also allows military OR analysts to derive expressions for
approximating (or estimating) probability statements that
represent measures of effectiveness (MOE) , and to compute
their values without expenditure of excessive computer time.
That is, a useful MOE can be approximated analytically, and
in near closed form; the results can be used in a program to
optimize logistics allocations. For example, suppose that
the MOE, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, is
to minimize the probability of penetration of at least z free
bombers. It is assumed that bombers are not capable of
delivering their load, or their bombs will not hit targets
defended, when they are being engaged by defenders. Define
T to be the time required for the bombers to reach the bomb-
release line (or the hand over line). Then B (T ) represents




) > z|B(0) ,D(0) } (4.45)
where the conditional distribution of {B (T ) | B (0 ) ,D (0) }
given B(0), D(0) is given by Result (4.2) or Result (4.3),
depending upon the scenario under consideration.
The diffusion assumes the continuity of the state variables;
it is also an asymptotic approximation, i.e., it gives good
approximation as B(0) and D(0) become large simultaneously.
We can relax these assumptions, and evaluate their practical
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validity, by formulating the combat process as a continuous-
time discrete-state Markov process. This will require some
other assumptions that will be stated in the next section.
G. MARKOVIAN COMBAT MODELS
Assume that the engagement time between a defender and a
bomber is Markovian (i.e., has an exponential distribution).
That is, a defender takes an exponential time with mean a
to kill a bomber, once an engagement started; and that a
bomber takes an exponential time with mean aD to kill a defender
Assume, further, that the defender takes an exponential amount
of time with mean to detect and engage a free bomber. The
air-to-air combat is formulated as a trivariate continuous-
time-Markov process. Recall that we continue to assume that
bombers are arriving simultaneously.
1 . BCD Markovian Combat Model
Under the BCD scenario, the state of the process is
represented by the trivariate-Markov process {B (t) ,C (t) , D (t)
;
t >_ 0} operating on the state space S ; where:
S = {(i,j,k): <_ i + j <_ B; <_ j+k <_ D; < i + j+k;
i = 0,1,..., B; j = ,1, . . . ,min (B,D) ; k = 0,1,..., D}.
During a small interval of time (t,t+dt], the state changes
occur with the following probabilities:
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t t+dt Probability
(i#jrk) * (i+l,j-l,k) f (i,j,.k)dt + o(dt)
-> (i-l,j+l,k-l) f (i,j,k)dt + o(dt)
(4.45a
(i,j-l,k+l) f D (i,j,k)dt + o(dt)
(i,j,k) 1 - f(i,j,k)dt + o(dt)

















(i,j,k) + fQ (i,j,k)
Let,
PmnJ .., (t) = P{B(t) = i,C(t) = j,D(t) = k|B(0) = m,run X/ ; l j k
C(0) = n,D(0) = 1}
In what follows, for simplicity of notation, we will
suppress the initial condition, and write:
Pi,j,k (t) ~ Pmn£;ijk (t '
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Apparently {B (t) ,C (t) ,D (t) ; t > 0} is a finite state
space multivariate death process, as defined by (4.45).
The forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations are derived
by writing the probability that the process is in state (i,j,k)
at time t+dt as a function of the state probabilities at time
t. The probability of being in state (i,j,k) at time t+dt
is, in general, expressed by:
Pi,j,k (t+dt)




1/j+1 ^(t) + fD (i,j +l,k-l)dtP. /j+1/k_1 (t)
+ o(dt);
the terms on the right-hand side express the mutually exclu-
sive possibilities: (i) no state change, (ii) the number of
combats increase by one, (iii) a bomber wins an engagement,
(iv) a defender wins an engagement.
Subtractinq P. . , (t) from both sides and dividing by
dt, and letting dt tend to zero results in the following sys-
tem of differential equations:
dt -f(i,j,k)P. (t) + fc (i+l,j-l,k+l)Pi+1/j_1/k+1 (t)
+ f
B





-* as dt * 0. If B(0) = B, and D(0) = D, then
the initial condition is:
1 if (i,j,k) = (B,0,D)






P! . . (t) = ±>3> Ki/j/k dt
The forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations may be
written out as follows, starting with the above initial condi-
tions and recognizing boundary conditions explicitly:
PB,0,D (t) "
-f(B '°' D)PB,0,D (t)
P











1 < k < D-l
Pi,0,D (t » -
-fii
-°- D)Pi,0,DW + fD ii - 1 ' D-1) h,l,^l it) <4 - 47)
1 < i < B-l
p6,j,k (t) =









l,j,o (t) " "f U-W*i.i.oM + fc (i+1 '3-1 '1)pi+i,j-i,i (t)
+ fgd-l.j+l.OlP^-,^
j+1
(t) i,j > 1 < i+j < B
pi,j,k (t) = -f(i '3^)Pi/jrk (t) + fc (i+l,j-l,k+l)P. +1;j _lik+1 (t)
+ fB (i-i,j+i,k) Pi.1/j+lik (t) + %(i.J+i^Dsitj+lfW
1 < i < B-l 1 <_ k < D-l
1 < i+j < B-l 1 < k+j < D-l
pi,j,k (t) "f (i'3.WPirjr!c (t) + fc (i+l,j-l,k+l)Pi+1# ._1/k+1 (t)
+ fB (i-l,j+l,k)P (t) (4.47)J (Cont'd)
1 <_ i <_ B-l 1 <_ k <_ D-l
i+j = B 1 < j+k < D-l
p
;,j,k (t) =
-f^' k > pi,j,k (t > + fc (i+i '^i ' k+i)pi+i fj-i f k+i (t)
+ f
D
(i^+1 ' k-1)Pi^l,k-l (t)
1 1 i :i B_1 1 1 k 1 D~1
1 < i+j < B-l j+k = D
pi,j,k (t)
= ^ (i+1 '3-1 ' ]*1 > pi+i fj-i Ifcfi«t >
1 <_ i < B-l 1 < k< D-l
i+j = B j+k = D
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'o,j,o (t) ^ t>,i.o)s0iii0w*tca.i-i.wlii_lil it.)




f (i '°'k)Pi,0,k (t) + V1-1 '1'*^-!,!,* 00 < 4 - 47(Cont'd)
+ fD (i,l,k-l)Pi(lik.l(t)
1 < i < B-l 1 < k < D-l





Pi,0,0 (t) " «Btt-i.i.»)Pi.i,i.o (t) 1 ± ± ± B
Let P. . , (s) be. the Laplace transform for P. . . (t)
,
1
, J , K 1(]/K
then




i i k (t)dt s > °
Taking the Laplace transform for P _ ^(t) , and using
D f U , JJ










Using integration by parts, it follows that:
- 1 + SPB,0,D (S) =
- f(B '°' D)PB /0/ D (s)
Therefore
PB,0,D (s) s + f (B,0,D)
Taking the Laplace transform for the general form
of P. . , (t) in (4.47), we get:
1/ 3 /K
pi,:,k (s) tf(i,i,M' fc (ltl 'J-1 'M)pitl,i-lM'81
+ fB (i-l,j+l,k)P..lf (>
+ fD (i-J+l.k-l)Pi,j+i,k_i (s)} (4.48)
Therefore, we obtain the following system of equations
for the Laplace transforms:
P
B,0,D (S) s + f (B,0,D)






B-l,l,k (s)) l± k iD-l (4.49)








k,j > 1 < k+j < D
p





+ fB (i-l,j+l,0)Pi_1(j+1/0 (s)}
i,j > 1 < k+j < D







(i, j+l,k-l)P. jj+1<k.1 (s)}
1 < i < B-l 1 < k <_ D-l
1 < i+j < B-l 1 < k+j < D-l
;i,j,k (s) = i+f(T^kr{fc (i+1 ^-1 ' k+1) ^i+i,j-i,k+i (s)
+ f
B
(i-i ;]4i,k) Pi_1/]+1 , (s)}
1 1 i 1 B_1 1 - k 1 D~1
i+j = B 1 < j+k <_ D-l
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pi,j,k (s) B*a,W% i±+1 '*-1M1) *i+i.i-i.toi {u)
+ ^(i.J+l^DPifj+ifM (s)}
1 •< i < b-1 1< k< D-l
j+k = D 1 <: i+j < B-1
K,j,k {s) " iTF(T7jTkr{fc (i+1 ' j-1 'k+1)pi+i,j-i,k+i (s)1
1 < i < B-1 1 < k < D-l





s+f(0,j y O) {fC (1^"1 - 1) ^l / j-l /l (s)} 1<J<«^^
Pi,0,k (s)
=






+ f_(i,l,k-l)P. , , , (s)} 1 < i < B-1 1 < k < D-l
1J 1 f J- f K X — —
P0,0,k ls) = i{fD (0 ' 1 ' k
-1) P0,
1 ,k-l
(s)} 1 ± k<- D




i-l,l,0 (s)} 1 l i ± B
Equations (4.49) are in a form that is suitable for






S+f(B-U^l) {fC (B -°'d)PBAD (S)}
PB,0,D-1 (S) s+f (B,0,r>l) L "B^^'^W^W*
P





1^1)PB-l / l / I>l
(s)}
PB-l,0,D (s) s+f (B-1,0,D)^HW)PH1^(B) }
P













B-2 / 2 / I>2
(s)}








s+f (B,0,D-2) "BfD (&-lrl,D-2)PM flfD_2 (3)}
P






D-2)PB-l / l,D-2 (5)
+ f
B















































B-2 f l / D-l
(s)}
'
Continuing in this manner we can solve for the Laplace
transforms recursively starting from state (B,0,D).
The state space, S, of the trivariate Markov process
is a nonempty set of states. Define the set of edges E to
be:
E = { [ (i, j ,k) , (n,m,£) ] : (i,j,k) and (n,m,&) e S,
and (n,m,£) is accessible from (i,j,k)}
Since { B ( t) ,C ( t) , D (t) ; t 0} is a multivariate pure death
process, then E is a nonempty set of edges. The edges are
ordered pairs [ (i
,
j , k) , (n ,m, I) ] of states. The state (i,j,k)
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is called the tail and the state (n,m,£) is called the head
of the edge [ (i, j ,k) , (n fm, I) ] . Let G = (S,E). Then G is a
directed graph. For a definition and discussion of graphs
see Aho, Hopcroft and Ullman (1974). Figure (4.2) illustrates
the graph G. Define the depth of a state (i,j,k) in G to be
the length of the path from state (B,0,D) to state (i,j,k),
where the length of each edge is 1.
The set of equations (4.50) shows that by knowing the
Laplace transforms of the states at the n depth of the graph,
stthen the Laplace transforms for the (n+1) depth can be
calculated for any value of s. With this observation we can
solve (4.49) by the following algorithm:
1. Construct the graph of the process. For the n
depth find the possible states and calculate its
widtn, i.e., how many states are in the n tn depth.
Continue until the width of the depth is zero.
2. For the n depth, if width (n) ^ then pick a state
(say (i
, j ,k) ) . Then:
2.1 Calculate the meanof the corresponding sojourn
time. ((f(i,j,k)) L )
2.2 Examine all states in the (n-l) st depth, to
determine which states are accessible to state
(i, j ,k)
.
2.3 Calculate the corresponding transition rates
from the state determined in (2.2) to (i,j,k).
2.4 Calculate the Laplace transform for (i,j,k).
Repeat for all states in the n^n depth. If
width (n) = 0, stop.
Recall, in Chapter III we derived a one-to-one mapping
between the multivariate Markov-process to a univariate Markov













A Graph Representation of the BCD Combat
Process
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to be able to store and retrieve the states and their corres-
ponding Laplace transforms.
The solutions for equations (4.50), i.e., the Laplace
transforms can be used to evaluate some measures of interest
as follows.
Suppose that the combat duration, TR , is assumed to
be a random variable distributed exponentially with mean
K • Let,
Pi,j,k (V = # B<V = i#C(TB) = j,D(TB ) = k|B(0) = B,
C(0) = 0,D(0) = D,TB }
Following the argument provided for evaluating the
readiness of the squadron at the time of attack under the par-
tial surprise scenario, we can express the combat outcome in terms
of a Laplace transform, as follows:
E[P
i i k (TB )]
=
/ P n i k (U)Ce
?UdU
= CP- , W U) (4.51)1 1 J / K
The probabilities P. . , (t) can be determined by
inverting the Laplace transforms P. . ,(s); see Gaver (1966)






tt . (B) = P{ i bombers eventually survive the combat}
From (4.47) we get






Integrating both sides, we obtain:
/ p i,o,o (T)dT V 1"1 ' 1 ' ' J Pi-l,l,0 <T)dT
Therefore
:





' / pi-i,i,o (T)dT
*LW = P i,0,0 ( °°»
= f
B
(i-l,l,0) J P i . 1/1
,
(T)dT
Hence, in terms of Laplace transforms,









I ifB (i-l,l,0)P._ (0) (4.531=1
Equations equivalent to (4.52) and (4.53) can be
derived for the defenders by following similar arguments.
3 . Markovian Combat Model for I Scenario
Under the I scenario, the state of the process is
given by {B(t); t >_ } . The transition probabilities
the process {B(t); t >_ 0} of order dt are as follows:
t t+dt Probability
i-1 f (i)dt + o(dt)
1-f (i)dt + o(dt)
(4.54)





minU,D(0) } ; (4.55)
Actually, the remaining results hold quite generally
for arbitrary f (i).
Let D = D(0), and B = B(0). The stochastic process
{B(t); t > 0} defined by (4.54) is a pure death process with
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state space {0,1,..., B}; see e.g., Feller (1971), Chapter
14. The parameters of the process are given by:










P. . (t) = P{B(t) = j|B(0) = i} (4.57)
1 1 J
For simplicity of notation, we will suppress the
initial condition for the moment, and write:
P, (t) E P (t)
J ± i J
The forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations can be
derived, as in the BCD case; i.e., the probability of being
in state (j) at time t+dt is expressed by:





+1 (t) + o(dt)
It follows that,
P!(t) =
-fD (j)P.(t) + f D (j+l)P (t)
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(t) + f D (j+l)P (t) 1 < j < B-l (4.58)
P'(t) = -f D (B)P B (t)
with initial condition
P. (0) . t
1 if j = B
otherwise




P. (s) = / e
" u
p. (t)dt s >
D J
Taking the Laplace transforms of (4.58), using inte-





P,(s) = f (i)+ S {fD (j+1) ^i+l (s)} 11J1B(0)-1 (4.59
P
n
(s) = kf n (l)P, (s) }s D 1
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Notice that (4.59) is already in a recursive form. Starting









PD , (S) = e /TA, , (f D (B-l)+s
v f D (B)+s
-,
f n (B-l) f n (B)







Continuing this way, we get
, B f (n)
p-(s) = * ,., , nf
D ( ^
)+s
n-j+1 f D (n)+s
Therefore, the solution for (4.59) is as follows
1
PD (s)B w ' fD (B)+s
-,
B f (n)
P. (s) = -
, .,
,
n c , ,
,
1 < j < B-l (4.60
3 f D
(3)+s
n-j+1 f D (n)+s ~ -
, B fn (n )
p«(s) = - n
s
n=l f D (n)+s
Note that the term f (n) / ( f (n) +s) refers to the Laplace
transform of the time spent in state (n)
.
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a. Evaluation of Measures of Effectiveness: I
Model
A useful measure of effectiveness is to compute
the probability of at least z bombers alive at time T_ (recall
B
T is assumed to be deterministic) in terms of B(0) and in
particular, D(0) = D. The latter is influenced by logistics
considerations. The probability of interest is:
P{B(T
B





> z|B(0) = B,D(0) = D} = £ P. (Tg) (4.61)
j=z+l -"
The probabilities P. (t) can be determined by
inverting the Laplace transforms P. (s) , see Ross (1983b)
.
Suppose TR is assumed to be exponentially dis-
tributed with mean £ . Then as in the case of BCD, we
can express the probability of interest in terms of the Laplace
transforms; i.e., it can be shown that:





If we continue using the assumption that bombers
being engaged by defenders are considered to be ineffective,
then a measure of interest is to compute the probability of
at least one free bomber reaching the bomb release line. Hence
the probability of interest is: P{B(T_) > D (0) I B (0) ,D (0 ) }
.
To evaluate this probability we construct an equivalence
relationship with the sojourn times of the process in every
state.
Let X., j = 1 , 2 , . . . ,B (0) , be the sojourn times
for {B(t); t >_ 0} in state j. Therefore, X., j = 1,...,B,




distribution F (x) = 1 - e that has a rate Da for
A • D
:
j = D,D=1,...,B, and a rate jan for j = 1,2,...,D-1.
The event {B(TD ) > D(0)|B(0) = B,D(0) = D} is
equivalent to the event that the B(t) process at time TR
is at state j such that j e {D+l , D+2 , . . . ,B}
.
Let S be the waiting time until there are exactly
D bombers alive. At this point each bomber is being attacked
by a defender (according to the present model) . Then
B
S = I X (4.63)j=D+l J
Thus, the event {B(TJ > D(0)|B(0) = B,D(0) = D}
B
is equivalent to the event {S~ > T„|B(0) = B,D(0) = D}. But
S D is a sum of i.i.d. exponential random variables with rate
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Da . Therefore, the conditional distribution of S given
B(0) = B, and D(0) = D, is Gamma (B-D,Da ).
Hence
:






















Another measure of interest is to compute the
expected number of bombers alive at time t, i.e., E[B(t)|B(0),
D(0)]. To simplify the notation, we will temporarily suppress
the initial condition, and write:
E[B(t)] = E[B(t) | B (0) = B,D(0) = D]
From the transition probabilities of B(t) of order dt given
by (4.54), we get:
I




( B(t)-1 with probability f (B(t))dt
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E[B(t+dt) |B(t) ] = B(t) - f D (B(t))dt
Taking expectation of both sides, we get,
E[B(t+dt)] = E[B(t)] - E[f
D
(B(t) )]dt
Subtracting E[B(t)] from both sides, dividing by dt and
letting dt tend to zero, gives:
E'[B(t)] = -E[fD (B(t))J
B
I f D (J)P i (t)
j =
From (4.55), it follows that:
D B
E'lB(t)] = -{ T a njP.(t) + anDP.(t)} (4.65)j=0 D ^ j=D+l U ^
B
Adding and subtracting £ a rP P ' ^ to t ^le r ignt~hand sidej=D+l D
of (4.65), we obtain:
B
E'[B(t)] = -a nE[B(t)] + cv (j-D)P.(t) (4.66)D D j=D+l 3
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From (4.60), we have,
-,
B f (n)
P. (s) = _ t^t— n F-T—r-r D+l < j < B-l
3 fD
(:)+S
n=j+l f D (n)+S
(Da ) B_j





D (j) = DaD for D <_ j <_ B.
Let L {P.(s)} denotes the inversion of P.(s),
then
Pj (t) = L X {P (s) }
r












D+ l < J < BF
j
ir; (B-j)l
Substituting into (4.78), we obtain:
B (Da t) B D "Da t
E'[B(t)]
- -anE[B(t)] + a n £ (j-D) r^TTi ej=D+l l J; "
Adding a E[B(t)] to both sides of the above equation and
aD
t
multiplying by e , we obtain:
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D E[B(tH} = °D I
+1
(J-°) (B-j). e
Integrating both sides, we obtain













JJ-D)D i_ e D j ^_
i=D+l (D-l) D ( k=0 K -
By transforming indices, we obtain
-a-,t -a_t B-D . _. _ __ . (













B > D (4.68)
Note that if B < D, we obtain
-at
E[B(t)] = Be u
When the combat process starts with B(0) = B D,
then there are no free bombers . Every bomber will be







1 if the i " defender is engaging a bomber
otherwise
Then, Y.(t), i = 1,2,...,B, are i.i.d. Bernoulli random
-at B
variables with probability e . Therefore, B(t) = Y.(t)
-at i=l x
is a binomial random variable parameter (B,e ). Hence,
-at
E[B(t)|B(0) = B,D(0) = D] = Be U if B < D (4.69)
Note: The above result can also easily be found
if the combat times of individual bombers vs. defenders are
arbitrary but i.i.d., denoted Z:
E[B(t)|B(0) = B,D(0) = D] = BP { Z > t}
We summarize the above in the following result.
RESULT (4.4) :
The expected number of bombers alive at time t
for the I model is given by:
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-CLt -a_t B-D







,1 + l Z?—JjifB>Dk=l
if B < D
H. THE LARGE-DEVIATIONS APPROXIMATION FOR THE I MODEL
The large deviations technique is based on the idea of
displacing the distribution towards a value of interest,
applying the central limit theorem to the displaced distri-
bution, and re-displacing. The resulting approximation will
better estimate the behavior of the distribution at the value
of interest, particularly when it is in the tail (is of small
probability). For an exposition and some useful theory, see
Feller (1971) and Esscher (1932); for an application see
Mazumdar and Gaver (1984).
As noted earlier the combat process is, in the case of
the I model, a pure-death process that starts initially from
state B. The pure death process {B(t); t > 0} operates
on the state space { , 1 , 2 , . . . , B (0 ) } . Let X., j = 0,1,...,B,
denote the sojourn times for (B(t); t >_ 0}, i.e., X. measures
the duration that the process spends in state j. Therefore,
X.
, j = 0,1, ...,B, are independent random variables with an
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exponential distribution F ( • ) that has a rate Da forX . D
:
j = D,D+1,...,B, and a rate jet for n = 0,1,..., D-l.
The model is constructed to evaluate P{B(t) > z|B(0) = B,
D(0) = D}. The event (B(t) > z|B(0) = B,D(0) = D} is equiva-
lent to the event that the process at time t is at state j
such that j £ { z+1 , z+2 , . . . ,B} . Let S be the waiting time
to get exactly z bombers surviving. Then we have:
BS= 7 X. 0<z<B (4.70
j=z+l 3
Thus the event {B(t) > z|B(0) = B,D(0) = D} is equivalent
to the event {S > t|B(0) = B,D(0) = D} . It follows that
P{B(t) > z B(0) = B,D(0) = D} = P{S_ > t|B(0) = B,D(0) = D}
B
= P{ I X. > t|B(0) = B,D(0) = D}
j=z+l 3
Note that the case B < D is a special case of a more
general case where B > D. Therefore, in what is to follow,











assumed to exist for real s > 0, s
n
< s <0. Since the random
variables X. for j = D,D+1,...,B are i.i.d. random variables,
then they have the same moment generating function. Let
<£ (s) be such a function,
x
Let F (s) be the moment generating function of S . To
simplify the notation let F(x) = F (x) and F(s) = F (s).
z z
We will also suppress the initial condition. Then
B
sS s I X n
z i=z+l J
F(s) = E[e Z ] = E[e J ]




(s)) n ^x (S) (4.72)j=z+l j
Let V be the probability distribution associated with
2
F(-) , with mean y and variance a where:
V{dx} = e / {dx} , s > o (4.73)
F(S)
Let V(^) be the moment generating function of V. Then
00 °° ( s+ ?) x r^r^i i
V<5> = / e5
xV{dx} = / " \ F ' dx >




V(£) = F(g+S) 5 > 0, s > (4.74
F(s)




<J> U + s) v B-D D-l *X. (C + S)
v( ^ = MStTST n a? , c ^ £ > (4.75
\ *x
(8> / j=z+l *x. (s)
D s >
Let K ( £ ) = £n V(£) be the corresponding cumulant generating
function. Then,
K(£) = (B-D) (in <j)
x (C + s)
- £n ^(s))
D-l
+ I (in (J) x (£ + s) - Jin cj>x (s)) (4.76)j=z+l j j
Differentiating equation (4.76) with respect to E, , and
evaluating the resulting function at £ = , we get the
following expression for the mean y(s)
.
(B-D)<J>'(s) D-l *X. (s)
V S) j =z+l ^X. (S)
J
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Differentiating equation (4.76) twice with respect to





























































s > 0, j = 0,1,... ,D-1 (4. 84
Note that the mean and variance of the associated dis-
tribution, equations (4.77) and (4.78), respectively, are
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functions of s. Therefore, there is a family of associated
distributions for F (•)• Let m(s) = t (i.e., center the
z
associated distribution at the point of interest) , and solve
for s. Let s be the value of s such that u(s) = t. Thus,
an associated distribution V has been determined. Therefore,
equation (4.73) becomes:
V{dx} = e -ZlMJ s > (4.85)
F(s)
with




variance = a (s)
Thus
and
F{dx} = F(s)e sXV{dx} (4.86)





P{S > t} = F(s) / e SXv{dx} (4.87)
Z
t
Invoke a normal approximation to V; this is justified
if the sum belongs to the domain of attraction of the normal
distribution according to the central limit theorem. Cer-
tainly the initial B-D components are i.i.d. and have a
second moment by assumption, and hence the CLT does apply
to their sum. Provided z is not too small (e.g., if
z = kB(0), k fixed), then the remaining terms are also
well behaved, and the normal approximation should be adequate





> t} - PLD (Sz > t)
= F(s) -^ -/
2 ~
1 r -sx 2a (s) dx
v/2~7f y (s) a (s)








~2 2 ~ ~2 2 ~
Multiplying the right-hand side by e , to
complete the square, we get:
~ ~ i"2 2
~
1 ~ " 2
~ ~ -sy(s)+pS a (s) °° -y(w+sa(s))
P (S > t} = F(s)e / e dwi,u z
Q
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Let x = w + sa(s) . From the above equation, we obtain
]~2 2 ~





> t} = F(s)e — ... . / e ' dx (4.88
/2tt sa (s)
Using equations (4.72) and (4.79) to (4.82), we obtain
Da n \ B-D / D-l ja n
f(s) |^A nDa D" § / \j=z+l 3a D_S
Since y(s) = t, equation (4.88) becomes
Da \ B-D / D-l ja v -st +^s a (s)
PTn{S : t} I—
^
[ n ^-Ar] e Z (l-0(sa(s)))
(4.89)
where








J + I —j '
(DaD-s) j=z+l (jaD-s)
and s is the appropriate solution of









To solve for s, we note that s > since it is the trans-
form variable for the moment generating function. We also
note that in order to have P{S > t} > 0, we must have
z —
-
-* > for every j = z + l,...,D-l. Hence, s < (z+l)a^.ja -s J J D
Therefore we obtain the following condition on s:







D j=z+l J D
Hence, if t > t*, then s > 0. We now need to determine if
for all values of t > t* there will always exist a < s < (z+l)a p
such that equation (4.90) is true.
Define
f (S) = rr + ) -. - tDa
D"
S j-Z+1 3aD" S
The function f(s) is a piece-wise continuous (differen-
tiable) function with points of discontinuity s = ia
,
D
j = z+l,...,D. Differentiating f(s) over the ranges of
continuity (differentiability), we get:
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R-n D-1 i
f'(s) = —— 7 + I 7 for < s < (z + l)a_
(Da -s) Z j=Z+l (ja -s) D
and for ja Q < s < (n+l)a ; j = z+2,...,D.
From the model assumption we have B > D. Therefore
f ' (s) > V < s < (z+l)a ; jaD < s < (j+l)aD
Hence, the function f (s) is a piecewise continuous func-
tion, and each piece is a monotdnically nondecreasing function
over its corresponding range.
Note that f(0) < for t > t*, and f((z+l)a ) = °° for
any t. Thus, by imposing the condition t > t*, there will
always exist < s < (z+l)a such that f (s) = 0. The bisec-
tion method (Gerald, 1984), was implemented to determine s
numerically.
Hence, the Large-Deviation approximation for the invul-
nerable combat model becomes:
1~2 2
~







y (1 - $(sa(s)))
where
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t > Mz£ + Y J_ B> D












< s < (z+l)a
such that:
Da -s j=z+l ja -s
In Appendix A we derive a general equation for the
large deviations approximation for a fixed and a randomized
sum of i.i.d. random variables, together with some applications
to other logistics problems.
I. SIMULATION OF BCD MARKOVIAN MODEL
In order to check the multivariate diffusion approxi-
mations for the BCD model, a simulation was carried out by
using Monte-Carlo methods to generate a realization of the
air-to-air combat process, which is modelled as a trivariate-
continuous-time discrete-state Markov process. Combat data
were then generated to compute combat statistics.
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The Monte-Carlo simulation was constructed based on the
following
:
a. The time spent by the process at state (i,j,k) is
exponentially distributed with rate f(i,j,k). If
desired, the exponential distribution can be replaced
by an arbitrary distribution function to obtain a
semi-Markov model.






P{X. . , < t} = ! (4.92
, t <
b. The transition probabilities for the embedded Markov
chain are as follows:
Present Next Probability
fB (i, j ,k)(i,j,k) + (i+l,j-l,k)
f (i,j,k)
fr (i,j,k)
(i-i, j+ i,k-i) fTl737k) (4 - 93
f
D (i, j ,k)
(i f j-l,k+l) f(i,j,k)
The conditions in (a) and (b) are used, together with a
uniform random number generator that produces independent
samples of a random variable that is uniformly distributed
over the interal (0,1), so as to generate a realization of
the combat process. This is done by generating two independent
samples of a unit uniform variate, denoted by U-, and U„ .
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U-, is used to produce a realization of the time X. . ,
,
time spent in state (i,j,k), by applying the inverse trans-
form method, as follows:
P{X. . . < x. . . } = 1 - e f (i'J' k > x = u





= 1 - U = U
]_
Therefore,
-f (i, j ,k)x . . = In V,
Thus, we obtain, as is well-known,
- Jin U,
X. . . = g-7-i . t^ (4.94)i, j ,k f (1,3 ,k)
The number U„ is used to determine which state the process
will enter next. After spending x. , units of time in
l / 3 i K
state (i,j,k), the process will next transit to:





f (i,j,k) f (i,j,k) + f (i,j,k)





We collect statistics for the process by discretizing
the time domain. Let At be the length of the time increments,
and T be the length of time for the simulation of the process.
T could be the time for bombers to be in region from detec-
tion to hand-over line. Define N to be the number of incre-




BB,BS to be arrays of size (N+l) whose entries are
M M 2
BB(n) y B (nAt) ; BS(n) 7 B (nAt)L





CC,CS to be arrays of size (N+l) whose entries are
M M ?
CC(n) 7 C (nAt); CS(n) = 7 C (nAt)L
t m u n m
m= 1 m=
DD,DS to be arrays of size (N+l) whose entries are
M M
2












is a (the m ) realization of the state of the process at
time nAt for the m replication, and M is the total number
of replications.
_ 2
Let B(t) and S (B(t)) be the sample average and variance,








Z (B(nAt)) = I —- ^ n = 0,1,.. . ,N (4.97)
m=l
It can be shown that the above are unbiased estimators
for the process mean and variance (Larson, 1983).
Equations similar to (4.96) and (4.97) can be constructed
for C(t) , and D(t)
.
J. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION FOR VARIOUS COMBAT MODELS
This section presents some numerical illustrations for
the various combat models presented above. The illustra-
tions will be conducted by comparing the diffusion approxima-
tions with the simulation estimations or the actual parameters
242
when possible. Therefore, for the BCD combat model we
compare the diffusion approximations to the simulation
estimations, while for the I combat models we compare the
diffusion and the large deviations approximations to the
actual values.
1 . An Illustration for the BCD Combat Model
The following basic data were used as an example
for model illustration:
A threat of B(0) = 12 bombers attacking an area of
responsibility of an interceptor squadron that is
assigned exactly a = 40 aircraft. Therefore, at the
time of attack, the interceptor squadron will have
D(0) aircraft ready to engage in combat where
< D(0) < a.
Each interceptor aircraft (and bomber) is assumed to
take an exponential amount of time, to kill its
opponent with mean (ap)""^ = (.008)~1 seconds (and
(aB )~l = (.004)~1 seconds) respectively.
The command and control system is assumed to take
an exponential amount of time, with mean (6 )~^- =
(.006)~1 seconds, to detect and engage a free bomber.
FORTRAN programs were written for:
1. Computing the approximate mean and variance for B(t)
using the diffusion approximation.
2. Simulating the discrete-state Markovian combat process
to compute the mean, and variance for B(t). The
number of replications M = 10,000.
For illustration purposes the following values for
D(0) were considered:
D(0) = 6, 12, 16, 20, 30, and 40 .
Figure (4.3) shows plots of the simulation mean,
and the deterministic mean resulting from the diffusion model
243
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for the above cases. It is clear from the plot that the
diffusion approximation produces a good approximation for
the mean of the process.
Figure (4.4) shows a comparison of the variance func-
tion resulting from the diffusion model with the variance
function resulting from simulating the Markovian combat proc-
ess, for the above different values of D(0). The figure
shows that the diffusion approximation provides a good
approximation to the variance as D(0) increases. Since we
are assuming an increase of B(0) + D(0) -> °°, where B(0) and
D(0) -> °° simultaneously and at a fixed proportion. We












Figure (4.5) shows a plot of the resulting vari-
ance functions of B(t) for the above cases as determined
by the simulation model and the diffusion approximation.
The figure shows that the variance approximation result-
ing from the diffusion model greatly improves as B(0) and
D(0) -* °° simultaneously and at a fixed proportion. Note
that the diffusion variance is systematically larger than
the simulation variance, but the discrepancy is reduced as
time advances. Since it is probably the relatively long
245
WO) -6 0(0) - 12
twe
0(0) - 16 0(0) - 20
TIC
0(0) - 30 0(0) - 40
Figure 4.4. Plots of the Variance Approximation Resulting
from Diffusion Versus Variance from Simulation,






































































times (of flight of the bombers towards their objective)
that is of interest, the discrepancy may not be serious,
but in any case the direction of the difference is conser-
vative: The diffusion model will predict greater leakage
of bombers than does the (presumed) more exact simulation.
The diffusion computation is far more computationally
economical* Its adoption actually permits many more rapid
calculations than would use of simulation.
2 . An Illustration for the Invulnerable Combat Model
The following basic data were used as an example
for model illustration:
A threat of B(0) = 20 bombers attacking an area of
responsibility of an interceptor squadron.
The squadron has exactly D(0) = 13 aircraft operational
and ready to engage.
Each interceptor aircraft is assumed to take an
exponential amount of time to kill a bomber with mean
(an
)~l = 20 minutes.
An interceptor aircraft is assumed to be invulnerable,
and is controlled by a perfect command and control
system. Therefore the time taken for a free defender
to start engaging a free bomber is instantaneous, i.e.,
equal to zero.
The intelligence has reported that the enemy tactical
doctrine dictates that the raid to be cancelled if
there are z = 2 bombers or less alive. Hence, we are
interested in evaluting P{B(t) > 2JB(0) = 20,D(0) = 13}
FORTRAN programs were written for:
1. Computing the stochastic mean, stochastic variance
and probabilities using the Markov-process formulation
2. Computing the approximate mean, and variance using
the diffusion approximation, and then applying the




3. Computing the approximate probability using the large-
deviations approximations.
Figure (4.6) shows a plot for the stochastic mean
compared to the deterministic mean. We find that the
deterministic mean yields a good approximation for the sto-
chastic mean. To further investigate that, a plot of the
stochastic mean versus the deterministic mean, and a plot
of the difference between the stochastic mean and the deter-
ministic mean versus time, are shown in Figure (4.7). It is
obvious from the figure that the two means form a 45° line
when plotted against each other. Figure (4.7) shows that the
bias between the 2 means tends to zero as t -> °°. The bias
is defined to be the difference between the stochastic mean
and the deterministic mean.
Bias = Stochastic mean - Deterministic mean
Figure (4.7) also shows that the bias is always
positive and tends to increase from zero at t = to a
maximum bias of .167, and then starts to decrease to zero as
t -* °°. This shows that the deterministic mean under-
estimates the stochastic mean for the initial stages of
combat
.
Figure (4.8) shows a plot for the exact variance
compared to the variance resulting from the diffusion approxi-
mation. We find that the variance obtained by diffusion gives




















































































































































stochastic variance versus the diffusion variance, and
of the difference between both variances versus time,
are shown in Figure (4.9). It is obvious from the figure
that there exists some bias in the variance, and such bias
tends to disappear as t •* °°. In this case, the bias is
defined to be the difference between the stochastic variance
and the diffusion variance.
Bias = Stochastic Variance - Variance by Diffusion
Since there exists bias in both the mean and
variance approximations, we expect to have some difference
between the actual probabilities for the Markov process
and the probabilities resulting from applying the normal
approximation
.
Figure (4.10) shows a comparison between the actual
values for p{B(t) > 2|b(0),D(0)} as a result of applying the.
Markov-process model, and the normal approximation values
without continuity correction using the diffusion approxima-
tion. Figure (4.11) shows the same comparison as Figure
(4.10) but after applying the continuity correction factor
to the diffusion approximation. We find that the continuity
correction factor has improved the diffusion approximation
results
.
Figure (4.12) shows a comparison between the actual
values of P{B(t) > 2|b(0),D(0)} and the large deviations




























































































































































































































































correction for the large deviations, since the large deviation
equation has been derived for a sum of exponential random
variables. Figure (4.13) shows a comparison of the actual
probability and the diffusion approximation for large values
of t. Comparing Figures (4.12) and (4.13) , we find that,
for large values of t, the large deviations better approximate
the actual probability than the diffusion approximation.
Figure (4.14) shows a plot of the diffusion approximation
versus the actual probability for large values of t. We
find that the resulting curve doesn't form a 45° straight
line. Figure (4.14) also shows a plot of the relative error
over time, where
, . . Actual - Diffusion
relative error = J Actual
We find that the error tends to increase steadily until it
hits a 100% error, a 100% error means that the diffusion
has resulted in P{B(t) > 2|b(0),D(0)} = 0, while the actual
probability is not yet equal to zero.
Figure (4.15) shows a plot of the large deviations
approximation versus the actual probability. We find that
the resulting plot forms approximately a 45° straight line,
which suggests that the large deviations yield a good approxi-
mation to the actual probability. Figure (4.15) also shows
a plot of the relative error over time, where the relative
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_ , _ Actual - Large DeviationsRelative Error = J =
—
r—*-*Actual
We find that the error tends to increase initially
but drops to zero for very large values of t. This suggests
that the large deviations tend to give a better approximation






One of the major problems an air force faces is the
determination of its budget allocation when a new weapon
system is to be phased in. In this chapter, the term "weapon





Repair facilities, including personnel.
Early warning system.
Other components, such as the intelligence system, and
3the communication, command and control (C ) system can be
considered to be part of the general weapon system defined
above. For example, as seen in the operational logistics
models constructed in Chapter II, the effect of the intelli-
gence system is considered under the total and partial surprise
3
scenarios. The C system effect is introduced very economically
in the combat models under the BCD scenario, developed in
Chapter IV, which is represented by the time spent to detect
and engage an enemy bomber. The early warning system influ-
ences the duration of the combat . The sooner the attack is
detected, the sooner the defenders can meet and engage it
before it reaches the handover or bomb release line.
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The outcome of combat depends upon the number of defenders
ready to engage at the time of attack, D(0) . For planning
purposes, D(0) is a random variabe; its distribution has
been determined in Chapters II and III by use of the logis-
tics model.
The effectiveness of a weapon system, WS , must be evalu-
ated by a model that determines the readiness of WS at the
time of attack, and then computes the MOE for the squadron.
Hence, we need a model that is capable of integrating a
logistics model with a combat model. Such a model is referred
to as a Combat-Logistics model .
In formulating combat-logistics models, the type of air-
craft is assumed to be known to the analyst. In reality the
analyst may wish to assess the effectiveness of different
aircraft types. Mathematical optimization techniques may
finally be applied to the combat-logistics model to define
the optimal weapon system.
B. OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this chapter is to determine an
optimal weapon system for an interceptor squadron that meets
specified mission needs. The determination takes into account
budget, combat, and logistics constraints.
To determine an optimal weapon system .means first to
identify the various feasible weapon systems that are avail-
able for the decision maker, considering "real-life" constraints,
and then to select the weapon system that optimizes the
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measure of effectiveness of the interceptor squadron. In
reality it may be best to present the decision maker with
a selection among a few systems (a short menu) along with
some uncertainty assessments as to cost and performance.
C. SCOPE
An air-interceptor squadron is selected to represent
the situation under study. The squadron is considered to
consist entirely of the same type of interceptor (or fighter)
aircraft. The decision maker has a budget of $K for procur-
ing the weapon system, and an annual budget of $Ki t to be
allocated for maintenance facilities (repairmen or crews,
and equipment)
.
This study concentrates on finding the optimal way of
distributing (allocating) the initial budget and the annual
budget among the different components of the weapon system.
Here the term "optimal" refers generally to the minimization
of the probability of enemy bomber's penetration. The proba-
bility of penetration has been analyzed in the previous
chapter.
D. THE MODEL'S BASIC CONCEPT
1 . General
The CL model assumes a small or middle-sized air force,
represented by a squadron, defending a specific area of
responsibility against a known enemy. However, the mathemati-
cal modelling is more general and can be applied to many




The following specific assumptions can be made:
(i) The threat can be assessed far into the future.
The number of enemy bombers attacking, together
with their capabilities, can be predicted.
(ii) There is no attrition of aircraft and/or modules
during non-combat periods.
(iii) No modules leave or enter the logistics system.
(iv) There is only one level of repair (i.e., no depot
repair)
.
(v) Immediate replacement of flight-line level.
(vi) Full instantantous cannibalization
.
(vii) There is no recruiting or attrition of repairmen
(or crews) during the non-combat periods.
(viii) There is no support from any of the neighboring
country's air force during the combat periods.
E . APPROACH
To achieve the above objectives, the combat-logistics
process of the squadron has to be analyzed. The combat-
logistics process represents the combat, non-combat activities
of the squadron. The effect of the budget allocation supplies
the restrictions for determining the optimal weapon system.
When a weapon system is procured, it will operate under a
peacetime environment (non-combat periods) , where it should
be managed and maintained so that it is found in maximum
readiness when called upon for combat. The weapon system
then performs its prime objective (conducts combat) , so as
to achieve certain combat objectives, as measured by a
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suitable MOE . Therefore, when comparing weapon systems, we
need to evaluate the weapon system under both peace and
wartime (combat and non-combat) environments.
WS is first evaluated during non-combat periods by the
operational logistics models discussed in Chapters II and
III. The readiness (availability) of aircraft is then deter-
mined as an initial condition for the warning model. If a
total surprise scenario is considered then the distribution
of aircraft readiness, resulting from considering the limiting
distribution of the operational logistics model, is provided
as an initial condition for the combat model. If a partial
surprise scenario is considered, then the limiting distribu-
tion of the operational logistics model is considered to be
the initial condition for the warning model, constructed
in Chapter II. The warning model provides the distribution
of aircraft readiness at time of attack. This is used as
an input to the combat model, where MOE ' s are then evaluated.
A schematic for the above approach is shown in Figure (5.1) .
The combat-logistics process can be formulated as a
mathematical programming problem. The constraints for the
mathematical program are divided into two categories.
1 . Budget Constraints
The budget constraints are subdivided into the
following two categories:
(a) Fixed budget constraint: This represents the



















Figure 5.1. A Schematic for a Combat-Logistics Model
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(b) Annual budget constraint: This represents the annual
budget allocated for the squadron to operate and
maintain WS.
2 . Operational Constraints
These represent the necessary levels for the various
components of WS , so that the squadron can conduct its mission
during both combat and non-combat periods. Note that the
budget constraints may be incompatible with the operational
constraints (requirements).
F. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We now consider a simplified illustrative representation
of the problem confronting a decision maker. Consider an
aircraft squadron that is assigned a budget of $K to procure
WS . WS is to consist of:
1. A number, a, of aircraft.
2. M-, and M„ repairable modules of Type 1 and Type 2,
respectively
.
3. R]_ and R2 repairmen to be assigned to Shop 1 and
Shop 2, respectively.
4. An early warning system.
Suppose the squadron is allocated $K-, annually as a
maintenance budget (or annual salaries for repairmen (plus
the cost of necessary equipment)
.
The squadron is to defend the area against a prototypi-
cal threat of B(0) enemy bombers, attacking simultaneously
a number of national and/or military targets. The squadron
is assigned the responsibility of minimizing the probability
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of the enemy bombers ' penetration to or beyond their bomb
release line (a hand-over line) . Recall the following com-
bat model. Each enemy bomber is assumed, when engaged by
a defender, to take an exponential amount of time, with
mean a , to kill a defender (if unopposed) . Each defender
is assumed to take an exponential amount of time, with mean
6 , to detect and engage a free bomber, and an exponential
amount of time, with mean an , to kill a bomber (if unopposed)
once engagement starts; the combat is thus modelled as a
competing risk problem. It is assumed that only one free
defender can engage a free bomber, and that the engagement
will be fight-to-the-f inish.
Let X denote the overall Markovian failure rate of an
individual aircraft, and let p, denote the conditional proba-
bility that a failure requires just Type 1 (e.g., engines)
repair, p~ the conditional probability that the failure is
of Type 2 (e.g., avionics) and p, - the conditional probability
that both Type-1 and Type -2 failures occur. Thus, p, + p„ + p,
~
= 1, and the sequence of successive failure types is one of
independently and identically distributed random variables.
Finally, it is assumed that repair is Markovian (or exponen-
tial), where only one repairman can work on a failed module,
and y . denotes the rate at which an individual repair of
Type i, i = 1,2, is completed at Shop i. Let R. be the




, i = 1,2, denotes the number of modules of Type i,
i = 1,2, that are in or require repair at time t.
B(t) denotes the number of free bombers at time t.
C(t) denotes the number of bombers (hence defenders) in
engagement at time t.
D(t) denotes the number of free defenders at time t.
As shown in previous chapters, the stochastic process
{X-,(t) ,X„ (t) ; t ^ 0} is a bivariate birth and death process;
and the stochastic process {B (t) ,C (t) ,D (t) ; t _> 0} is a tri-
variate pure death process, defined by (2.16) and (4.45),
respectively
.
It was shown in Chapter IV that the process
{B (t) ,C (t) ,D (t) ; t >_ } can be approximated by the trivariate
diffusion process {B (t) ,C (t) ,D (t) ; t > 0}; where B(t), C(t),
and D(t) is the continuous approximation for B(t), C(t), and
D(t), respectively.
G. MODEL'S STRUCTURE
1 . The Objective Function
The objective of the squadron is to minimize the
probability of penetration of enemy bombers. The probability
of more than z free bombers reaching their bomb release line
is given by P{B(t) > z|B(0)}; this can be obtained by blend-
ing the combat model with the logistics model. From the
law of total probability, we obtain:
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P{B(t) > z|B(0)} = I P(B(t) > z|B(0),D(0) = j}P(D(0) = j} (5.1)
j=0
Let u (B(0) ,D(0) ,t) and a
2 (B (0 ) ,D ( ) , t ) be the conditional
mean and variance of the marginal process {B(t); t
_> } ,
given the initial force levels. From Results (4.2), and
(4.3), we find that:
B(t) - N(y(B(0) ,D(0) ,t) ;a 2 (B(0) ,D(0) ,t))
It follows that P{B(t) > z|B(0) = B} can be conveniently
calculated as follows:
a
P{B(t) > z|B(0) = B} - I P{B(t) > z|B(0) = B,D(0) = j}P{D(0) = j}
j=0

































a(B,j,t) }P{D(0) = j} (5.3)
where min [ ] refers to the act of minimizing (maximizing)
WS
the quantity [ ], subject to budget constraints.
To evaluate the objective function, we need, for every
j , to:








— } usinq one of the
o (B, ] , t)
diffusion combat models constructed in Chapter IV.
Alternative combat representation can also be
utilized as required, but the diffusion model renders
computer calculations economical.
(b) evaluate the term P{D(0) = j} using one of the
operational logistics models constructed in Chapters
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II and III for a range of logistics assets (spare
parts, repair facilities) that is within budget
constraints
.
(c) select the optimal combination from the results of
(b) .
2 . Budget Constraints
a. Fixed Budget Constraint
A major constraint when a weapon system is to
be procured is the amount of available (or planned) budget.
The budget is thought of, in this study, as a fixed budget
that is available to purchase the hardware components of the
weapon system, which are:
aircraft,





I = number of different types of modules
Hence, the budget must be equal to or exceed
the summation of the products of the above components of
WS times their individual cost coefficients, assuming that
linear costs are appropriate; otherwise a suitable non-
linear cost is required. Thus:
I N
c n a + V c .M. + V d E <K (5.4)
.
L




K($) : Total amount of budget available
M. : Number of Modules of Type i
E : Early warning system, type n
c ,c.,d : The cost coefficients of aircraft, module
° i n j th n • Ltype 1, and n Uil early warning system
respectively
N : Number of different types of early warning
systems available to purchase.
b. Annual Budget Constraint
The annual budget considered, for this study,
is the annual maintenance budget. This is represented by
considering the annual running cost of the maintenance
facilities (e.g., annual salaries of repairmen).
Therefore, the planned annual budget must be
equal to or exceed the summation of the products of the
number of repairmen (or crews) assigned to Shop i times
their individual annual salary (or cost). Thus we obtain:
) r.R. < K 1
.
L
-. 11 — 1i=l
where
K, = Total annual budget planned for maintaining
WS
R. = Total number of Repairmen to be assigned
to Shop i
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r. = The annual salary for an individual repair-
man assigned to Shop i.
3 . Operational Constraints
In order for the interceptor squadron to conduct
training programs and reconnaissance missions during non-
combat periods , and to be able to cause some damage to enemy
bombers during combat periods, the number of aircraft, a,
must have a positive lower bound. The lower bound of a, I
,
should be at least 2 aircraft so that some training missions
can be conducted. However, the solution strategy for our
models allows different values of I which can be determined
a
by the decision maker. Therefore, we obtain the following
condition:
a > £ (5.6)
— a
Similarly, lower bounds for M., i = 1,2,. ..,1, can
be derived. In order for the event of having all of the
aircraft assigned to the squadron operational, to occur,
we must have the following condition:
M. > a i = 1,2, ... ,1 (5.7)
Since the modules are assumed to be repairable, then
every shop should be assigned at least one repairman (or
crew) . Of course our model implies that the probability of
having at least one idle repairman at Shop i is one if R. > M.
Hence we obtain the obvious constraint:
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1 <_ R. <_ M. , i = 1,2,. ..,1 (5.8)
In a more detailed model several crews or individuals might
work simultaneously.
Modules that are operational, and not installed
on any aircraft, are stored in the supply depot. This results
in a capacity constraint; for planning purposes, this can
be represented by the decision maker specifying a certain
coefficient, p., for determining the ratio of modules of
Type i to aircraft, where:
M. < p. a then p. e [1,°°)
l — H 2. 1
Considering (5.7), it follows that,
a <_ M. <_ p. a i = !,...,! (5.9)
— x
It is assumed that only one early warning system
is to be purchased for the air defense system. This can
be represented by the following constraint:
N
T E 1 , and E is binary, n = 1,...,N (5.10)L
, n n
n=l
Finally the WS , WS*, that maximizes the objective




















a l MilP- a i = 1, . . . ,1
1 1 Ri 1 Mi i = 1 , . . . , I
E binary n = 1,...,N
a, M. , R., i = 1,...,I, are positive integers
In general models that integrate logistics with
combat will be referred to as combat-logistics (CD models.
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H. COMBAT LOGISTICS MODELS: SIMPLE ILLUSTRATIONS
Suppose there are two early warning systems, E, and E~
,
available for purchasing. Each system can allow a different
combat duration. The term "combat duration," referred to
in this chapter, is the length of time required for the
bombers to reach their bomb release line, measured from
the beginning of the engagement.
Let t, be the combat period achieved by deploying E,
,
and t~ be the combat period achieved by deploying E„ ; t-.
and t~ are assumed to be deterministic.
Special cases of the above combat-logistics model are
the Single-Module Combat-Logistics (1MCL) and the Two-
Module Combat Logistics (2MCL) models.
1 . Single-Module Combat-Logistics Model (1MCL)
Under the single-module logistics assumptions,
stated in Chapter II, the corresponding combat model becomes
1MCL: max j ${
Z ^ j^ }P{D ( 0) = j}
WS j = °&>1'V
s . t
.













E-. , E^ binary; a, M positive integers
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Note in the present 1MCL formulation we may drop
the annual budget constraint for the repairmen. This is
because it is assumed that there is only one shop. There-




where r = annual salary for an individual repairman, since
the above salaries are the only component of annual cost
in the present model.
The maximization is thus over the specification of
WS , where we abbreviate the latter as
WS = [a, M, E
x
]
i.e., WS is represented by a vector whose components are
the number of aircraft, a, the number of spare modules, M,
and the particular warning system selected, E- . If E, = 1
then the first early warning system is selected, otherwise
E-, = which indicates that the second early warning system
is selected.
Availability of aircraft is a nondecreasing function
of the number of modules purchased for a given number of
aircraft. That is, if the squadron has a number, a, of
aircraft then procuring more modules will tend not to decrease
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the availability of aircraft. The above, and constraints
of 1MCL, justify the following, for a given value of a:
let M = min{pa,
K-dlEl -d 2 E 2 -c a
1MCL can be solved' iteratively over all feasible
values of a, E-, , and E„ ; while choosing M to be as given
above
.
2 . Two-Module Combat-Logistics Model (2MCL)
Under the two-module lgistics assumptions, stated









a(B?j?t)' >g {D < > " i }
























a 1 M i — Pn a
a £ M2 — p ? a





E, , Ep binary; a, M, , M 2 , R, , R are positive integers
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In this case, WS is specified by the vector








In the k-module , s-shop case the WS is specified by
an analogous vector.
As in the case of the 1MCL , for a given a and M,
,
it is assumed that the availability of aircraft is a non-
decreasing function of M~ . Also, for a given a, M, , M„ , and
R-, , we assume that the availability of aircraft is a non-
decreasing function of R„ . Therefore for a given value of




















R~ = min{M9 ,
Krr iRi
L °2
2MCL can now be solved iteratively over all feasible







This section presents illustrations of some scenarios
that can be modelled by 1MCL, and 2MCL. The scenarios
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considered in this section are the BCD, and the I combat
models, under the total surprise situation. We first pre-
sent two illustrations of the 1MCL model. one uses the I
model for the combat part of the model, and the other uses
the BCD model. Then, we present an illustration of the 2MCL
model that uses the I combat model.
The diffusion models constructed in Chapter IV are
used to approximate the combat process under both the I and
BCD models. The single-module logistics model, and the
two-module logistics model, constructed in Chapter II are
used to represent the logistics system required for WS
.
2 . Model Parameters: 1MCL
The following parameters are used for model
illustrations
:
(i) Threat . The threat considered is B(C; = 12
bombers attacking simultaneously. We have not
taken into account the possible uncertainty in
identifying the threat magnitude.
(ii) MOE. The decision maker is interested in mini-
mizing the probability of more than 3 bombers
penetrating, or reaching their bomb-release line.
(iii) Logistics . Each aircraft fails at a rate of
A = 0.5 aircraft per day.
There are R = 4 repair crews assigned to the
squadron.
- Each failed module is repaired at rate y = 1.0
modules per day, where only one repair crew
can work on a failed module.
There is enough space to store modules when
they are up and not installed on aircraft;
i.e., p is assumed to be °°.
(iv) Combat . Each defender takes an exponential amount
of time, with rate of aD = 3 (bombers per hour)
,
to kill a bomber, where only one defender can
engage a free bomber.
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For the I model the defenders are invulnerable,
For the BCD model, C takes an exponential amount
of time, with rate = O.b to detect and engage
a free bomber. Each bomber, if engaged, takes
an exponential amount of time with rate a = 0.5
(defenders per hour), to kill a defender.
If early warning system E]_ is deployed then the
combat period is t^ = 1.0 hour. If E2 is
deployed then the combat period is X-2 - 0.8 hour.




The squadron has been allocated a budget of
K = $115 million for purchasing the WS
.
Each aircraft costs Cq = $10 million.
Each module costs c = $2 million.
The E]_ costs d^ = $15 million, while E
2
costs
dp = $5 million.
Using the above parameters, the 1MCL becomes:
max f










a - M >_
a 1 2
E. binary i = 1,2
a, M integer.













Then, if E, is deployed then E, = 1 and t = t,
,
otherwise E~ is deployed and t = t~ since E, = 0. For every
2
j, y(12,j,t) and a (12,j,t) are determined using Result
(4.3) for the I model and Result (4.2) for the BCD model;
2
where p ( ) and a ( ) are the mean function and the variance
function of the {B(t); t > 0} process obtained by the diffu-
sion approximations.
3. 1MCL Using I Model
Under the I model assumptions, the diffusion
approximation for B(t) is given by Result (4.3).
For every combination of a and M, P{D( P ) = j} was
computed using equation (2.8).
Figure (5.1) shows a surface plot of the objective
function when E, = 1. The figure indicates that if E-,
is selected as the early warning system to be deployed,
then the optimal WS = [6, 20, 1], i.e., to buy 6 aircraft,
and 20 modules, this yields an objective value of 0.9903;
i.e., a probability of penetration = 1 - 0.9903 = 0.0097.
Figure (5.2) shows a surface plot of the objective
function when E~ = 1, which indicates that the optimal
solution will be to buy 7 aircraft and 20 modules, and










































































































From the above, it is concluded that the optimal
weapon system, WS*, is:
WS* = [6, 20, 1]
i.e., buy 6 aircraft, 20 modules, and deploy E, . WS*
under the single-module logistics and the I-combat assump-
tions results in a probability of penetration of 0.0097.
a. Comparison with Exact Computations
If a = 6 aircraft and M = 2 modules, then we
get the following readiness distribution, using (4.8):
j =01 2 3 4 5 6
P{D(0) = j} = 0.0002 0.0006 0.0017 0.0034 0.0054 0.9887
If we calculate P{B(1) > 3|B(0) = 12,D(0) = j},
j = 0,1,... ,6, using the Markovian combat model, i.e., by
solving the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations (4.58)
numerically, we obtain the following:
P{B(1) <_ 3|
B(0) = 12,D(0) = j = 0.0004 0.1527 0.5444 0.7989 0.9590 0.9892
Therefore
6
I P(B(1) > 3|B(0) = 12,D(0) = j}P{D(0) = j} = 0.9870
j=
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It follows that by solving the Chapman-Kolmogorov
equations numerically for WS* proposed by 1MCL, we obtain






i.e., a relative error of about 20% is obtained. This indi-
cates that the diffusion is overly optimistic . But, the
order of magnitude seems adequate, even though the numbers
are small.
4 . 1MCL Using BCD Model
When the BCD combat model was used with the param-
eters given earlier (i.e., a^ = 3, a D = .5, = .6), 1MCLd a
gave: WS* = [7 15 1]; with an objective value of 0.5288,
i.e., probability of penetration = 0.4712. If early warning
system E~, which has shorter detection range than E-,
,
is procured the corresponding optimal WS = [7 20 0]
,
with an objective value of 0.4686. This shows that, for
the current example, procuring E, results in a better
combat effectiveness than procuring more modules.
Procurement of WS* = [7 15 1] yields a relatively
high probability of penetration when compared with the I model
case. This is due to introducing the combat parameters
a and 0. Table (5.1) shows the probability of penetration
for decreasing values of aR , and increasing values of 0.
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TABLE 5.1
BEHAVIOR OF PROBABILITY OF PENETRATION PROVIDED


















We find the probability of penetration decreases as aR
decreases and 9 increases.
It is evident from Table (5.1) that the MOE improves
as 6 increases and/or a D decreases . In particular the MOE
tends to approach the value provided by the 1MCL using the I
model (i.e., . 01)
.
a. Comparison with Simulation Results
From equation (4.8), we obtain' the following
readiness distribution for a squadron of 7 aircraft that has




P{D(0) = j} = 0.0002 0.0014 0.0056 0.0149 0.0298 0.0478 0.0637 0.8366
Since E, is deployed the combat duration
is 1 hour. Therefore the MOE has to be evaluated at t = 1.
Simulating the Markovian combat process {B (t) ,C ( t ) , D ( t )
;
t 0} for 10,000 replications; where a^ = 0.5 and = 0.6 and
collecting statistics at t = 1, we obtain the following
values for P{B(1) < 3 | B (0) = 12,D(0) = j}, j = 0,1,.. .,7:
j =01234567
P B(l) <_ 3|B(0) = 12,
D(0) = j} = 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.09 0.32 0.59 0.80
The simulation-of-combat calculation gives
7
I
P{B(t) : 3|B(0). = 12,D(0) = j}P{D(0) = j} = .72
j=0
i.e., probability of penetration = .28.
Recall that 1MCL gave a probability of penetra-
tion value of 0.47 which yields a relative error of about
67%. This indicates (as anticipated in Chapter IV) that
the diffusion is very conservative , but is of the correct
order of magnitude. However, the relative error drops as
B(0) + D(0) -> °°. Nevertheless, the use of diffusion provides
insights, and simple interpretation analysis of the problem
without an excessive computational burden. Such insights may
then be used for more detailed investigations if required.
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Analysis such as Table (5.1) suggests that sensi-
tivity analysis can be carried out easily on the combat-
logistics model, by changing logistics and/or combat parameters,
and re-solving the resulting model. The computational bur-
dens of re-solving are not at all excessive, in part because
the calculation of leakage probability is facilitated by
the diffusion approximations.
Note that the leakage obtained under optimal
3logistics assignment appear excessive, unless the C capa-
bility, measured by 6, can be improved, or perhaps the early
warning, and hence combat time, be extended. As an example
of the type of analysis that can be carried out by the use
of the CL model, a training program is analyzed below,
b. Training
Suppose the decision maker would like to inves-
tigate the effect of adopting a certain training program
for the pilots. Suppose that implementation of the new
training program results in improvement of pilots ' combat
and firing skills. Such improvement could be represented
through an increase in the combat parameter a_ . Suppose that
if the new training program is adopted, then the defender
killing rate increases from an = 3.0 to a' = 4.0 bombers per
hour.
Assume that aircraft are required to be operated
at a higher rate (i.e., no simulators) if the program is
adopted. The effect of the training program on the logistics
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system can be represented through the failure rate X. Sup-
pose that the training program causes the failure rate to
increase from A = 0.5 to A 1 = 1.0.
The effect of the new training program on the
overall squadron performance can be evaluated by the use of
CL. The new parameters were considered by the 1MCL model,
which gave the following values: WS* = [7 15 1J with an
objective value of 0.398, i.e., a probability of leakage
of 0.602
.
Comparing the results before and after the
implementation of the training program, we find that even
though the training program results in an improvement in
the skills of the pilots (represented by the higher killing
rate) , it has a considerable effect on the logistics system
which in turn increased the probability of leakage (.4712
before implementation versus .602 after implementation).
5. 2MCL Using I Model
The following parameters are used as an illustration
for the 2MCL model using the I model.
a. Cost
The squadron has been allocated a budget of K = $75
million for purchasing WS
.
Each aircraft costs c„ = $10 million.
Each module of Type 1 costs c, = $2 million.
Each module of Type 2 costs c
?
= $1 million.
E-, costs a-, = $10 million, while E 2 costs a„ = $5
million.
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A repairman for Type 1 has an annual salary of
r^ = $20 thousand, and a repairman for Type 2 is paid
and annual salary of r 2 = $10 thousand.
The squadron has an annual budget for salaries of
Ki = $80 thousand for repairmen.
b. Logistics
Each aircraft fails at a rate of A = 0.5 aircraft
per day.
Condition probability of an aircraft failing due to
Type 1 module is p]_ = 0.4.
Conditional probability of an aircraft failing due to
Type 2 module is P2 = 0.5.
Conditional probability of an aircraft failing due
to both types of modules is pj_2 = 0.1.
An individual failed module of Type 1, or Type 2,
has, respectively, a repair rate pj_ = 0.5, or p2 = 1-0,
modules per day, where only one repairman (or crew)
can work on a failed module at any time.
p, = 2 and p_ = 2.
c. Combat Data
Each defender kills at a rate of a
n
= 3.0 bombers per
hour.
If Ei is deployed then the combat period is tj_ = 1.0
hours, while if E~ is deployed then the combat period
is t„ = 0.8 hours.
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a, M-. , M„ , R, and R„ are positive integers
2MCL(1) is solved iteratively over all possible
WS that satisfy the constraints. For every j, y(12,j,t)
2
and a (12,j,t) are determined using Result (4.3) of Chapter




. For every WS, P{D(0) = j } is
computed by solving the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equation,
using proposition (2.1). Table (5.2) shows the different
WS ' s when E, is deployed and the corresponding objective






ILLUSTRATION OF 2MCL(1) FOR I
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I.e., buy 4 aircraft, 8 modules of Type 1, 8 modules of
Type 2, assign 3 repairmen to Shop 1, and 2 repairmen to
Shop 2, while the last component being 1 indicates the
deployment of E, . Choosing WS, , and assuming the 2 module
logistics system together with the I scenario, results in an
objective value of 0.7706.
Table (5.3) shows the different WS ' s when E
2
is deployed, and the corresponding objective value. We find
that if E„ is deployed, then the optimal WS is:
WS = [488320]
i.e., buy 4 aircraft, 8 modules of Type 1, 8 modules of
Type 2, assign 3 repairmen to Shop 1, and 2 repairmen to
Shop 2, where the last component being indicates the
deployment of E„ . This yields an objective value of 0.4925.
Since WS, results in a higher objective value
than WS~, the optimal solution for 2MCL is:
WS* = [4 8 8 3 2 1] ;
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Solving the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations




P{D(0) = j} = 0.0023 0.0143 0.0435 0.0879 0.8519
Calculate P{B(1) < 3 | B (0) = 12,D(0) = j} for
j = 0,1,. ..,4, using the Markovian combat model, i.e., by
solving the resulting forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equations
(4.59) numerically. This gives
j =01234
P{B(1) > 3|B(0) = 12,
D(0) = j} = 0.0 0.0 0.15 0.54 0.79
Therefore,
4
I P(B(1) > 3|B(0) = 12,D(0) = J}P{D(0) = j} = 0.73
j =
i.e., a leakage probability of 0.27.
Hence, the 2MCL solution is a reasonably good




0.27 - 0.22 I
relative error = J »
—
^-= L = .19
6 . Other Cases: Sensitivity Analysis
Substituting WS* in 2MCL , we obtain




Comparing the above equations for the optimal
point with the set of constraints for 2MCL, we find that:
1. M* and M* are at their upper bounds.
2. The annual budget constraint is binding.
3. The fixed budget constraint is not binding since
75-10a* + 2MJ + M*; + 10E£ + 5E$ = 1, i.e., when
a = 4, increasing Mj_ and M2 for given R^ and R2
results in improvement of the objective value,
but Mj_ and M2 have reached their upper bound before
the fixed budget constraint becomes binding.
a. Case 1
Suppose we increase the upper bound for M-
,
reflected by increasing p_ to 2.5 (i.e., change in the
right-hand-side) . The solution for the new 2MCL is shown
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with an objective value of 0.7808. The budget constraint
is now binding, and M, is at its upper bound while M„ is
not.
b. Case 2
Suppose we are interested in seeing the effect
of changing the repair rate, i.e., change y, to 2 . while
p„ is still 2.5. The solution for the resulting 2MCL is
shown in Table (5.5) . The new optimal point is:
WS* = [489241]
with an objective value of 0.8574. Note that increasing the
repair rate in Shop 1 has resulted in a corresponding
increase in the objective value, and caused the optimal
number of repairmen to be assigned to Shop 1 drops from 3





ILLUSTRATION FOR THE EFFECT OF CHANGING
THE REPAIR RATE AT SHOP 1 OF 2MCL(1)






2 2 5 1 5 1 0.0360
2 2 5 2 4 I 0.0371
2 2 5 3 2 [ o.oe67
2 3 5 1 5 L 0. 1042
2 3 5 2 4 I 0. 1071
2 3 5 3 2 I 0.1 065
2 4 5 1 5 1L 0. 1085
2 4 5 2 4 L 0. 1096
2 4 5 3 2 1 0.1 090
3 3 7 1 6 I 0.3654
3 3 7 2 4 ! [ 0.3795
3 3 7 3 2 1 0.3770
3 4 7 1 6 I 0.4515
3 4 7 2 4 1L C.4770
3 4 7 3 2 1 1 0.4723
3 5 7 1 6 1 L 0.49 16
3 5 7 2 4 ] I • 4948
3 5 7 3 2 1 I 0.4897
3 6 7 1 6 1 L 0.4926
3 6 7 2 4 ] I 0.4981
3 6 7 3 2 3 0.4913
4 4 1 1 6 1 .6493
4 4 10 2 4 ] .6=370
4 4 10 3 2 1 • 6^49
4 5 10 1 6 1 0. 76 1 5
4 5 10 2 4 ] 0.8196
4 5 10 3 2 1 0.6 143
4 6 1 I 6 I 0.8120
4 6 1 2 4 1 . 34 9 1
4 6 1 3 2 ] .8422
4 7 1 1 6 1 • 8360
4 7 10 r> 4 1 0.3565
4 7 1 c 3 2 1 .846"''
4 ^ 9 1 6 1 . 8472
4 3 9 2 4 1 .8574
4 3 9 3 2 1 0.833a
5 5 5 1 5 1 .6691
5 5 5 2 4 1 0. 7083
5 5 c 3 2 1 .6751
303
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. GENERAL REVIEW
The objective of this research has been to construct and
utilize analytical models for certain combat-logistics
situations. Since combat outcome is often crucially
influenced by a combatant's readiness, and readiness depends
strongly upon the adequacy of logistics support, it is
necessary to link an appropriate logistics model with one
for combat to create a combat-logistics (CL) model. Use of
such a combined model allows the effect of the organization
and budgetary constraints of the logistics system upon
combat outcome to be directly assessed and optimized.
The particular situation considered in this dissertation
has been that of a squadron of aircraft designated to defend
a small areas against surprise attack by wave of bombers.
Upon detection of the bombers, ready defenders are vectored
towards them and engage them in combat. Combat outcome is
summarized by a measure of bomber leakage through the combat
zone.
Both logistics and combat are conducted in environments
of substantial random variability and the numbers on both
sides are small. Consequently stochastic models have been
developed for the logistics and combat phases of the
scenario described, and these models have then been linked.
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The linked CL model allows a decision maker to identify
fixed resource (budget-constrained) allocations that
effectively minimize a chosen measure of bomber leakage.
In order to provide a usable analytical tool, i.e., a CL
model that can provide practical, reasonable and useful
numerical outputs with feasible computational resources,
mathematical approximations have been invoked. Particularly
is this so in the combat modelling area, where an essen-
tially transient and multi-state situation must be modelled.
Various approaches have been taken, but most emphasis has
been given to a form of diffusion approximation. The
quality of this approximation improves when opposing forces
become large, but the approximation provides useful accurate
inputs to a logistics system optimization stage •'"hat would
otherwise be computationally prohibitive.
This chapter reviews the models constructed for analyz-
ing peacetime and wartime activities. It highlights the
main results obtained, and it points out areas that require
further research.
B. PEACETIME (NON-COMBAT) ACTIVITIES
1. Single-Module Logistics Model
The peacetime (prior-to-combat) part of the combat-
logistics process was analyzed with logistics models in
Chapters II and III. This was accomplished initially by
representing a weapon system, i.e., a defending aircraft,
subject to failures as a single module. For this single
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module situation, a logistics model was developed to
describe aircraft readiness as a function of the number of
spare parts, number of aircraft, number of repair facilities
and failure and repair rates. The limitation of the model





To overcome the limitation of the single-module
formulation a model was developed for the case in which the
aircraft consists of two modules both of which are required
for the aircraft to be considered mission capable. The
model allows for simultaneous failures of the two modules,
permitting much greater operational realism in representing
the logistics activities of an aircraft squadron.
The model is a bivariate-continuous-time Markov
process. The size of the corresponding infinitesimal
generator is (M^+l) (M 2 +l) , which becomes very large for even
moderate values of M]_ and M2 . In order to solve this
problem, the matrix geometric approach was implemented.
With this approach the infinitesimal generator of the
process was constructed and the limiting distribution and





In order to compute the probability distribution for
the number of aircraft ready to engage in combat, the
306
surprise phenomenon of war was considered. In this study
the element of surprise was classified as total or partial
surprise. Under the total surprise scenario, the defender
has no time to prepare for combat, and hence there is no
opportunity to cause changes to the logistics process.
Under the scenario of partial surprise, the defender is
assumed to have an exponential amount of time to prepare for
combat. The combat preparation phase was modelled by
decreasing the failure rate of an individual aircraft, and
increasing the repair rate of an individual repairman.
Hence, a new logistics process is introduced. This new
process uses the limiting distribution of the old logistics
process as an initial condition. The probability
distribution of the number of aircraft ready to engage in
combat at time of attack is then computed by solving a
linear system of eguations for the Laplace transforms. The
cases studied indicate the degree with which readiness is
improved when there is a warning time (i.e., partial
surprise) . This evaluation can be used to estimate the
effect of an improved intelligence system on aircraft
squadron performance.
4 . Repairman Allocation Model
The problem of assigning repairmen (or crews) as a
function of the state of the system was analyzed in Chapter
III. Optimal assignment was determined by formulating the
operational logistics system as a multivariate
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discrete-state continuous-time Markov decision process. The
optimal policy was then computed by applying dynamic
programming and linear programming methods to the Markov
decision process. In order to use Howard's (1976) solution
algorithms for solving a univariate Markov decision process,
a general one-to-one transformation function for mapping a
multivariate state space on to a univariate state space was
derived. This transformation facilitated solving the
multivariate process as a univariate process using existing
algorithms and theory. The results were then retransformed
to the multivariate case for the final solution.
5. Further Research
The logistics models presented in this thesis assume
modules that are operational and not installed on an air-
craft to be stored at a supply depot in a ready-to-install
status. When an aircraft lands with a failed module,
replacement is carried out instantaneously if there is a
module of the same type in the supply depot. This assump-
tion may be relaxed by introducing a random module replace-
ment time.
The models studied in this research assume that the
repair shop is capable of conducting all types of repair. A
multi-echelon repair system with base and depot repair may
be considered explicitly by introducing a random delay
during which time a module is diagnosed as repairable at the
base with probability 3 , or requires depot repair with
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probability 1-3. See Sherbrooke (1968), Muckstadt (1973),
Hillestad (1982), and Homesby (1985).
Other distributions can be assumed for the warning
time. Gaver (1966) examined a class of densities that is
convenient for representing warning times and presented a
method for obtaining an approximate inverse of the Laplace
transform. This provides some generalization in modelling
surprise and the effect of an improved intelligence system.
This is an area that merits further research. The results
presented in Chapter II show that the element of surprise
plays a major role in providing a link between the logistics
and combat processes through its impact on the initial
conditions of the combat process.
The repairmen allocation model assumes neither cost
nor time involved in assigning/reassigning repairmen to
shops. The assumption of no elapsed time required to
reassign repairmen to shops may be relaxed by introducing a
"state of transition" for repairmen. If a repairman in one
shop is reassigned to another, then the repairman experi-
ences a delay (is said to be in limbo) for an exponential
amount of time. One can also include costs in the repairman
assignment problem. Two straightforward ways to do this
are:
(i) Introduce another objective function. The model
then has two objective functions. One is to maxi-
mize the long run expected number of aircraft ready
to engage. The second is to minimize the long run
expected cost. The model can then be solved as a
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multiple-objective Markov decision process; see
Viswanathan, Aggarwal and Nair (1977).
(ii) Add a new constraint which indicates that the long
run cost must not exceed a certain bound. The
resulting model can then be solved for different
values of the bound. A plot of the objective value
(i.e., the expected number of aircraft operational)
versus the long run expected cost can then be
constructed.
C. WARTIME (COMBAT) ACTIVITIES
Analytical models for representing air-to-air combat
were studied in Chapter IV. The major areas are summarized
below.
1. The Finite-Re-Enqaqement Rate Combat Model (the BCD
Model)
The BCD model assumes that defenders are vulnerable
and spend some time searching for a free enemy bomber. Once
a free bomber is detected, it is then engaged by a free
defender until either one of them is killed. If the bomber
is killed, the defender once again searches for a free
bomber; if a bomber wins, or is never engaged in combat, it
may leak through the combat zone and attack the area
defended.
The combat process under the BCD scenario was
initially modelled deterministically by a system of differ-
ential equations. The deterministic model provides repre-
sentation of the number of free bombers, bombers (hence
defenders) in combat, and free defenders as a function of
time. A simple criteria for defenders/bombers to win was
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obtained in case combat time available is unlimited. An
equation that predicts (approximately) the expected number
of defenders/bombers surviving was presented.
The deterministic model was then generalized by a
diffusion model. The use of diffusion theory allowed us to
represent some combat measures of effectiveness in near
closed form mathematical equations. This, in turn, simpli-
fied the linking of the combat models to the logistics
models.
A trivariate-continuous-time discrete-state Markov
model (in particular a trivariate pure death process) was
developed to represent the BCD combat process. A method for
computing the Laplace transforms of the time-state proba-
bilities was presented. The Markov process was simulated to
check the results of the diffusion model. It was found that
the diffusion results provided good approximations to the
Markov process.
The diffusion results were found to produce an
approximation to the expected number of aircraft alive at
time t that was identical to that provided by the deter-
ministic models. In addition, the diffusion results provide
an approximation for the variance-covariance matrix. Thus,
probability statements can be evaluated by using the normal
approximation
.
The dimension of the system of differential equa-
tions resulting from the diffusion approximations is not a
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function of the initial size of the forces. This allows
military analysts to model economically combat processes for
larger size problems. It also allows military analysts to
derive expressions for approximating probability statements
that represent measure of effectiveness and to compute their
values without expenditure of excessive computer time.
2 . The Infinite Re-Engagement Rate, I Model
The I model assumes that defenders are invulnerable,
and once a bomber is killed a free defender engages a free
bomber, if any, instantaneously. The combat process was
modelled deterministically by a differential equation. The
equation was solved to provide an expression that approxi-
mates the expected number of bombers alive as a function of
time.
The deterministic model was then generalized by
developing a diffusion model. Expressions that represent
the mean and variance of the number of bombers alive at time
t was derived. It was found that the deterministic and the
diffusion models gave the same representation of the mean.
A simple univariate pure death model was developed
to represent the I combat process. It was found that the
diffusion results provided good approximation to the pure
death model. An expression for the expected number of
bombers alive as a function of time was derived.
To allow more refined approximate calculations to be
made for the I model, the large deviations method was
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applied. A large deviations equation was derived to
approximate the probability of at least z bombers alive at
time t for relatively large values of t. It was found that
the large deviations technique resulted in a better
approximation for the measure of effectiveness than did the
diffusion approximations. As yet there is no known way of
applying large deviations to the BCD model. Hence the
diffusion approximation has been used in the logistics
optimization phase of the problem.
3 . Further Research
The application of the large deviations method to
multivariate stochastic combat models appears to be a ripe
area for further research.
Diffusion models were used to generalize the deter-
ministic models for air-to-air combat. It would be useful
to develop similar models to generalize (approximate) the
deterministic (Markovian) models for other types of combat
(e.g., land, sea, ground-to-air, etc.). See Appendix B for
a generalization of Lanchester's linear law; there it is
shown that the diffusion mathematics recovers Lanchester's
linear law and provides in addition a representation for the
variance-covariance matrix of the approximating multivariate
Gaussian process.
D. COMBAT-LOGISTICS MODEL
Chapter V was devoted to linking the analytical
logistics models with the diffusion models of combat to
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produce a combat-logistics model. The combat-logistics
model is a non-linear-integer-mathematical programming
model. That model determines the optimal number of
aircraft, modules, and the type of early warning system to
be procured, given fixed budgetary constraints. In
addition, the optimal number of repairmen to be recruited
(employed) is determined. The solution minimizes the proba-
bility of penetration of enemy bombers subject to budget,
operational, and capacity constraints on the defenders.
1. Further Research
Further work remains to be done. The combat-
logistics model described in this thesis allows a decision
maker to evaluate the outcome of air-to-air combat, and
hence provides the initial distribution of the number of
bombers to be engaged by SAM forces. An analytical model
for the ground-to-air combat, that can be grafted onto the
proposed combat-logistics model, is also needed. A
generalization to the combat-logistics model that allows for
repeated enemy attacks over a short period of time is also
needed.
E. CONCLUSION
The research presented in this thesis represents an
effort to develop analytical models which can be used to
assist decision makers in making some of the complex logis-
tics decisions having an impact on combat effectiveness.
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This work represents the first known effort to integrate the
logistics and combat processes analytically.
Combat-logistics models of the type illustrated here
appear to have much to recommend them. Making decisions
under a peacetime environment that can considerably affect
combat outcomes is a complex task. The use of combat-
logistics models similar to those presented here can assist
the decision maker in answering "what if" questions
interactively without expenditure of excessive computer
time. The models can also be used to assist the planner in
determining the effects of implementing new policies, cuts
(or increases) in the annual maintenance budget, reductions
in the number of modules, increases in the number of
aircraft, improvement of the intelligence system, modifica-
tion of the early warning system, or improvement in the
communication, command and control system.
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APPENDIX A
NUMERICAL STUDIES IN LARGE DEVIATIONS
A. GENERAL
This appendix is designed to analyze the large deviations
technique for evaluating probabilities at large values. The
analysis includes: Deriving the large deviations equation;
comparing it with actual values and with central limit theorem
(CLT) results; and performing error analysis for the entire
range of the independent variable.
The idea of the large deviations technique is to displace
the distribution of the random variable toward the value of
interest, which is situated in the tail of the distribution.
Applying the Normal approximation to the displaced distribu-
tion gives a new, better approximation to the actual proba-
bility (Feller, 1971).
The appendix applies the large deviations technique to
the compound Poisson process and renewal processes.
An approach to reduce the large deviations error is
introduced by shifting the value of interest with a prescribed
interval. This approach is fully illustrated for the com-
pound Poisson process.
B. LARGE DEVIATIONS CONCEPT
Suppose Y, ,Y~,...,Y are independent and identically
distributed random variables with a common distribution
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sum ( I Y )/(a/n) has the "n" fold distribution F . By
k=l K
the CLT, F tends to the standard normal ($)
.
n
For large x, $ (x) is close to unity, which indicates
that for very large values of x, the CLT becomes empty. To
overcome this problem, the large deviations (LD) technique
was suggested by Esscher (1932). Also see Feller (1971); for
a recent application of the technique see Mazundar and Gaver
(1984)
.
We now derive the LD equation for P{X > z}, where X is
either a fixed or a randomized sum of i.i.d. random variables.
Let F (x) be the probability distribution function for X,
x
•\









(du} s > (A-l)
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Let V be the probability distribution associated with
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Let V(0 be the moment generating function of V. Then
CxV(£) = / e^ V{dx}
Substituting (A-2) and (A-l), we obtain:
F (s+£)




If K(^) is the cumulant generating function for V, then,






(s) = K" (0
2Note that y and a are functions of s, i.e., there is a
family of associated distributions for F„ ( * )
.
Let p(s) = z (i.e., center the associated distribution at
the point of interest) , and solve for s. Let s be the value
of s such that y(s) = z. Thus, a unique associated distribu-











mean = y (s) = z ,
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By standard substitution, and after completing the square,
we get:
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s 2 ~ 1 ~ ~ 2
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Hence, the LD equation is










(s) = moment generating function of X
y(s) = mean of V = z
o (s) = variance of v.
The above equation is the LD equation with parameters
"*
~ 2 ~{FY (s) , y (s) , o (s)}. The claim in this appendix is that any
probability value computed for a point that is far in the
tail using equation (A-4) will result in a better approxima-
tion for the actual probability than CLT
.
Numerical studies were conducted to compare the CLT to
the LD approximations. This is done according to:
The length of the interval on the real line over
which better results were achieved.
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The variation in the relative error over the range of
the independent variable.
The behavior of each approximation at both relatively
small and large values.
C. LARGE-DEVIATIONS APPLICATIONS
1 . An Application To Compound Poisson Process
Let (N(t) ; t >_ 0} be a Poisson process with mean At,
and {Y-, i = 1,2,...} be a family of i.i.d. random variables











Suppose we are interested in evaluating P{X(t) > z}
where z lies on the extreme right tail of the distribution.
Let
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Let F , v (s) be the moment generating function of X(t)






x(t) (s) = E[e
SX(t)
] = E[E[e 1=1 | N (t) ]
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= e s > (A-5)
To shift the distribution F(-) to the right, we




F , . {dx}
V{dx} = £-^ s > (A-6)
FX(t) (s)
Let V(£) be the moment generating function for V(*).




V(£) = e * * s > 0, g > (A-7)
The cumulant generating function becomes
K(K) = Xt(({,Y (s + C) " 4)Y (s)) (A-8)
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Differentiating (A-8) with respect to £ , and setting
5 = , we obtain the following expression for the mean of v:
y (s) = At <{>^(s)
Differentiating (A-8) twice with respect to E, , and





Let s = s(z): z = At <j>'(s(z)) f i.e., let s be the
value of s that centers the distribution at the point of
interest. It follows that:




(s) = Atd>£(s) . (A-10)
From (A- 5) , we also obtain:
-At[l-cf> (s)]
F
x(t) (s) = e (A-ll)
Substituting (A-9)-(A-ll) into (A-4 ) , we obtain
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~2
-At [l-4>v (s)+s4> •(£)—<!>"(£)]
P{X(t) >z}-e Y Y z Y
x [1 - $(s/At^(s) )] (A-12)
2 . Example
Suppose {Y., i = 1,2,...} is a family of independent
exponentially distributed random variables with mean y
Recall that N(t) is a Poisson process with mean At.
a. Computing Actual Probability









f is the Gamma distribution with parameter (n,y)
x °° . . , .
,
. n , . n-1

















- AtlAtL_ (1 _ l e-^l^ll) x >
n=l n! j=0 ^ !
b. Computing Probability Using the Central Limit
Theorem
E[X(t)] = E[N(t)]-E[Y] = ^
Var(X(t)) = E[N(t)] -E[Y 2 ] = At (-^ + ~) = ^|
y y y
Hence
p{x(t) > 2} '- 1 - $ ; z " At/y
l/p(/2At)
c. Computing Probability Using Large Deviations
The moment generating function for {Y., i = 1,2,...}
is given by:
Y
(s) = ^ s < v
From (A-9) we get





s = y ± /(Aty)/z
,
But s < y, therefore we obtain




P{X(t) > z} = e Y Y 2 Y
x {1 - $(s/At<J>£(s) ) }
where







Y , ~> 3(y-s)
d. Data
The following data are used to compare CLT and LD
to the actual probabilities of the compound Poisson process:
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{N(t) ; t >_ 0} is a Poisson process with mean At, where
A = 1,2,3, and 4.
{Yj_; i = 1,2,...} is a family of i.i.d. exponential
random variables with rate y = 1, 0.5, 0.33, and 0.25.
The precision used for calculating the actual proba-
bility value is 0.1 xl0"6.
The probabilities were evaluated at "z" values ranging
from 1.0 up to zmax , where the actual probability
of being greater than zmax is less than 0.1 xl0"°.
The error for both CLT and LD is defined as:









Figure (A. 1) shows the intervals of z over which the CLT,
or the LD, gives better approximation. The figure shows 16
cases where z was chosen such that it is greater than the
mean of the compound Poisson process. The figure shows that
the LD technique yields better approximation for larger
intervals than the CLT approximation.
Figure (A. 2) shows the variation of the error with
respect to z values for the first four cases, i.e., A = 1.0,
and y = 1.0, 0.5, 0.33, and 0.25. The four cases show that
errors tend to behave in a similar way. It is evident from
the figure that CLT tends to lose accuracy very rapidly for
values of z that are not very far from the mean value. On
the other hand, it seems that the LD approximation is improv-
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—i Error L.D. < Error C.L.T.
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shows that the worst accuracy the LD gives is at relatively
small values of z; the error is relatively small when com-
pared with the maximum error the CLT generates at relatively
high values of z, which in all of the cases studied was found
to converge to 100% error.
Figure (A. 3) illustrates the actual probabilities versus
CLT and LD approximations (in logarithmic scale) for the
above four cases. The plots show that generally the LD
results in a good approximation , especially for large z values,
and it always overestimates the actual probability (at least
for the cases examined so far). The deviation from the actual
probability tends to decrease as z increases. The figure
indicates that LD error tends to decrease as \\ increases.
To get a better understanding on the behavior of both
approximations, case (4) (i.e., A = 1.0, and y = 0.25) was
studied. Figure (A. 4) illustrates the comparison between
the actual, CLT, and LD probabilities at small z values.
The figure indicates that CLT results in a better approxima-
tion than the LD technique.
Figure (A. 5) illustrates the comparison between the
actual, CLT, and LD at relatively large values of z for case
4. The plot supports the previous conclusion that LD gives a
good approximation for the actual probability at large values
of z
.
1 . An Application to a Renewal Process
Let (N(t), t } be a renewal process. Suppose we
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t. Define X(n) to be the waiting time for the n^^1 renewal.
The event (N(t) < z} is equivalent to the event {X(z) > t}.
Hence, we are interested in evaluating P{X(z) > t}.
Let Y be the time between the n*-n and (n+l) st event,
n
and {Y , n = 1,2,...} is a family of i.i.d. random variables
with distribution F(«). Therefore:
z
P{X(z) > t} = P{ j Y. > t}
i=l X
where t lies in the extreme right tail of the distribution
Let
oo
<J> v (s) = E[e
sY
] = / e
Sy dF{y}
Let













v{dx} = ZMU s > ,
^X(n) (s)
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The moment generating function is given by
V(£) = -£±21 s > 0, ? >
fX(n) (s)
Substituting (A-13) , we obtain
<j>Y (s+£) z
v( 5» (^T¥^> <A- 14 »
The cumulant generating function becomes
K(C) = zUn(<|> (s+£)) - Hn(<[)y Cs)}} (A-15)





y (s) = — , / x s > o
<py (s)












s = s(t)s t =
^^y (A-16
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i.e., s is the value of s that centers the associated dis-
tribution at the point t.
From (A-4), the LD equation for the renewal process
becomes
:
~ ,1~2 2 ,~.
-st+ys a (s)
P{N(t) < z} - (4, v (s))
Z









and s is given by (A-16)
.
The application of the CLT to the renewal process
is given by the following theorem (Ross, 1983):
Theorem :
2Let y and o , assumed finite, represent the mean and
variance of an interarrival time. Then,
N(t) -t/y ) 1 ( Y -x
2/2
—^- < y / -* J ep { ) > —— dx as t ->
'y
a Vt/y ' /27T
where (N(t), t >_ } is a renewal process. I.e., N(t) is
asymptotically normally distributed as t -» °°.
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E. TOWARDS A BETTER APPROXIMATION FOR LARGE DEVIATIONS
Although the LD yields a better approximation to the
actual probability values, a more detailed research work was
done towards improving the approximation. This work is based
on investigating the skewness of the associated distribution
V. The experiments done for the compound Poisson process indi-
cates that the skewness value for the associated distribution
is generally positive, i.e., it is skewed to the right. This
led to carrying out some numerical studies to determine the
effect of shifting the mean of the associated distribution an
amount A.
Equation (A-9) becomes:
z + A = At cj)^(s) (A-18)
Using (A-5) and (A-6), we obtain:
-At[l-<|>'(s)] - ~
P{X(t) > z} = e / e v{dx}







P{X(t) > z} - e Y — / e" e
'2? z At<j)J(s)
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By standard substitution (considering (A-18), we obtain
-At[l-cb (s)] , - -s(At<}>' (s)WAt4>"(s)-^-
P{X(t) >z}-e — S e Y Y ^ dco
/2if -A
At<j>J(s)





P{X(t) >z}-e Y Y 2Y —
-j(aj+sAt4>"(s))










v (s)+s<J>'(s)-^"(s)] A ,
P{X(t) >z}-e Y Y ZY {$( A - s At4)"(s))
AtakJ(s)
The following algorithm was used for computing A*, where
the minimum relative error is achieved:
1. Set A, = 0, k = 1.
2. Set the mean of the associated distribution, y(s) =z +Aj
<;
.
3. Compute P{X(t) > z}, (actual and LD) for the compound
Poisson process. Evaluate the relative error e^, and the









4. If (ek > ek_ 1 ) stop, A*
= A
R _ X
, k > 1,
Else,
A, , = A, + Increment
k = k+1, go to 3.
F. DELTA-TECHNIQUE: RESULTS ANALYSIS
Implementing the proposed technique leads to a better
approximation to the actual probability values. For example,
it was found that for the case of X = 1, and u = 1, the maxi-
mum relative error for z values greater than the mean of the
compound Poisson process is .0006.
The numerical studies done indicate that the large devia-
tion using the delta approach gives better approximation over
the entire range of z-domain, even in the intervals where the
CLT previously gave better approximations, i.e., for relatively
small z values.
The numerical studies also indicate that as A increases,
both the skewness coefficient and the relative error tend to
decrease for a fixed z value. This continues until A*, where
the relative error starts to increase, while the skewness
coefficient continues to decrease. All cases studied indicate
that A* is reached before the skewness coefficient reaches
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the value of zero. This observation leads to the conclusion
that the best associated distribution doesn't necessarily
have to be symmetric.
Figure (A. 6) shows the values of A* for a given value
of z for 16 cases (y = 1, .5, .33, .25; and A= 1, 2, 3, 4).
The figure points out an interesting feature: The value of
A* can be chosen to be a fixed value for each y. These average
A* values are:
If y =1 the average A* = 2.2
If y =2 the average A* = 4.4
If y =3 the average A* = 6.6
If y =4 the average A* = 8.8
Note that average A* = 2.2 (y ) , and it is independent of
A. Applying this criterion for determining A to all of the
16 cases resulted in a maximum relative error of .08 over the
entire range of z. The proposed approach (i.e., A* = 2.2 (y )),
in addition to providing better approximations than the CLT over
the entire domain, gives a simple algorithm to follow. On
the other hand, if a better approximation is required, then
some work has to be invested in constructing a table that



















































LANCHESTER'S LINEAR LAW: A GENERALIZATION
A. GENERAL
This appendix is designed to generalize Lanchester ' s .
linear law (LLL) . Let B(t) and D(t) be the surviving com-
batants at time t in the attacker and defender forces,
respectively. Assume B(0) = B, and D(0) = D.
Let a^ (a_) be the rate at which an individual defender
(attacker) kills an individual attacker (defender)
.
Define the following functions:
b(t), an approximate representation of the number of
attackers alive at time t, given the number of
attackers and defenders entering combat initially.
d(t), an approximate representation of the number of
defenders alive at time t, given the number of
attackers and defenders entering combat initially.
B. DETERMINISTIC MODEL: LLL MODEL
Assume that the attrition rates are proportional to the
number of targets as well as the number of firers. The
combat process can be modelled deterministically (LLL; see




an b(t) d(t)dt D
(B.l)
dd(t)





The first equation of (B.l) represents the rate of change
of b(t) as a function of time. The expression states that
the rate of change of the attackers depends on the number
of attackers and defenders alive at time t. The expected
decrease in b(t) caused by a defender killing an attacker is
represented by the term a b(t)d(t). A similar argument is used
to write the second expression of (B.l).
Before presenting the solution for (B.l), we carry out
a similar analysis as for the BCD scenario presented in Chap-
ter IV. From (B.l), we get:
db(t) dd(t) ,_. 9 ,aB ~dt— - aD -at— (B - 2)
Integrating both sides of (B.2), we obtain:
aB Ib(t)
- b(0)J = aD [d(t) - d(0)]
from the initial conditions, we get
a
R
[b(t) - B(0)] = aD [d(t) - D(0)] Vt (B.3)
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Criteria for Defenders to Win
A rough criterion for defenders to win can now be obtained
by assuming that in order to conclude that defenders won,
we must have b(°°) =0 and d(°°) > 0. Under this assumption,




D(0) - aBB(0) (B.4)






Therefore, the condition for the defenders to win is to





Notice that equation (B.5) is the same as equation '(4.9)
which gives the condition for the defenders to win in air-
to-air combat under the BCD scenario. So the deterministic
model for the LLL model, which is usually used to represent
land combat, and the BCD model resulted in the same condition
for the defenders to win (eventually) . This is due to the
fact that the condition given by equation (4.9) (hence, (B.5))
is independent of the engagement rate 6, and also because of
the fact that the product, b(t)d(t), in (4.1) and (B.l) can
be replaced by any function with the same result.
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B exp [-(olD -OgBJt] D / B
d(t) =
lrT^Dt f°r aD° = ^
These equations permit easy numerical computation of b(t),
and d(t), i.e., the representations for the number of combatants
of both forces at various points in time during the combat
period.
C. DIFFUSION MODEL FOR THE LLL SCENARIO
Following the arguments used in Chapter IV to derive
the diffusion approximation for the BCD scenario, we can
formulate the combat process under the LLL scenario as a
diffusion process.
Define the following:
B(t) to be a stochastic diffusion representation for
the number of attackers alive at time t.
D(t) to be a diffusion representation for the number
of defenders alive at time t.
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N to be the total number of combatants of both forces
available for combat initially (i.e., N = B(0) + D(0))
We can characterize the land combat process approximately
when N + °° (hence, B(0) + D(0) + °°) , by treating {B(t),D(t);
t
_> 0} as a bivariate diffusion process. We can model the
state vector {B(t),D(t); t >_ } by writing it in the form
of Ito stochastic differential equations as follows:
dB(t) = -a B(t)D(t)dt - /a
D
B(t)D(t) dW(t)
dD(t) = -a_B(t)D(t)dt + /a DB(t)D(t) dW(t)
where (W(t); t >_ 0} is a standard Wiener process
Consider the following transformation:
B(t) = Nb.(t) + /N X
1
(t)
D(t) = Nd(t) + /N X
2
(t)
Differentiating (B.8), we obtain
dB(t) = N db(t) + /N dX
1
(t)






where: b(t) and d(t) are deterministic functions of time,
being approximations to the process means {X. (t) ; t > 0},
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i = 1,2, are stochastic elements, all of which need to be
determined
.
Suppose that X, (0) = X
2
(0) = 0. Then we obtain,




Let aD = a DN and a_ = a^N to be constants as N -> °°; i.e.,
assume that a„ and an to be small enough such that aDN and
a N -» constant as N -> °°. This means that on the average a
defender or an attacker takes a relatively long time to
achieve a kill.
Now, substituting (B.8) and (B.9) into (B.7), and isolat-
ing terms of order N and /N, and letting N -> °°, we obtain
the following sets of equations.
1 . Deterministic Equations






with initial conditions given by (B.10).
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Equations (B.ll) are equivalent to equation (B.l),
which shows that the diffusion approximation for the LLL
scenario results in the same approximations for the process
means as the deterministic model.
2 . Stochastic Equations









dX^t) = -{aBd(t)X1 (t) + aBb(t)X2(t) dt + /fiB5(t)d(t) dW(t)
where
Writing the above in a matrix form, we get























Since X(0) = "5, b(0) and d(0) are given by (B.10).
Then by appealing to the central limit theorem, for all t > 0,
{X-i (t) , X„ (t) ; t >_ 0} has a bivariate normal distribution
with mean and covariance matrix Z (t) which satisfies the
following differential equation (Arnold, 1974):














Therefore, we have obtained the following:
RESULT (B.l) :
(B(t) ,D(t) } is approximately bivariate normal
(Gaussian), as N -> oo (hence, B(0) and D(0) > °° simultaneously
and in a fixed proportion)
.
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{B(t),D(t)} z Normal (N(b(t) ,d(t) ) ,NL (t)
)















a ll^ a 12 ^
a 12 (t) a 22 (t)
Equation (B.13) becomes:




































D. LLL MARKOVIAN COMBAT MODEL
Suppose an attacker takes an exponential amount of time
with mean a to kill a defender; and that a defender takes
a
an exponential amount of time with mean a to kill an attacker
Then the combat process can be represented by the bivariate-
continuous-time discrete-state Markov process {B(t),D(t);
t >_ 0} operating on the state space S = {(i,j): < i+j ;
i = , 1 , . . . , B ; j = , 1 , . . . , D } .
The transition probabilities of the process (B(t),D(t);


























(i,j) + fD ti,j)
Let
Pm„ ,^(t) = P{B(t) = i,D(t) = j | B (0) = m,D(0) = n}run f _l j
For simplicity of notation we will suppress the initial
condition, and write:





_> 0} as defined by (B.14) is
a finite state bivariate death process
-





-f <B 'D > PB,D
(t)
P
B,j (t » =




D)Pi,D (t) + fD (i+1,D)Pi+l,D (t) 1 i i l B









< i < B-l













= fB (i ' 1)Pi l (t) 1 l i l B
with initial condition:
P j( 0) =
1 if (i,j) = (B,D)
otherwise
Let P. . (s) be the Laplace transform for P. . (t) . Then
-st
P. . (s) = /
1
' 1 n
We now take the Laplace transforms for (B.15) by follow-
ing the procedure done for the BCD scenario; and using the
initial condition we get:
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" f(B,j) +S [ fB (B 'J+1)PB,j+l (s" ^U"
Pi,D (S > = f(i,D) +s [fD (i+1 - D)Pi+l,D (s)} ilii 6"1
p
i,j (s) " fa3Ti{fB (i '3+1)pi, j+i (s) +fD (i+1 '3 )pi+i,j <s)) (B - 16)
1 < j < B-l
1 < j < D-l
P
0,J
(S) i fD (1 '3 )Pl,j< S) 113 ID
Pi,0
<S)
= l fB (i ' 1)Pi,l (S) ililB
Figure (B.l) shows a graph representation for the Markovian
combat process. Equations (B.16) are in a form that is
suitable for a recursive solution.
PD ~(s) is given in (B.16) . Now we can find P D _ , (s)a f u t> r u— j.
and P , „(s) since they are functions of P ^(s) only. The
r>~ X , JJ 3 , D
/\ /\
PD _ -. (s) and P n -. ~(s) are the only transforms needed to
find P
R D_ 2 ^
s )' PR-1 D-l^' and PB-2 D^' aS 9 iven by (B.16)
Continuing this way, we find, as in the BCD Markovian model,
that by knowing the Laplace transforms of the states in the









Figure B.l. A Graph Representation of the LLL
Combat Process
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depth can be calculated for any value of s. Therefore, an
algorithm similar to the algorithm used to solve (4.49) can
now be constructed to solve (B.16):
1. Construct the graph of the process as follows:
For the nth depth, find the possible states and
calculate its width, i.e., how many states are in
the nth depth. Continue until the width of the
depth is zero.
2. For the n depth, if the width = 0, stop. Else,
pick a state (say (i,j)). Then:
a. Calculate the mean of the corresponding sojourn
time of the state (i.e., (f(i,j))~l).
stb. Examine all states in the (n-1) depth to deter-
mine states that are accessible to state (i,j).
c. Calculate the corresponding transition rates from
the states determined in b . to state (i,j).
d. Calculate the Laplace transform for (i,j). Repeat
for all states in the ntn depth.
The solutions for (B.16), i.e., the Laplace transforms,
can be used to evaluate quantities of interest, such as:
tt (i) = P{i defenders eventually survive combat}
Following the same arguments presented for the BCD model,





E[B(oo)|B(0) = B,D(0) = D] = £ jf
E)
(l / j)P1 . (0) (B.18)
J-
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E. SIMULATION OF LLL MARKOVIAN SCENARIO
Following the same arguments used for simulating the
BCD scenario, we can simulate the LLL Markovian combat
process
.
The Monte-Carlo simulation was constructed based on the
following
:
a. The time spent by the process at state (i,j) is
exponentially distributed with rate f(i,j).
b. The transition probabilities for the embedded










Generate U, and U 9 as in the BCD simulation. A realiza-




X. . = —
-e-t—r^ (B.20)i/: f (1,3)
After spending X. . units of time in state (i,j), thei,3
process will transit to:
f R (i,j(i,j-l) if < U-








(nAt) ; M = 1,2,...,M} be a (the mth )
realization of the process {B(t),D(t)} at time nAt, and
during the m replication of the simulation model.
Defining BB, BS , DD, and DS as in the BCD simulation,
we can calculate the statistics by applying equations
(4.85) and (4.86) .
The following basic data were used as an example for
model illustration.
A threat of B(0) = 12 attackers engaging exactly D(0)
defenders. Each defender and attacker is assumed to take
an exponential amount of time with mean (a ) = (.008)




Suppose we are interested in evaluating P{B(t) > 3|
B(0) = 12,D(0) = j} for j = 1,2,..., 20. FORTRAN programs
were written for:
1. Computing the stochastic mean, variance and proba-
bility distribution for B(t) using the forward
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations.
2. Computing the approximate mean and variance using
the diffusion approximation to compute the required
probability.
3. Simulating the Markov process to compute the stochas-
tic mean, variance, and required probabilities.
For illustration purposes the following values for D(0)
were considered:
D(0) = 3, 5, 10, 12, 16 and 20
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Figure (B.2) shows a plot of the stochastic mean result-
ing from the simulation model and the deterministic mean
resulting from the diffusion model. It is clear from the
plot that there exists a bias between the stochastic mean
and the deterministic mean. The bias -* as D(0) increases.
It is also clear that the deterministic mean underestimates
the stochastic mean.
Figure (B.3) shows a plot for the variance function result-
ing from simulation compared to the variance function result-
ing from diffusion approximation, for the various values of
D(0). We find that the variance of the diffusion tends to
approach that provided by simulation as D(0) increases.
Figures (B.2) and (B.3) show that the diffusion approximation
model results in good approximation as D(0) increases. The
example shows that for a relatively small value of D(0),
e.g., D(0) = 16 and D(0) = 20, the diffusion approximation
started to result in a good approximation.
Since there exists bias in both of the mean and variance
approximations, we therefore expect to have some difference
between the actual probabilities for the Markov process and
the probabilities resulting from applying the normal approxi-
mation. To compare the different values for P{B(t) > 3|
B(0),D(0)} a value of t = 20 minues was selected.
Figure (B.4) shows a comparison of the actual values for
p{B(t) > 3 | B (0) ,D (0) } , as a result of solving the forward
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations numerically, to the normal
approximation values with continuity correction using the
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Figure B.3 Plots of the Variance Approximation Resulting
from Diffusion Versus Variance from Simulation
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diffusion approximation, and the probability resulting from
the simulation model. We find that the simulation output
represents the actual probability obtained by solving the
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. The diffusion tends to give
a better approximation as D(0) -*- °°.
Figure (4.5) shows plots for the various differences
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